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In my introduction I analyse the state of research in my subject. No detailed study of the i
subject has been conducted in recent years, hence there exists no work which takes £
.Î
account of recent conclusions in the examination of Sensibility in its entirety. I, I
therefore, consider it important to trace the origins of a movement in European culture. f
I draw attention to possible influences from pMosophy and psychology which have 
tended to be neglected in favour of too exclusive emphasis on Empfindsamkeit as 
secularised Pietism. The main part of my thesis is devoted to detailed interpretation of ;|
five novels covering a period 1747 to 1776. This study yields various conclusions. In the 
novel as a genre, as in theoretical works on Empfindsamkeit, there is no polarity 
between the Enlightenment and Sensibility. Each of the novelists analysed is concerned 
to proclaim the necessity of achieving a balance between reason and emotion. In the 
novels of GeUert and La Roche this is explicitly stated in the form of moral instruction |
to the reader, while the fate of the heroes of Goethe and Miller perhaps suggests 
indirectly that such an equilibrium might be desirable. In particular the earlier authors I 
study equate moderation in feeling with virtue. Here these novelists advocate only 
feeling in the cause of virtue, wlüle at the same time arguing that those who are capable 
of "true feeling" are by definition virtuous. In the sphere of religion, all novelets show a 
tendency to regard Christianity as a matter of emotion on the one hand and of practical 
ethics on the other. While there was a shift in emphasis from Tugendempfindsamkeit to 
the cultivation of feeling for its own sake, perceptions of the nature of religions and 
virtue remained constant. (295 words)
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF SENSIBILITY
Was aus moderner Sicht konventionell und trivial erscheint, verdient als Kulturbild des 
ausgehenden achtzehnten Jahrhunderts neu bewertet zu werden; ein Beispiel fUr die 
Interaktion von Publikum und Literatur, fUr die vielfaltigen Moglichkeiten der 
Romangattung zu dieser Zeit, fUr die Art und Weise, in der sich Philanthropen und 
Popularphilosophen des Romans bedienen, um Leserschichten zu gewinnen}
The aim of this thesis is not to assess the German novel of Sensibility in accordance 
with any æsthetic criteria. As should become clear in the course of our investigation, 
perceptions of the role of the novelist and of his product in society have changed too 
radically for such an approach to be a very fruitful one. Nor do I intend to analyse the 
works chosen with a view to gaining any very valuable insights into the characters, 
circumstances or indeed creative processes of their respective authors. Rather I would 
agi'ee with the supposition put forward by many recent literary historians that it is in the 
artistic attempts of the less than first-rate that we can find the richest source of 
information on prevailing and developing attitudes and customs. Those novelists who are 
least gifted with originality and creative imagination are perhaps most rewarding as 
informants on contemporary social behaviour and currents of thought, since these might S
be thought to have remained closest to the aspirations and preoccupations of the ordinary 
reading public. Hence this essay is almost exclusively concerned with novels which, #
having enjoyed great popularity at their time of publication, rapidly sank into oblivion 
and have since received attention very largely only m their role as necessary, if very 
flawed, precursors of later more congenial examples of their genre.
f
Of course, such an avowedly sociological approach is not without its dangers. Some 
historians have tended to adopt a straightforwardly Marxist standpoint, treating 
individual novels as neither more nor less than political statements, of however veiled a #
kind, as political statements m the struggle of the middle classes to assert their right to ^
power and influence. While it should not be forgotten that the novel-reading public of 
tlie mid- and later eighteenlh century was substantially bourgeois in composition (see 
below), and that many novels of the time do contain an element of social criticism 
which may well have been welcomed by such an audience, too many historians have 
been over-zealous in imputing to novelists explicitly revolutionary aims, sometimes on 
tlie slenderest evidence.^ It cannot lie within the scope of an essay of this kind either to 
apportion blame when an author fails to deliver a political message, or to base an
interprétation of a work of fiction on negative factors — such as the existence of .
censorship, or possible fears of giving offence to persons in positions o f influence/ %
Quite simply it is my intention to examine in turn five novels of Sensibility, assessing |
each according to purely historical criteria. The questions to be asked are the following:
What was the author’s intention in writing this particular novel? What factors hifluenced w
his choice of subject matter? How do his attitudes to questions of religion and morality ^
influence both his choice and his treatment of themes? What factors influenced the ^
contemporary reading public in its reaction to these novels? Why were precisely these 
factors significant? In providing answers to these questions, I would hope to go some |
way towards constructing a homogeneous picture of the climate of Sensibility in 
Germany.
Recent research has produced some interesting conclusions about the composition of the §
eighteenth-century reading public; although, despite studious consultation of statistics 
from publishers’ fairs and lending libraries'^ , it has not been possible to achieve any real 
degree of consensus about precisely what was read and by whom. In trying to determine 
who the readers of sentimental fiction actually were, we should begin by remembering 
the extent to which illiteracy remained a problem throughout the eighteenth century.
Thus the mass of the population must be discounted here as lacking the basic education 
necessary to derive any benefit or enjoyment from literature. Moreover, despite rapidly 
increasing production and sales, for those outside the economically prosperous classes 
the cost of books remained prohibitive. Absence of leisure is another crucial factor here: 
when all the time which was not devoted to the unremitting struggle to earn a livmg was 
allocated to the equally necessary pursuits of eating and sleeping, there remained little 
opportunity for cultivating the finer emotions through novel-reading. Bearing all these 
points in mind, it is scarcely surprising that by far the largest category of novel-readers A
at this time appear to have been women of the increasingly prosperous and leisured 
middle classes®.
Some mention must also be made of what was read by those sections of the population 4
who were literate and in possession of sufficient financial resources to obtain books. 4
Here we should not underestimate the continuing influence of the Church, which for
much of the century remained largely hostile to the practice of novel-reading, on
grounds of its alleged pernicious effects (see below). Furthermore, there is much to
suggest that the old habit of "intensive" rather than "extensive" reading, i.e. the oft-
repeated perusal of some few trusted favourites, instead of any willingness to try new
authors and genres, continued to prevail*^ . While the records of the annual book fairs at f
Leipzig and Frankfurt show a steady increase in the production of books in the general
category of belles lettres, works of a religious nature continued to dominate the market.
The staple reading-matter of an average middle-class household in the middle years of
the century would have consisted principally of the following: the Bible; prayer books;
catechisms; lives of the saints or of other pious persons; or, otherwise, the very populai*
ahnanacs or Rath- und Hülfsbüchlein, which contained a curious mixture of moral
instruction and advice on household and agricultural matters. Such books met all needs; 4
it was felt that the written word was by its very nature too serious and important to be
expended on mere story-telling. As Albert Waid has pointed out, religion long remained ?i
the strongest motivating force in the lives of most people, and their reading-habits were
formed accordingly:
Religion was... the highest and mightiest of aU social values... The 
orthodox Protestant had his God before him in all his deeds and in all 
his thoughts. Life to him was but a short transition, a short but important i
preparation for life eternal, and nothing was more urgent or more logical 
to him than to put his time on earth to good use by preparing for death 
and the entrance to true existence in the Kingdom of Heaven: anything 
which did not directly help along the path to salvation was rejected out 
of hand as valueless and sinful. Books which might smooth his path for 
him were naturally extremely welcome.^
Such was the point of view from which the contemporary novel was seen and judged by 
tlie mass of readers.
Until quite late in the eighteenth century most æsthetic theories failed to take any
account of the novel as a genre. One of the most influential works on æsthetics of the
age, Johann Georg Svizer's Allgemeine Theorie der schonen Kiinste (1771-1775),
contained no article devoted to the novel, and Sulzer’s definition of the concept of the
"novelesque" (romanhafi) is derogatory in the extreme:
Man nennt eigentlich dasjenige so, was in dem Inhalt, Ton oder 
Ausdruck den Charakter hat, der in den ehemaligen Romanen herrschend 
war, wie das Abentheuerliche, Verstiegene, in Handlungen,
Begebenheiten und in den Empfiadungen. Das Natürliche ist ohngefahr 
gerade das Gegenteil des Romanhaften.^
Critics frequently objected to the novel on the grounds that it was nothing more than a 
purveyor of lies:
Es sind ja keine wahren Geschichten,... sondem erdichtete Dinge, und 
ein zusammengesponnenes Gewebe vergebHcher EinbÜdungen, die umso 
gefahrlicher sind, je wahrscheinlicher die Lügen, oder wenn man ja das 
derbe Wort allhier nicht brauchen soU, die auf ahen Blâttem und Seiten 
angebrachten Erfindungen seien.^
Novelists constantly resorted to a number of ploys in the hope of overcoming prejudice 
against the genre. Few novels of the time openly declared themselves as such. There 
were any number of possible disguises, formulaic titles which aimed to present the novel
as an authentic piece of documentation. Thus novels masquerade as history, as memoirs, ï
4
journeys in letters, confessions, biographies of well-documented historical personages. I
iClearly the authors of such works are doing more than merely adhering to a literary |
convention. Attacks on the novel by its critics, particularly by those of a moralistic bent, i
tended to reject the genre out of hand on grounds of its mendaciousness; to avoid such 
criticism, a work of fiction had to proclaim itself fact, however implausible the events it 
77portrayed. Only thus could general critical and popular approval be won. The 
eighteenth-century novelist was therefore faced with a daunting task. On the one hand, 
his plot must be sufficiently believable to avoid the charge of lying; on the other hand, 
he must present a story unusual enough to be capable of sustaining the reader’s interest.
He must satisfy the conflicting demand for authenticity and for imaginative depth.
10
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nAt this point we would do well to consider the chronological or historical position of the 
novels under discussion in this thesis. There is a gap of ahnost one hundred years 
between Grinimelshausen’s Simplizissimus and GeUert’s Leben der schwedischen Grafin 
von G***, the first novel which I have selected for analysis. Schnabel’s Insel 
Felsenburg, which combines most of the distinguishing features of the classic novel of 
adventure with an attempt to convey a specifically moral message, dates from some 
fifteen years before the publication of GeUert’s novel. A further gap of no less than 
twenty-five years faUs between the appearance of the Schwedische Grafin and Sophie 
von La Roche’s Geschichte des Frduleins von Sternheim and Friedrich Nicolai’s 
Sebaldus Nothanker. It was only after these works had become popular that Goedie 
wrote his Leiden des Jungen Werthers, the novel which was to set new levels of 
expectation, both as regards ethos and æsthetic standards. Thus the German novel of the 
eighteenth century was slow to develop and to gain respect as a serious Uterary genre. €
By the beginning of the century the Baroque novel, much criticised on account of its 
excessive length and consequent tediousness, had largely been replaced by the novel of |
adventure and the so-caUed galant novel; the latter genre dispensed with the element of C
political interest often found in the Baroque novel, placing the action in the purely j
personal sphere of love relationships. Such novels were often criticised on account of |
1their supposed moral ambiguity. Frivolous they often were and sometimes explicitly |
erotic, fuU of amorous adventures, intrigues and coincidences, with stereotyped 4
%characters. This was fiction which could perhaps entertain the reader, but which was t
scarcely capable of instructing or elevating him.^ ®
The dearth of worthy and respected traditions in fiction-writing in Germany had a 
number of effects. On the one hand, it was by no means entirely to the disadvantage of t!
the novel as a genre that it lacked a reputation hallowed by consistent critical acclaim. 4
Unlike both tragedy and comedy, for instance, the novel was not expected to adhere to 
any pre-established rules of good taste and sound construction; there were no universally
acknowledged criteria according to which aU new examples of the genre were inevitably 
judged. Instead, the novel found itself in a position conducive to diversity and 
experimentation. Since there existed no hard-and-fast guidelines for the aspiring novelist, 
he was thus left with the freedom to allow his initiative and creative imagination to 
develop at wdl.
At die same time it is scarcely surprising that German novelists looked to foreign 
models for inspiration. In this context we would do well to consider the forerunners of 
the German novel of Sensibility in other European literatures. Critical consensus has 
long seen the origins of the novel of Sensibility, indeed of the modem novel per se, in 
the output of Samuel Richardson. It is certainly incontestable that Richardson’s three 
novels long enjoyed unrivalled popularity both in England and abroad. The reasons for 
this prodigious success, particularly of Pamela, lie principally in the choice of subject- 
matter. The novel-reading public was familiar with the theme of persecuted innocence 
and the eventual triumph of virtue over vice. Such a theme was attractive on various 
grounds. In the first place it offered gratification of a decidedly prurient impulse. Mr 
B .’s attempts on Pamela’s virginity fall short of the explicitly pomograpliic, but are 
nevertheless depicted in such a manner as to call forth both moral indignation and 
titillation. While enjoying the erotic spectacle the reader might assuage his conscience 
with the assurance that he was suitably shocked and repelled by the conduct of the vile 
seducer. Precisely this combination of sex and morality made Richardson’s first novel 
not merely popular but also acceptable as improving reading matter. In producing a 
novel of this kind Richardson did much to rehabilitate the reputation of the genie.
In botii England and Gennany the Moral Weeklies were instrumental in gaining 
acceptance for this new moral type of novel. While they had not hesitated to condemn 
the galant novel for corrupting the taste of its readers and making them vain, superficial 
and generally unfit to fulfil any useful function in society, as soon as the novels of
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Prévost, Marivaux and especially Richardson began to become known, the Moral 
Weeklies published extracts from these and were quick to point out their potential as 
purveyors of moral instruction.
Pamela was engrossing, quite simply a good read; the choice of the letter form ensmed 
close identification between reader and heroine; the length was ideal, long enough to 
involve the reader totally, sufficiently succinct to avoid boredom. Clearly Pamela was 
also improving fiction, an expansion of the edifying tales made popular by the Moral 
Weeklies, with the welcome addition of an element of sensationalism. Thus the novel 
might legitimately be regarded as fulfilling the twofold function of literature, as defined 
by populai* criticism; Richardson offered both entertamment and instruction, and herein 
lie the roots of his success.
Whether, or to what extent he can also be said to have provided sentiment remains a 
vexed question, despite Dr Johnson’s famous remark^\ despite also the consensus of 
subsequent literary history. Pamela herself, as Fielding was of course foremost in 
recognising^^, is somewhat too resolute, too calculating even, to be entirely convincing 
as the heroine of a specifically sentimental novel. She is singularly lacking in the 
typically sentimental emotions of pity, gratitude and tender receptivity to the feelings of 
others, Pamela feels on one issue, and on one issue alone. All-important to her is her 
"virtue": with die preservation or loss of chastity her entire moral worth stands or falls. 
Pamela is capable of tears only when her chastity is threatened. Moreover, her desire to 
preseiwe her virginity is not based on moral considerations alone. Her chastity is also her 
fortune, an asset to be guarded as a guaiantee of future prosperity. Indeed, one might 
even go as far as to say that a preoccupation with virtue is the only hnk between 
Pamela’s emotional world and that of subsequent heroes and heroines of Sensibility; 
Pamela’s concept of virtue is singularly narrow.
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iThis kind of sensibility is not primarily concerned with virtue, the questions it posed are 
much more searching. Here rather than in Pamela we fmd the emotional climate of 
Werther and Woldemar,
i-
Shice it is scarcely possible to see in Richardson the sole founder of the sentimental I
movement in fiction, we should attempt to look for possible forerunners of the German
novel of Empfindsamkeit in a different tradition. It should not be forgotten that in France
even iu the seventeenth century we find evidence of a cult of Sensibility, both in the 4
theatre and in fiction. Novels such as Madame de Lafayette’s La Princesse de Clèves —
which takes as its theme one very dear to later novelists of SensibiUty, namely the
conflict between feeling and the dictates of vhtue -  retained their popularity throughout
much of the eighteenth century, as did the novels of Mile de Scudéry, the creator of the 3
Carte de tendre^  ^ — what was tlie cult of tendresse, to which even Racine must be seen
||]  as having been hi some degree an adherent^ '^ , other than Sensibility under another
name? Moreover we would surely not be mistaken in seemg a further predecessor of 4
SensibiUty in the Mémoires d’un Homme de Qualité of the Abbé Prévost. As has been
argued most convincingly:
Déjà l ’Homme de qualité est une âme sensible, qui s ’interroge sur son 
destin... Prévost aime prêter à ses héros la violence et la pureté des 
belles passions... H découvre dans le senthnent son domaine propre: 
l ’amour maudit, la vocation du malheur, l ’aptitude à aimer sans bornes et 
sans mesure, les paroxysmes de la soufïrance.^ ®
1Prelhmnary to any consideration of the novel of SensibiUty in Germany must be some 
critical analysis of the contemporary understanding of the phenomenon Empfindsamkeit. 
Contemporary writers were assiduous in their attempts to define and assess this new 
development in the diverse fields of psychology, pedagogy, moral philosophy and the 
arts. Some commentators wished to arrive at an understanding of the movement by 
tracing its intellectual roots. Others were pimcipally concerned to identify different 
forms and degrees of SensibiUty: their aim was to determine when increased emotional
14
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awareness might be regarded as desirable and when it threatened the delicate equilibrium f
of emotional and intellectual faculties (which was considered essential to mental health 
in the individual and to the good of society as a whole).
4One definition of Sensibility which could have enjoyed general acceptance was supplied |
by Samuel Johami Erast Stosch in his article "Empfindsam/Empfindlich" m tlie Kritische
Anmerkungen iiber die gleichbedeutenden Worter der Deutschen Sprache.
Memes Erachtens kann man sich des Wortes Empfindsam sehr wohl 
bedienen, wenn man von eiaem Menschen sagen wiU, daB er geneigt sey, 
bey aUerley Begebenheiten und Umstanden sehr lebhafte und rührende 
Empfindungen zu haben, woran das Herz einen zarthchen Antheil 
nimmt... Selbst geringe Dinge und Kleinigkeiten brmgen bisweilen sehi' 
lebhafte Empfindungen bey ihm hervor. Allés riihret ihn, allés ist 
vermogend, seine Empfindungen in Bewegung zu setzen,^ *^
One school of theorists was keen to stress the links between Sensibility and the virtues
of philanthropy, pity and unselfishness. It was held that the cultivation o f emotion was
desirable in that it led to empathy with the sufferings of others and to the resolve to
alleviate their distress. Such philanthropic action might also be produced by a purely 4
intellectual awareness of need, but it was generally accepted that emotion was a more A
direct and immediate spur to action than rational perception could hope to be. Thus Karl
Daniel Küster writes in his Sittliches Erziehungslexikon:
Der Ausdruck "ein empfindsamer Mensch" hat in der deutschen Sprache 
erne sehr edle Bedeutung gewonnen. Es bezeichnet die vortreffiiche und 
zartUche Beschaffenheit des Verstandes, des Herzens und der Shmen, 
durch welche ein Mensch geschwinde und Starke Einsichten von seinen 
Pflichten bekommt und einen würksamem Trieb fühlet, Gutes zu thun... 
denn Empfindsamkeit und Menschenfieundlichkeit sind gewissermaBen 
Synonymen.^ ^
In other words, the purpose and value of Sensibility lie entiiely in its tendency to spur* f
its exponents on to the performance of their duties towai'ds their fellow men.
Like numerous other commentators Stosch is eager to point out that Sensibility can be 
carried too far, so that its practitioners only succeed m making themselves ridiculous.
Above all, these critics argue, it is essential to ensure that emotion is only produced by a 3
15
sufficient cause, since noble sentiment can be triviaHsed if it is expended on unworthy g
objects. Indeed, it is argued that the whole purpose of feehng is to make people more |
iassiduous in the performance of their social duties. Sensibility should not be permitted to |À
degenerate into a mere fashion or conventional stance. It is not, and should not be, an ?
end in itself. In Die Feyerstunden der Grazien. Ein Lesebuch Johann Georg Heinzmann 
uiges this point:
Erinnem sie sich, meine schone Leserinnen, Ihre feine und zarte i
Empfindungen sind Ihnen nicht bloB zum Schminkén gegeben worden, 
sondem Sie zu edlen und wohlthatigen Handlungen anzuspannen -  das 
Mitieiden zum Beispiel ist dem menschlichen Herzen nicht eingepflanzet 
worden, um bloB ein schones Gesicht mit sanften Thranen zu zieren, 
oder einem holden Auge eine schmachtende Amnuth mitzutheilen. Nein, 
es ist vom Schopfer bestimmt worden, die eifrigsten Bemühungen zur 
Hülfe der Nothleidenden in unserem Busen zu erregen.^ ®
It is my intention to show in the context of this thesis that Sensibility in Gennany was 
by no means a static or a homogeneous phenomenon. In the early stages of the 
movement it might perhaps be appropriate to adopt the designation 
Tugendempfindsamkeit y since the feeling displayed by the practitioners and 
recommended by theorists and novelists is largely concentrated on the experiencing of 
specifically moral feelings, such as benevolence, gratitude, pity and sympathy. At this ^
time sensibility is viewed as a prerequisite to the conduct of a virtuous life in the 
community (see esp. chapters on Gellert, La Roche).
It has become a cliché of literary history that the movements designated "Enlightenment" 
and "Sensibility" are polar opposites. A consideration of contemporary writings on the 
subject seems to disprove this assumption. Indeed, virtually all those who express an 
opinion on the subject are specifically concerned not to reject either Enlightenment or 
Sensibility from the viewpoint of the supposedly opposite movements, but rather are at 
pains to distinguish between "true" and "false" Enlightenment, "true" and "false" 1
Sensibility. A ll authors accept that the desired state is one of harmony between head and 
heart, of equally balanced intellectual and emotional faculties. In fact, the earlier novels
16
of Sensibility (Gellert, La Roche) share certain assumptions and preoccupations we 
would generally associate much more specifically with the Enlightenment. As already 
indicated, for these autibtors Empfindsamkeit is in practice equivalent to 
Tugendempfindsamkeit. They regard the pursuit of virtue as the rightful purpose of all 
human existence and religion as little more than a vehicle for the realisation of the ideal 
of virtue. They have no obvious respect for the Church as an institution -  Nicolai 
indeed quite the contrary -  and do not make pronouncements on matters of dogma.
These authors see it as their mission to preach morality, tolerance, optimism, a belief in 
the perfectibility of mankind, in the eventual triumph of virtue, both in this world and in 
the next. They deliberately present the virtuous life as not only morally commendable, 
but also as easy and pleasant, as the best and surest path to happiness — and this not i
fr om any belief that happiness is to be found in self-sacrifice, but out of a belief in a 
kind of enlightened egotism and out of faith in the beneficence of Providence.
Fui'thennore, there is much to be said for the idea that Enlightenment and Sensibility 
were, in fact, simply two facets of a single phenomenon: if Man’s intellectual faculties <
were in need of emancipation from the rigid strictures of authority -  be it the authority v|
of the Church, the State, or merely of habit and convention — precisely the same was 1
surely true of his emotional capacities.
I
If Sensibility began as a largely moral imperative, it must not be assumed that it long 
remained so. The link between sensibility and virtue, which at first had been considered %
all-important, gradually faded from sight. Thus, it came to be felt that emotion was 
worthy of cultivation for its own sake. Feehng itself was experienced as desirable, 
regardless of any course of action which it might be expected to instigate. The 
exponents of Sensibility began to take pride in thek simple capacity for feeling, be the 
feeling inspired by whatever cause. With the appearance of works such as Werther and |
Siegwart y in which feehng was seen to have emancipated itself from any concept of -j
vhtue, the hero found his whole raison d’être in the experiencing of the maxhnum
17
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We should now turn our attention to the philosophical ideas which might be considered 
to have exerted some influence on the development of the cult of Sensibility. Since 
Descartes and Spinoza there had gradually evolved a more positive evaluation of 
emotion, which previously had been regarded not as a faculty equal in status to reason, 
but as evidence of man’s essentially sinful nature, more precisely as the source of all 
those sins of self-indulgence emanating from egotistical and corrupt human nature. At 
the same time emotion was coming to be seen as a valid means of perception. Thus in
18
degree and intensity of emotion. Only then did the novel of sentiment become a true cult 
phenomenon. Critics began to decry the advent of Romanfieber, the degeneration of 
Empfindsamkeit into Empfindelei, the exaggerated and trivialised parody of itself.
Writers on the subject repeatedly attacked Sensibility as the source of multifarious social 
ills -  mental weakness and instability, neglect of responsibilities, apathy and the |
resulting inability to make any contribution to the good of society. Thus the movement |
1
was denounced in the strongest terms. Joachim Hemrich Campe declared Sensibility to 
be "eine jetzt umgehende Seelenseuche, welche unter alien Krâften unserer gesamten 
koiperlichen und geistigen Natur zu recht sichtbarer Verminderung der Summe unserer 
Lebensfreuden seit einigen Jahren erne furchterliche Verwüstung ausgerichtet hat".^  ^ |
Various possible remedies were suggested, from medical treatment of an unspecified ^
nature to nothing less than the deporting of advanced cases, since nothing less drastic 
could be relied upon to stop the spread of the "disease". The danger was felt to be that |
the sensitive soul would somehow weaken his emotional immune system through over- 
sensitive emotional responses to such an extent that eventually he would be capable of 
being brought to the point of hysteria by tlie most trivial causes. These dangers are 
threateningly characterised as "Krankheit"^®, "Nervenschwache", "Seelenhypochondrie",
"Melancholic" and "Schwermut", perhaps the most sinister being the "Nervenfleber", 
which was thought to have sometimes produced fatal results -  among others, for 
example, in Wackenroder; though this was a somewhat later development.
England Locke took as the idea central to his philosophy the concepts of "emotion" and 
"reflection", while in France Condillac based his psychology on the notion of pleasant 
and unpleasant sensations. In Germany the rationalistic scholasticism of Wolff continued 
to hold away in the universities, but it must also be argued that Empfindsamkeit was #
working among the mass of the educated classes to foster an entirely different concept ^
of the nature of Man.
Recent historians have rightly stressed the influence on the tendency developing into 
Sensibility of the "moral sense theory" expounded by thinkers such as Shaftesbury and 
tlie Cambridge Flatonists. In direct contrast to die egotism preached by Hobbes, these 
thinkers argued that Man was endowed with an innate capacity for distinguishing good 4
from evü, and that his own natural feelings would inevitably lead him to recognise and 
to do what was right. Moreover, this instinctive finer moral sense was believed to form 
the basis of all true religion. According to this philosophy, man is "ein von Natur mit 
benevolence begabtes, geselliges Wesen, das sich den Affekten anvertrauen kann und 
sein moralisches Gefiihl als Richter über Tugend und Laster anerkennt"^\ Shaftesbury 
maintained that this innate moral sense enabled man to distinguish good from evü as 
automatically and infallibly as the ear is capable of distinguishing harmony and 
dishannony. It is clearly possible to detect a number of points of contact between the 
moral-sense theory and some of the ideas underlying Sensibility. Not only is supreme 
importance accorded to the role of spontaneous feeling in the sphere of morality and 
religion; emphasis on the ethical rather than on the dogmatic aspect of religion and the 
preoccupation with social virtues such as benevolence is also typical of the thinking of 
the exponents both of tire Enlightenment and of Sensibility.
The phenomenon of Sensibility lacks both the inner cohesion and the theoretical 
foundations which would easüy allow it to be considered a fully-fledged and 
independent literary movement. Rather it might more aptly be described as a "tendency",
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since most of its exponents share certain preoccupations and are aiming to achieve a 
specific effect on the reader, usually through the use of a number of shared motifs and 
stylistic features. Thus again and again in the novel of sentiment specific emotional 
responses are called forth in the cliaracters -  and, it is intended, also in the sympathetic 
reader -  by exposure to certain immediately recognisable stimuli, such as the moon, 
sunrises and sunsets, ruins, graveyards, uncultivated English-style gardens, wild and 
forbidding landscapes. Easily identifiable metaphors occur repeatedly, to very much the 
same purpose. Thus the heart is seen variously as a stoim-tossed ship, as a musical 
instrument (on which the emotions are the strings) and so on.
Punctuation in the novel of Sensibility shmlarly adheres to certain conventions, 
calculated no doubt to ensure the maxhnum emotional impact. The repeated use of 
exclamation marks, of dots and dashes and of the so-called Unsagbarkeitstopos serve to 
impress upon the reader the narrator’s inability to express within the confines of 
conventional gr ammar the degree of emotion to which his characters are subject; 
furthermore to encourage the reader to participate actively in this overwhelming 
experience of emotion.
It is the hitention of provoking the maxhnum emotional response hr the reader which 
governs the sentimental novelist’s choice of subject-matter, plot construction and 
depiction of character. Hence spring the preponderance of death-bed scenes, these 
sometimes being protracted beyond what might reasonably be considered credible, the 
frequent depiction of pathetic faiewells between friends and their subsequent equally 
emotional reunion. Here also we fmd an adequate explanation of the most favomed 
choice of theme, namely love and friendship: subjects which most easily lend themselves 
to treatment in a sentimental manner, and of wliich the reader may be expected to have 
some personal experience — with which he will therefore be able to identify and which 
will therefore more easily stimulate ia him a specifically emotional response.
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It is no coincidence that many examples of the novel of Sensibility were written in the 
epistolaiy fonn. Here the reader is addressed directly by the characters; a direct appeal is 
made to his emotions, he is asked to bestow his understanding and sympathy on the 
suffering protagonists. This use of this direct mode of address enables the author to 
guide — one would hesitate to say manipulate -  the reader’s reactions and feelings, the 
better to convince him of his own point of view. Very much the same is true of the first- 
person naiiative form. In the latter instance the very fact that the narrator is as it were 
offering a confession to the reader predisposes the reader to be sympathetic and hence 
also receptive to whatever messages the author wishes to transmit. Thus both the first- 
person narrative and the epistolary novel are by their very nature ideally suited to the 
purpose of the novelist of Sensibility, who explicitly seeks to persuade by means of the 
cultivation of certain feelings in the reader.
We can perhaps best understand the effect of the adoption of these two forms of the 
novel if we compare them with a traditional third-person narrative, such as is employed 
by Wieland. Here the narrator, a figure distant from and often critical of the hero or 
heroine, is very much in evidence. This kind of narrator stands between the reader and 
the characters, interpreting the action and commenting on it, sometimes from a highly 
ironical perspective, at other times embarking on long digressions only very loosely 
connected with the plot. Such tactics encourage a detached, intellectual response hi the 
reader; he is invited to judge the characters and their actions rather than to sympathise 
with them. Sophie von La Roche’s novel, by contrast, has the reader place himself hi the 
position of the protagonist, to respond directly and emotionally, rather than intellectually. 
In both cases of course the reader is being manipulated; the author simply employs a 
different means of bringing him round to a certain point of view, of convincing hum of 
the merits of a life based either on the pursuit of virtue or on the gratification of die 
need for emotional stimulation.
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We have so far considered the composition and habits of the eighteenth-century reading |
public, die development of the novel as a genie and its reception by critics and 
historians; the origins of the phenomenon of Sensibility and the salient features of the |
novel of Sensibility in Germany. Of course, all these points will receive a much more %
thorough and wide-ranging treatment in the course of the coming chapters. Before 
concluding this introductory section, however, I would wish to add some comments on 
the legacy of Sensibility, not only in the field of literature, but in society as a whole.
j
The heritage of Sensibility is to be seen in the Romantic movement throughout Europe, 
with its emphasis on the spontaneous, emotional response of the sensitive individual.
Themes which recur repeatedly in the literature of SensibiUty feature strongly in the 
works of the Romantics: Nature, and man’s relationship to it; love and friendship; 
personal suffering — above ad suffeilng brought about by the deliberate cultivation of 
emotion. What is important is that the âme sensible and the romantic hero should feel, 
and feel as deeply and as much as possible; what cause occasions this feehng, whether 
indeed there exists a sufficient cause for it, are very minor considerations. One would 
hesitate to claim, as some critics have done, that only with the invention of the novel of 
Sensibdity — whether this achievement be accredited to Richardson, to Rousseau or to 
Goethe -  did anything like modem subjective consciousness emerge from the mass of 
Man’s previous aUeged state of rigid and unnatural rationalism^ .^ At the same time, I 
hope that it wdl become evident in the course of this thesis that Sensibdity did at least 
constitute something of an increase in awareness of the nature and value of feeling in 
general, and of the gentler emotions, such as pity, gratitude, tender friendship and love 
in particular. #
It remains to make some mention of the possible effect of Sensibdity on eighteenth- 
century society. Here, of course, anytlting which might unreservedly be considered as 
evidence is necessardy slight, but it is certain that at the time when the literary
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movement was at its height, various measures were gradually being implemented which 
did point to an increasing awareness of the need for greater humanity in the treatment of 
the poor and suffering. Indeed, some contemporary historiographers saw in Sensibility 
the source of certain important changes in attitude and even the root of some fairly far- 
reaching social reforms. Thus the system of justice was gradually made less rigid and 
more humane; torture was officially abolished; criticism of the death penalty and of 
prison conditions at least succeeded in securing some degree of improvement in tlie lot 
of ordinary prisoners. Similar improvements were also instigated in the handling of 
prisoners of war and of the war-wounded. Calls were made for the gentler treatment of 
servants and children, with a resulting abatement of the tendency of those in authority 
over them to resort to corporal punishment. In England, France and Germany the rise of 
Sensibility was largely contemporaneous with the founding of ahnshouses, orphanages 
and other charitable histitutions^^. Thus Sensibility was conceived of not purely as an 
æsthetic code or convention, or even as a social fashion. Its effects went beyond the 
areas of literary taste and of conventional behaviour to leave a lasting effect on the 
structure of society as a whole.^ '^
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2. GELLERT: DAS LEBEN DER 
SCHWEDISCHEN GRÀFIN VON G*** 1
27
Î
Die Empfindsamkeit [ist] gar kein pathologischer Zustand. Sie ist vielmehr lange Zeit 
hindurch nur eine Form, eine Anschauungsweise gewesen, in der sich die neuen 
I deale ethischer und asthetischer Art sich geltend machten} k
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%The novel Das Leben der schwedischen Grâfin von G*** by Christian Fürchtegott 
Gellert was first published anonymously in two volumes in 1746 and 1747. At the 
time of publication Gellert was thirty years old, teaching at the University of Leipzig 
and already known as one of the editors of the Bremer Beitrdge or Neue Beitrdge 
zum VergnUgen des Verstandes und Witzes, a periodical which made statements on 
literary matters, taking up a position against the rigid formalism of Gottsched. Gellert 
had also already published some plays, which had gained a certain popularity, as well 
as fables and histories with a moral bent. Thus he had already made something of a 
name for himself; indeed, he had gained a reputation which he did not want to 
endanger by letting it be known that he had published a contribution to the still very 
much despised and suspect genre of the novel.
The novel enjoyed speedy success both in Germany and abroad. In the remaining
years of the eighteenth century there appeared in Germany no less than half a dozen
reprints of the book. In addition, translations were made into the following languages:
English (four), French (three), Dutch (two), Italian and Hungarian. One English
translation was sponsored by Gellert’s much-admired fellow novelist Richardson. The
preface to this translation is laudatory in the extreme, and if it is typical of the
novel’s reception in England, bears witness to Gellert’s great popularity there.
Die Geschichte hat nichts Romanhaftes, AuBergewôhnliches oder 
Unnatürhches, und doch sind Hire Lebensereignisse mitreiBend genug und 
wohlgeeignet, die Aufinerksamkeit des Lesers zu beanspmchen. Der 
Roman ist voll rührender Szenen und interessanter Situationen, voU guter 
Gefühle und beispielhafter Lehren wahrer Moral.^
Furthermore, the Academy of Frederick the Great in Berlin, of which Gellert was a 
valued and popular member, initiated the publication of a French translation, dedicated 
to the Danish ambassador, and containing a preface which cited the same points in 
favour of the novel.
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The thoroughly favourable verdict passed by Gellert’s contemporaries was 
subsequently revised, and the author unceremoniously removed from his pedestal, by 
the new generation of Sturm und Drang writers. His immense popularity had been due 
in no small measure to the fact that the ideas he propounded corresponded closely to 
the spirit of the age. By the 1770s at latest his particular brand of 
Tugendempfindsamkeit was quite simply out of date.  ^ The new generation began to 
judge his literary production according to principally æsthetic criteria — and Gellert’s 
artistic failings were many and obvious. Johann Heinrich Voss dismissed his 
Schwedische Grâfin as "ewig unausstehliches Wassergeschwatz'V adding, to settle the I
matter once and for all: "mein Urteil ist das Urteil des Bundes und Klopstocks". This 
assessment has remained with us. For F.J. Schneider, Gellert’s novel was "ein 
seltsamer literarischer Wechselbalg" — and nothing more. Possibly in the eyes of 
Sturm und Drang critics — if not of their modem counterparts -  the extent of 
Gellert’s popularity was in itself an ominous sign: a work, it might be assumed, 
beloved of so many upright and enlightened citizens, could scarcely be anything other 
than mediocre. Be that as it may, Voss and others hke him clearly saw that Gellert’s 
significance as a writer was not æsthetic but historical. His novel and comedies are of 
interest today in their function as mirrors of mid-eighteenth-century mores, taste and I
thought.
At the outset we must discuss Gellert’s relationship to the Enhghtenment. Gellert’s j
treatment of religious questions is typical in many ways of the Enhghtenment attitude.
The rehgion of this Countess and her friends is based on reason and conscience.
Revelation is obtained from these sources and from Nature. The church as an 
institution has a neghgible part to play in the novel. The sermon given at Steeley’s 
and Amaha’s wedding -  the only one to be mentioned in the novel -  is designated 
not as a Predigt, but as a RedeJ Spiritual guidance from the Bible is apparently 
equaUy unnecessary: a good heart and a sound reason, it is imphed, whl find the right
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path on their own strength. Despite abundant references to divine Providence, the 
characters apparently never turn to prayer in the hope of averting evil. As Israel 
Stamm® has pointed out, the character of Herr R. is particularly illuminating m this 
context. Herr R. is "in his total adequacy the very antithesis of a Christian. So perfect 
a vessel has no need of Grace". Armed with reason and virtue, the characters have no 
need to call upon God in times of trouble. Religion is almost irrelevant in their world.
It is experienced as a worthy institution to which lip-service is regularly paid, but 
which reason and virtue have rendered more or less obsolete. Gellert’s God is a mild, 
good and loving Father, quick to forgive and slow to punish, indulgent of human 
weakness, even of doubt and unbelief.
Gellert is no metaphysician. His works testify amply to a marked distrust, typical of %
the Enlightenment, of metaphysical and abstract reasoning. As a true product of his 
time, he concentrates instead on practical reason, on the problems of day-to-day 
living. In their search for the right way to Hve, his characters are influenced above all 
by experience. It is true only to a limited extent that the Enlightenment may be 
categorised as the "Age of Reason". Its most characteristic adherents -  Hume,
Voltaire, Diderot, Lessing -  were well aware of the limitations of reason, or if not of |
reason as such, then certainly of rationalism. They were moreover on the whole too 
well-trained in scepticism to put such faith in metaphysics. The "other world", it was 
now felt, was best left to the theologians and mystics. The philosophes had more 
immediate and pressing concerns. This focus of interest on the "here and now" 
perhaps did more to further the secularisation of society than any amount of 
materialistic thinking in the style of d’Holbach and La Mettrie was ever able to 
accomplish.
Once the yoke of metaphysical speculation was at last thrown off, the preoccupation 
with the next world at the expense of this one at last overcome, possibilities for
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change and improvement in the immediate environment became obvious. Indeed,
Gellert presents reason and philosophy as opposites. The rational approach to religious 
questions -  or to religious practice, since this is what interests him most -  is 
represented as being directly contrary to the "philosophical" one. "Man glaube ja ?
nicht, daB er [i.e. the Countess’s guardian and educator] eine hohe und tiefsinnige 
Philosophie mit mir durchging. O nein, er brachte mir die Religion auf eine 
vemiinftige Art bei" [p. 192].
I
Gellert’s pragmatic rationalism is accompanied by a large measure of tolerance in 
religious questions. Almost thirty years before the appearance of Lessing’s Nathan der 
Weise, the Schwedische Grâfin pleads that tolerance and good wiU be extended to the 
Jewish community. While adhering to the general dictates of enlightened benevolence,
Gellert shows particular understanding for this repressed and despised minority. The 
Polish Jew who befriends the Count in Siberia, for all that he is an astute man of 
business, demonstrates exemplary generosity, quite without thought of material reward.
Indeed his conduct is such as would put many a Christian to shame. Gellert 
acknowledges that the race as a whole does not always correspond to this pattern of 
perfection, but suggests that the Christian majority may well be responsible for the |
bitterness and hostility common among Jews. Here we find evidence of Gellert’s 
typically Enlightened conviction that human faults are not only understandable, but 
capable of correction, often with a minimum of effort in terms of patience and good 
will.
Gellert’s tolerance extends also to free-thinkers, whereas Hermes (for example) sees 
unbelief as an unmistakable sign of moral depravity. Indeed, the excellent Herr R. has 
more respect for honest atheism than for hypocrisy in any form. "Die Schmeichler 
waren seine ârgsten Feinde und er glaubte, daB diese Leute der Wahrheit und Tugend 
mehr Schaden tâten, als aUe Ketzer und Freigeister" [p.210]. Thus Gellert no longer
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believes virtue to be dependent on religion. In according an autonomous status to |
morality, he has taken a large step in the direction of secularisation. When the
dogmatic element is thus removed from religious belief, the result is a faith in which
subjectivity is of central importance. The effect on the believer is very similar to the
effect of increasing rationalism:
Das Reügiôse hat schlieBhch keinen transzendental-objektiven Bestand %
mehr, sondem ist iiberhaupt nur noch vorhanden in der Einzelseele, in 
der Aktualisierung des Erlebens. Damit aber erhâlt diese Einzelseele eine 
ganz neue, ungemein erhbhte Bedeutung und eine gesteigerte 
Anziehungskraft.''
No mention is made in the novel of the very real dogmatic disagreements between
Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists and Pietists. Gellert’s Countess speaks often, but only
vaguely, of religion. The exact nature of this rehgion is never specified. Provided
tolerance and genuine piety are present she — and Gellert — are willing to approve
every shade of behef. She and her friends clearly believe in God, as a loving Father 3
and rewarder of the virtuous; they believe in the immortality of the soul and in the
inevitable triumph of good over evü — neither more nor less. Theirs is a rationahstic,
even deistic standpoint, one which has much less in common with orthodox
Lutheranism than Gellert may have realised or been willing to admit. Indeed, the
tolerance evinced by the characters seems to border almost on total indifference. Their
real interest is focused on questions of practical morality; religious faith concerns i
them less than does the pursuit of virtue. Eichendorff’s somewhat extreme and
certaMy prejudiced analysis is not, therefore, without an element of tmth; in his
estimation the time is clearly out of joint when:
...selbst ein so nüchtemer and so piinkthch gewissenhafter Mensch wie 
Gellert mitfortghtt und in seiner Unschuld nicht einmal ahnte, daB er mit 
dem groBen Strome fahre... Man sieht also selbst bei dem fi*ommen 
Gellert die See schon innerhch hohl gehen und die Wogen sind nur 
durch das oben aufschwimmende Ô1 der Moral noch beschwichtigt und 
niedergehalten.®
Thus also Kurt May can speak of:
eine unbewuBt unsicher gewordene Orthodoxie, die es zwar nicht 
ausspricht, aber deren mangelnden Folgerichtigkeit man den heimhchen
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Zweifel wohl anmerkt, ob sie wirkUch im Besitz des echten Ringes ist/
Clearly the religion of the Countess and her friends has a strong practical element.
Indeed, much of the value of religion for Gellert lies in its power to inspire virtue. At
times this accentuation of practical virtues comes dangerously close to pure
pragmatism, to the propagation of Christian ideals not for their own sake, but because
a virtuous and God-fearing Hfe will pay good dividends in this world and in the next.
This has something in common with Calvinistic concepts of morality. It entails the
application of Pascal’s wager to earthly as well as to heavenly circumstances. Gellert’s
enlightened characters almost seem to strike a bargain with the Deity — a bargain in
which belief and virtuous conduct constitute the payment exacted for the guarantee of
temporal and eternal prosperity. Religion thus appears advantageous, useful, pleasant; i
virtue makes hfe easier. The principles the Countess learns from her guardian serve
her well in future years:
er... überführte mich von den groBen VorteÜen der Tugend, welche sie 
uns in jedem Alter, in jedem Stande, im Gliicke und Ungliicke, im Tode 
und nach diesem Leben bringt. Er hatte die Geschicklichkeit, mir aUe 
diese Wahrheiten, nicht sowohl in das Gedachtnis, als in den Verstand zu 
prHgen. Und diesen Begriffen, die er mit beibrachte, habe ichs bei reifem 
Jahren zu verdanken gehabt, daB ich die Tugend nie als eine 
beschwerhche Biirde, sondem als die angenehmste Gefâhrtin betrachtet 
habe, die uns die Reise durch die Welt erleichtem hilft [pp. 192-3].
hi GeUert’s novel virtue triumphs over vice because virtue is, at least in the long 
term, the more pleasant and rewarding alternative. GeUert accepts that egoism is one 
of the principal factors motivating human conduct and, pragmatist that he is, wastes #
no time in regretting this state of affairs. Important here is the distinction between 
enlightened and unenhghtened egoism or blind dependence on subjective -  and 
eventually destructive -  passion. Gellert sees enlightened egoism as being, happily, 
entirely compatible with both reason and virtue. Indeed, since Providence has wisely 
ordained that the virtuous path will also be the pleasant one, egoism of the 
enlightened variety may even be regarded as a spur to virtue. Self-interest, self­
gratification, is, therefore the surest guard against temptation. The Countess beheves
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that human relationships are governed by the same principle: "Wo wiirde die 
BestSndigkeit in der Liebe sein, wenn sie nicht durch die Eigenhebe unterhalten 4
wiirde?" [p.246], she asks. The implication is that a sense of duty is insufficient to 
ensure good conduct; self-interest must lend a helping hand. The question as to what 
would happen if the virtuous were to receive no reward is never directly posed -  and 
understandably so. It is Gellert’s aim to promote the cause of virtue. In attempting to 
convert his readers to his own particular brand of Tugendempfindsamkeit, his principal 4
strategy consists in presenting the virtuous life as attractive, angenehm.
Reason and rehgion, rehgion and virtue are for Gehert inseparable. Reason and 
rehgion provide a twofold motivation for virtuous actions, a double source of comfort f
and moral strength. Thus, for instance, the Count’s father can die in peace because he 
has lived "vemünftig und tugendhaft" [p.206]. Ih his efforts to assist the conscience- - |
stricken murderer Dormund, Herr R. "nahm alle seine Vemunft und Rehgion zu Hilfe 
und suchte, diesem Ungliicksehgen damit beizustehen" [p.243]. In short, however, 
great GeUert’s debt to SensibUity may be — and this is a question to which we must A
return -  both rehgion and morahty are for his characters dependent on reason. I 
would, therefore, disagree with Newald’s assessment of the ideal of virtue contained 4
in the novel: "Er sagte sich von dem rationahstischen Moral, welche seinem Wesen 
nicht entsprach, los, stellte sich unter den Banner der christlichen EthUc und folgte der |
Stimme seines Herzens"^”. I would chaUenge this interpretation on two counts. As we 
have seen, GeUert’s ethical system is not without a considerable pragmatic or 
rationahstic element. Nor is his relationship to Christianity as unambiguous as Newald 
here suggests. Our analysis of the novel’s handling of rehgious themes revealed, on 
the contrary, that GeUert’s characters take from Christianity precisely that which 
corresponds to their own ideal of enlightened Tugendempfindsamkeit. The rest -  
which comprises almost the entire corpus of Christian dogma -  they choose to ignore. 
Fundamental to GeUert’s moral code is the conviction that those who know what is
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good will inevitably act accordingly. Since the road to virtue is pleasant and 
eventually rewarding, all that is necessary for the avoidance of evil is the abUity to 
recognise it. Gellert’s is a thoroughly optimistic philosophy, committed to the belief 
that as ignorance is gradually overcome by increasing general enlightenment, vice too 
will disappear. All that would seem to be required is an adequate process of 
education.
The assumption that aU men are good at heart -  an assumption by no means 
incompatible with a realistic appreciation of natural human weaknesses such as egoism
-  inevitably leads to an over-simplification of the issue. Gellert, not very 
convincingly, suggests that man’s innate goodness requires only some slight 
encouragement for universal harmony to ensue. Instead of being confirmed in their 
wicked ways by the assurance that these bring material benefit — as is, of course, the I  
case when the virtuous refuse to retaliate -  the forces of evil, egoism, cruelty are in 
Gellert’s novel almost effortlessly defeated. The novel contains several instances of 
sudden conversion or repentance. Dormund, Wid, even the Swedish Prince 
(responsible though this last is directly or indirectly for all the Countess’s misfortunes)
— each undergoes an instantaneous change for the better. Gellert’s belief in the 
possibility of such conversions is based at least partly on the notion that virtue is 
often the result of a particular emotional state: once this emotion, generally pity or 
gratitude, has been aroused, a return to virtuous conduct wiU be more or less ensured.
The implementation of the Christian exhortation to "turn the other cheek" is thus often 
the prelude to harmonious co-operation, ensuring practical benefit for aU concerned.
Thus, for instance, the sadistic Eskm, who shares Steeley’s imprisonment in Siberia, i|
experiences a sudden and complete change of heart the moment Steeley shows 
spontaneous and selfless generosity. Steeley’s willingness to share his meagre rations 
with a man who has used him thoroughly ill is a gesture capable of changing 
completely his one-time persecutor. Gellert, therefore, sees morality as being by no
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means a matter for the reason alone. Pragmatic though this ethical standpoint 
undoubtedly is, he also lays considerable emphasis on the role of feeling, especially of 
gratitude, m encouraging virtue.
Of Herr R. we are told: "Sein Verlangen war, alle Menschen vemünftig und aUe 
Vemünftigen glückhch zu sehen" [p.210]. It is Gellert’s conviction that reason and 
happiness belong together. He shows obvious sympathy for those who are able and 
wUhng to enjoy the pleasures of this world. Steeley’s father, for example, fuU of the 
joys of life despite his advanced age, is portrayed as a lovable and sensible, if slightly 
comic figure. In good-humour and liveliness he far outdoes his son and younger 
friends, and what is more rejoices in the fact, certain as he is that he has remained a 
good Christian.
Ich bin ein Kaufmann; ich habe meine Pflicht in acht genommen, und 
Gott weiB, daB ich niemand mitwillen um ein Pfennig betrogen habe. Ich 
bin gegen die Notleidenden mitleidig gewesen, und Gott wird es auch 
gegen mich sein. Die Welt ist schon; aber jene wird noch besser sein 
[pp.333-4].
Old Steeley is convinced that even if he were to die dancing he would be assured of 
a good welcome above. The pleasures of this world — Nature, love, even money -  
are for Gellert gifts from God, and must be enjoyed as such. Disdain for these 
pleasures would constitute ingratitude towards the Giver.
Herr R. beheves that happiness is not only compatible with duty — happiness is a 
duty in itself. He maintains "Wir haben aUe eine Pfhcht, uns das Leben so vergnügt 
und anmutig zu machen, als es mogUch ist" [p.222]. Such an attitude is far removed 
from orthodox Lutheranism, and further still from Pietism — a movement with which 
Gellert does at times seem to have something in common. According to Pietist 
teaching, aU actions, of whatever kind, faU into two categories — virtues and vices.
No action, however trivial, can be morally neutral. Hence aU actions which are not
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Central to this new ideal of earthly happiness is the role played by erotic love. The
Countess describes her blissful union with Herr R. in the following terms:
Man denke ja nicht, weil wir die Wissenschaften liebten, daB wir an uns 
nur unsere Seelen gehebt batten. Ich hab’ bei all memen Büchem über 
die metaphysische Geisterliebe nur lachen müssen. Der Kbrper gehbrt so 
gut als die Seele zu unserer Natur... Die sinnliche Liebe, die bloB auf 
den Korper geht, ist eine Beschüftigung Ideiner und unfiuchtbarer Seelen.
Und die geistige, die sich nur mit den Eigenschaften der Seele gattet, ist 
ein Himgespinst hochmütiger Schulweisen, die sich schâmen, daB ihnen 
der Himmel emen Kbrper gegeben hat, den sie doch, wenn es von den 
Reden zur Tat kâme, um zehen Seelen nicht würden fahren lassen 
[p.225].
Gellert’s treatment of love is a subject to which we must return in order to 
distinguish the type of Sensibility he advocates from that propounded in Richardson’s 
novels.
The catalogue of misfortunes which the Countess relates is little short of incredible. 
Bigamy, incest, murder, imprisonment in Siberia -  ah are experienced by this smaU 
circle of friends, and all are endured with varying degrees of resolution and fortitude; 
as indeed they must be endured, since there can be no reprieve from Fate. This fate is 
experienced as a malevolent force, which the characters are powerless to resist. At 
first sight there would seem to be a world of difference between the Christian concept 
of Providence -  according to which the virtuous are not punished, but rewarded and
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performed expressly in the service of God must be sinful — even such apparently |
innocent enjoyments as walking and picking flowers. Ah time which the Pietist does 4
not spend on the performance of tasks essential to everyday existence should therefore |
be spent on prayer or meditation. Gellert, with the Enhghtenment as a whole, rejects |
this view entirely. Herr R.’s views on marriage are particularly interesting here. His 
somewhat unusual argument is that if marriage is an agreeable state, then we are ?
obhged by duty alone to enter into it. For Gellert, happiness is no longer a sin or |
even a luxury, but a whole raison d’être.
1
protected — and this Schickung. The issue may be clarified somewhat if we interpret I
each new catastrophe as simply one more stage in the process of moral purification 
the characters must undergo -  though since Count, Countess, Herr R. and Caroline 
are presented to us as fully-fledged paragons, one might be tempted to ask how they 
can possibly be in need of improvement! Each near-disastrous episode may then be
'I
regarded as an opportunity for the characters to give further, in each case slightly i
varied, proof of their exemplary moral qualities. While each situation, each test is in 
itself a complete episode, a cumulative effect is also achieved; we are left with the 
impression that a moral code which can emerge unscathed from so many trials should 
not easily be disregarded.
Significantly, Gellert’s paragons suffer less at the hands of enemies or villains than 
from a series of blows of Fate. This may be explained at least in part by Gellert’s 
own natural mildness of temperament, and his firm belief in the moral perfectibility of 
the human race. Clearly he is unwilling to portray human beings as other than at least %
potentially virtuous. This unwillingness creates as a by-product a concept of a 
mysterious, even malicious Fate; this is an inevitable consequence of Gellert’s 
reluctance to hold man entirely responsible for the sorry state of the world.
Gelassenheit, or the peace of mind which comes from the knowledge of a trial 
endured, a duty accomplished or a generous act performed, is for Gellert a uniquely 
desirable end. Thanks to his exemplary life, the old Count not only dies a beautiful 
and universally instructive death, but religion and virtue have also preserved his 
tranquhhty throughout the years. Perhaps the greatest praise the Countess can bestow 
upon him is the assurance: "Ich kann sagen, daB ich diesen Greis in drei Jahren fast 
keine Stunde unruhig gesehen habe" [p.205].
Yet the proposition that reason plus virtue equals happiness does not enjoy the
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universal applicability one might expect. While the Carlson-Mariane-Dormund episode
does not, as Robert Spaethling would have us believe, throw Gellert’s entire moral
code into question, the doubt and eventual despair experienced by these characters
does provide food for thought. Spaethling rightly draws attention to the tendency of
the most sorely-tried characters to waver in their Gelassenheif^. Thus Carlson might
be able to reconcile himself to the prospect of an untimely death — a death we may
feel to be a punishment for his incestuous relationship with Mariane — were is not for
his reluctance to leave precisely this Mariane:
Ja, Ja, ich sterbe, ich sterbe getrost. Doch Gott, ich soU Euch nicht 
wiedersehen? Ich soil Euch verlassen, hebste Mariane? Ich soil sterben?
Welche entsetzliche Empfindungen fangen itzt in mir an zu entstehen?
Ach, ich kann nicht mehr schreiben [p.220].
If this episode may perhaps be dismissed as a warning example -  warning, that is,
against the dangers of unbridled passion — it is not only these three very imperfect
characters whose optimism is shaken. Even the heroine herself, Gellert’s ideal of
womanhood, on hearing of her husband’s imminent execution, is capable of the
following: "Alle Trostgriinde der Religion und der Vemunft waren bei meiner
Empfindung ungültig, und sie vermehrten nur meine Wehmut, und ich sah, daB sie
solche nicht besanftigen konnten" [p.213]. The fact that this despair is only temporary
scarcely lessens its impact, suggesting as the episode does that even for one with all
the sound moral principle the Countess has at her command, a state of mind the very
opposite of Gelassenheit is at certain times possible and even natural.
Spaethling argues:
Es ist wichtig zum Veistandnis der Grâfin und des Herm R., daB ihre 
Weisheit und Gelassenheit nur in der Studierstube gliicken, daB sie im 
entscheidenden Augenblick den Kopf verlieren, daB ihre Vemunft 
angesichts einer kritischen Lebenslage versagt, sie hrefuhrt und sie sogar 
in Schuld verstrickt, wenn es um Dinge des Lebens und der Liebe geht.^ ^
There is in fact no evidence that Gellert intends to portray any such weakness in his
characters. All that can be said in favour of Spaethling’s interpretation is that when
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one disaster has been as it were "overcome", it is quickly followed by another -  and 
another. The characters are powerless to end the chain of misfortune, and yet they 
deal with each separate misfortune with exemplary good sense. Their susceptibility to 
the whims of Fate -  and without this we should remember there could be no plot, no 
action -  is certainly not designed to expose Gellert’s ideal of Gelassenheit as a mere 
illusion, as Spaethling suggests. It would perhaps be more correct to see in the 
characters’ vacillation between rebellion and resigned acceptance not, as Spaethling |
does, some sort of metaphysical dialectic, but rather an attempt on Gellert’s part to 
give his novel some semblance of psychological credibility.
In Siberia the Count feels himself "von Gott und Menschen in meinen Gedanken 
verlassen und feindselig im Herzen wider beide" [p.272]. Yet in the very same 
sentence and precisely because of his lack of Gelassenheit he characterises himself as 
"ein schrecklicher Mensch" [p.272]. Interestingly enough, the reader learns of the 
Count’s sufferings and consequent state of near-despair only in retrospect, in the 
context of a letter to the Countess which she receives and imparts to the reader only 
after her husband’s return to safety and happiness is already an accomplished fact. To 
arouse a suspicion in the reader’s mind that the Count’s depressive state, his failure to 
derive adequate comfort from religion, might be entirely justified -  this would be 
directly contrary to Gellert’s didactic intention. Sympathy for the Count’s plight must 
not be allowed to cloud the reader’s judgement. Natural though such sympathy is, it 
can and must be kept in check by the assurance that all was indeed well in the end, 
that virtue did receive its just reward. The result should be to encourage the reader’s 
own faith in divine Providence, since:
Die GewiBheit der Liebe und Weisheit Gottes ist unerschiitterhche
Voraussetzung. Widersprechen kônnte ihnen ein Ereignis oder Zustand
nur zum Schein, fur unseren beschrânkten Verstand."
GeUert’s concept of Gelassenheit has very little in common with the Pietistic ideal of 
the same name. The Pietist strives to negate all personal wishes: he himself must
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jsimply be the instrument of the divine will. As we have seen, for Gellert, individual *
wishes are by no means incompatible with the dictates of duty. Indeed, misfortunes |
have a positive function in the novel -  they serve to further moral purification and
are, in retrospect, a source of edification, of wonder at the mysterious workings of f
beneficent Providence. The characters’ reaction to suffering is entirely positive -  or
should be; not even in their most despairing moments do they approach the Pietistic If
belief in the wretched unworthiness of humanity. Furthermore, the Gelassenheit Gellert
urges is not without a distinct pragmatic element. The willing acceptance of the
inevitable is shown to constitute the only sensible course of action. That submission
to God’s will might be desirable simply because it is God’s will and not because it
secures peace of mind, or makes Hfe generally more pleasant — this more obviously
"religious" attitude is scarcely discernible m Gellert’s novel — Gellert reduces the
specifically religious content of the Gelassenheit ideal to a minimum. In fact, parallels
with rationalistic Stoicism would be more appropriate than with Pietism. "Man sieht,
wenn man den Betrachtungen über die Vorsehung nachhSngt, die Unmoglichkeit, sich
selbst zu helfen deuthcher, als wenn man sich seinen Empfindungen überlâBt" [p.263].
In Siberia the Count and Steeley are forced to realise the limits of their own capacity
for Gelassenheit. Here the reality often falls short of the ideal.
Wir richteten uns bei unseren Klagen mit der Wahrheit auf, daB ein 
gütiger und weiser Gott dieses Schicksal über uns verhângt hatte, daB wir 
unser Elend nicht leichter machen konnten, als wenn wir uns semen 
Schickungen geduldig überlieBen [p.262].
Yet no sooner have the two prisoners successfully convinced themselves of these
helpful truths than they again begin to regret their homeland and to mourn the
separation from family and friends. Thus peace of mind, for Gellert one of the
greatest goods man can obtain, is by no means always sustained, even by the most
exemplary characters.
Nor is the Countess entirely perfect: she is not free, it would appear, from some
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degree of coquetry or feminine vanity. Her references to her own charms are by no 
means infrequent. On a superficial level this preoccupation with her own beauty might 
be explained by the fact that this attracts the attention of the licentious Swedish 
Prince, thereby setting the whole plot in motion. At the same time, it seems likely 
that Gellert’s readers would have been more interested in (hence more willing to 
accept moral guidance fi"om) an aristocratic, beautiful heroine than a low-born ugly 
one. Moreover, this slight flaw in the Countess’s character may be indicative of a 
desire on Gellert’s part to create "mixed" or psychologically plausible characters. The 
Count, for his part, is prone to sudden fits of anger. Steeley is indiscreet and 
quarrelsome. Like the Countess’s vanity, these are perhaps lovable failings. (Steeley, 
Gellert’s attempt at a typically British character, is irascible in the cause of justice.) 
But they are failings nonetheless. An at least partially realistic portrayal of his 
characters’ defects should tend to make the experiences — and the insights — of these 
characters more readily applicable to those problems likely to arise in the reader’s 
own life. Gellert is careful, however, not to develop this psychological realism to the 
point where his heroes might no longer be regarded as providing examples of ideal 
conduct. In the debate as to whether literature should represent men as they really are, 
or as they should be, he opts decisively for the latter alternative. The characters must 
not be so perfect as to make the triumph of virtue seem easy: for Gellert true virtue, 
on the contrary, is always the result of a conscious decision, in some instances also of 
intense inner conflict.
We are by no means to suppose that the Countess experiences no doubts or regrets on 
renouncing one of her husbands in favour of the other. She freely admits that on the 
resumption of marital relations with the Count she does not immediately become 
indifferent to Herr R. She has moments of weakness in which she is sustained only 
by Herr R.’s virtue. Her reaction is therefore more natural than scholars have tended 
to suppose: it is not Gellert’s intention to present his characters, for aU their self-
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control, as in any way unfeeling.
Critics have often found similarities between GeUert’s novel and Pamela, or Virtue 
Rewarded, the only one of Samuel Richardson’s three novels with which GeUert 
would have been acquainted at the time of writing his own. Despite GeUert’s 
undoubted admiration for Richardson -  which did admittedly extend to proclaiming 
him "more immortal" than Homer -  it would be mistaken to assume that his aim was 
simply to write a German Pamela. Indeed, the differences between Richardson’s novel 
and GeUert’s are at least as pronounced as the similarities. Hence Erich Schmidt’s 
criticism: "Wo bleibt Richardson? GeUert ist mit diesem Versuche eines moraUschen 
FamiUenromans klagUch gescheitert" '^  ^ is entirely misplaced. Of particular interest in 
this context is Richardson’s relationship to the phenomenon of SensibiUty. Sensibility 
does not play the dominant role in Pamela’s world view. It is true that she does 
subject her own emotional responses to the most careful scrutiny, and Richardson is 
certainly skiUed in the depiction of female psychology, especiaUy when it is a matter 
of tracing the growth of love; but love is something Richardson treats with a good 
deal of scepticism. Pamela’s self-analysis is conducted entirely in the cause of virtue, 
to which all her feelings are subordinated. It is for her innocence Pamela feels, not 
for her feUow human beings.
In Richardson’s novels virtue is more or less equated with chastity. This puritanical 
morahty in sexual matters is entirely lacking in the Schwedische Grâfin. The morahty 
GeUert advocates has a much broader foundation; it is benevolence, philanthropy, 
above aU unselfishness. Indeed, GeUert’s treatment of sexual questions is indulgent to 
the point of laxity. The relationship between the Count and Caroline, and the reaction 
of the Count’s father to this love affair provide a particularly revealing instance. 
Caroline -  with her never-wavering and abundant Gelassenheit perhaps the most 
virtuous of the virtuous characters -  is presented, despite her status as the Count’s
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former mistress, in the most favourable light. The Count’s promise of marriage as 
soon as circumstances will allow is implicitly recognised as sufficient justification for 
the sacrifice of her virtue. The Countess’s subsequent verdict is: "ein Frauenzimmer, 4ft
das sich unter solchen Umstânden in eine vertrauliche Liebe einlSBt, verdient eher 
Mitleiden als Vorwiirfe" [p.202]. In contrast to the then widespread belief that c’est le 
premier pas qui coûte, that the loss of a girl’s virginity before marriage will 
inevitably lead her down a path of corruption and degradation, in Gellert’s novel it is 
Caroline who, realising that marriage to a bourgeoise like herself will necessarily 
incur for the Count the disfavour of the Court, of her own accord magnanimously 
renounces all claim upon him. The Count’s father is so enlightened as to accept his 
son’s sexual urges as an inescapable fact — while Richardson’s Grandison, by 
contrast, goes "pure" into marriage -  and accordingly sanctions his relations with 
Caroline, "um ihn von den gefâhrhchem Ausschweifungen der Jugend durch ihre 
Gesellschaft abzuhalten" [p.201]. Similar indulgence is later extended to a girl the 
friends discover giving bhth in a field. The Countess writes: "eine gewisse schamhafte 
Miene entschuldigte ihren Fehler im voraus" [p.300], thus supporting the Count’s 
analysis of the case: "Das arme Madchen... wer weiB, welcher BetrCiger sie unter dem 2
Versprechen der Ehe um ihre Unschuld gebracht hat" [p.300].
The persecution of innocence is not for Gellert the all-important theme it is for 
Richardson, Hermes and Sophie von La Roche. The episode of the Swedish Prince, 
however devastating its consequences, in itself dealt with fairly quickly. It is little 
more than a device to start the sequence of events on which the plot depends.
The Prince’s motivation is clear. He is attracted, overwhelmed by the Countess’s 5|
beauty, so profoundly and permanently that many years later, after the deaths of their 
respective partners, he is still eager to offer his hand in marriage. The Count states 
explicitly: "Die erlittene Ungnade [that is, the Prince’s revenge for the Countess’s
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rejection of his advances] ist nichts als ein Beweis, daB ich eine Hebenswiirdige und 
tugendhafte Frau habe" [pp.209-210]. The causal connection is obvious: the subsequent 
misfortunes are a direct result of the Countess’s refusal to compromise her virtue.
This is purely on the level of events; no metaphysical necessity is involved. There is 
no suggestion that virtue must suffer simply because it is virtue, or that vice will 
always threaten virtue, regardless of the greater or lesser degree of personal 
satisfaction to be derived from the eventual conquest. The Prince’s conduct, on the 
contrary, corresponds to the familiar pattern of courtly intrigue - the Count had 
foreseen something of the kind. There is no transcendental connection at work, no 
great battle between the forces of good and evil, such as Hermes favours.
Indeed, Gellert has been accused, particularly by older generations of scholars, of 
gross immorality, especially with reference to the apparently unproblematic ménage à 
quatre — Count, Countess, Herr R., Caroline. One might however take the view 
(surely Gellert’s own view) that the fact that the difficult situation of one woman 
between two men -  Count, Countess, Herr R. -  is resolved at aU bears witness to 
the moral uprightness and, more specificaUy, to the unselfishness of the protagonists, 
rather than to any frivolity or indifference to their fate. GeUert’s exemplary characters 
accept the inevitable and accept it gladly -  as he believes all right-thinking persons 
will, or at least should.
We must assume that GeUert would have expected the solution of a ménage à quatre 
(albeit a thoroughly virtuous one) to be accepted as an unusual -  and experimental -  i
situation. Indicative of the fact that Gellert must have been weU aware of the radical A
nature of the solution proposed is the decision, before the supposed death of the 
Count, to provide for Caroline and her offspring at some distance from the newly 
married couple. The Countess tells us:
Ich hatte ihr gem das VergnUgen gegeben, den Grafen vor Uirer Abreise
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nach Livland noch einmal zu sehen, wenn es der Wohlstand hatte 
erlauben woUen [p.202]
There is at this stage no question of Caroline taking up residence with Count and 
Countess. Later aU such obedience to the dictates of social convention is discarded, 
but from the passage quoted above we can deduce that Gellert would have expected J|
the eventual solution to appear unusual, inappropriate or immoral. Similarly, the 1
Countess and her friends are dismayed at the thought of their mutual and complicated 4
ties being disclosed to an uninitiated, potentially uncomprehending or even hostile 
public. Even the blossoming state of relations between the inner circle and their 
already much-loved friends Steeley and Amalia provides no guarantee of any very 
positive response to such unorthodox and at first sight scandalous revelations. Fearing 4
that Caroline’s brother Andreas may disclose the secret, the Countess and her two 
husbands are filled with apprehension. Herr R. hastily leaves the room "mit 
niedergeschlagenen Augen". And indeed, on Steeley’s becoming acquainted with the 
bare facts surrounding her second marriage, the Countess notes "Er schien wirklich bei 
dieser Nachricht etwas von seiner Hochachtung gegen mich zu verlieren" [p.308-9].
Acts of generosity on a grand scale are almost commonplace in Gellert’s novel. Thus, 
for instance, Caroline offers the small estate which represents the entire livelihood of 
herself and her son to the Countess to accept as her own property. She is delighted 
for the Countess’s sake that the Count has apparently, contrary to aU expectations, 
escaped execution by dying an honourable death from his wounds — her thoughts are 
all for the Countess; she weeps for her sorrow, not for her own loss of a protector, 
friend and former lover. Steeley, having been cruelly tortured by the authorities in 
Moscow, is overjoyed when the Count manages to escape a similar fate. Under 
interrogation by the same court, the Count overcomes his fear of torture and even of 
death; he refuses to obtain his own release by testifying against Steeley. On winning 
the favour of the Siberian governor, the Count’s first request is that Steeley obtain
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some relief. This generous willingness to sacrifice personal well-being for the good of 
others is among the salient features of Gellert’s moral code. His is by no means an 
exclusively bourgeois morality (again compare Richardson and Hermes), having little 
to do with those virtues, such as frugality and sexual restraint, which are generally 
considered to be middle-class. Indeed, this unselfish generosity might perhaps be seen 
as a rather more positive force for good than Richardson’s ideal, the latter being more I
a matter of prohibitions.
The morality of Sensibility is complicated. It is not spontaneous, however much the
sensitive soul may value spontaneity, however necessary he may consider it to be to
genuine feeling. The virtue of the Empfindsame is on the contrary always conscious,
the product of reflection; at times, it would seem, positively contrived. Good deeds,
acts of outstanding generosity and apparent unselfishness are performed not for their
own sake or for the benefit of others, but for the personal gratification of the doer.
Indeed, the Countess reveals that this is not only the verdict of posterity:
Ich furchte, wenn ich meine Tugenden und Schwachheiten noch so 
aufilchtig bestimmte... daB ich doch dem Verdachte der EigenHebe oder 
dem Vorwurfe einer stolzen Demut nicht wiirde entgehen konnen [p. 193].
Thus we are faced with the paradoxical situation that whüe unselfishness is for GeUert
virtue par excellence -  so much, indeed, that his characters vie with one another in
gestures of self-sacrifice -  even his most exemplary figures demonstrate such pride
and self-satisfaction that their virtue seems rather to be adopted for a selfish end, for
the attainment of a sense of personal moral superiority. The "stoke Demut" of which
the Countess no doubt justly accuses herself, is an apt characterisation of the kind of
morality typical of Sensibility -  and of Pietism. The characters’ pronounced tendency
to self-analysis, the careful watch they keep over their own progress towards virtue,
should be proof enough of the Pietistic influence. Like the Pietists, the Countess and
her circle delight in the knowledge that they are the chosen few, die wenigen Edlen, a
Gefühlsaristokratie, set apart fi*om the common-place of mankind. Their contact with
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the world at large is kept to a minimum, outside influences often being resented as an 
intrusion into the private and all-important sphere of personal relations.
The Countess’s circle has become inward-looking. The result is a kind of group 
subjectivity, a reluctance to look anywhere other than to this self-sufficient élite for 
the fixing of moral values. While the adherents of the Enlightenment praised and 
practised sociability — Gellert’s own comedies provide a good example of this 
"worldly" ideal -  large social gatherings now imply superficiality. Just as the Pietists 
already considered themselves to be citizens of the next world, temporary and 
unwilling guests in this one, it is the ultimate aim of this group of âmes sensibles to 
create an "alternative" society, a world of their own, almost as difficult of access as 
the Pietists’ heavenly home; as exclusive as the traditional aristocratic and court 
milieux. Pride in birth, wealth or social status has been replaced by pride in 
conscious, cultivated feeling, by the agreeable conviction that one’s propensity to 
Tugendempfindsamkeit is something extraordinarily admirable.
The best possible ending to each day consists in meditation on the virtuous acts that 
one has performed in the course of it. No mention is made in this context of any 
hope of reward in the form of material benefit or of approval from society. The self- 
satisfaction which would seem to be the inevitable accompaniment to all good actions 
in Gellert’s novel might perhaps be attributed to a new sense of community between 
those who give and those who receive assistance. Each generous act, providing as it 
does an example to be followed, is accompanied by the pleasurable prospect of 
winning new recruits for the ideal way of life. This in turn gives rise to a sense of 
identity, both individual and collective, to a sense of belonging and a sense of 
purpose — all the more necessary, since it would appear that Gellert’s characters are 
no longer able to derive from religion alone the conviction that they are in possession 
of "the truth".
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The conscious enjoyment of one’s own exemplary conduct cannot easily be
distinguished from self-satisfied hypocrisy. In this context an assurance from Amalia,
after help rendered to the Count, is of particular interest:
Mein Gemahl weiB es nicht, daB ich mich Hires Unglücks angenommen 
habe, und er soU es auch nicht wissen, auch nicht die Welt. Ich bin 
zufrieden, daB Sie es wissen. Und vielleicht ware mein Dienst viel 
groBmüthiger, wenn ich Hinen solchen nicht selbst bekanntgemacht hâtte 
[p.291]. 5:
Thus Amalia, in conduct and sensibility as exemplary as the Countess and her
immediate circle, acknowledges that she has been guilty of at least some small
weakness or vanity in owning herself to be the Count’s benefactress. Significantly, she
shows no interest in earning the approbation of the world at large. Her husband,
moreover, is so thoroughly lacking in sensibility that he has no right to knowledge of
her inner Hfe; his character necessarily excludes him from the community of noble
souls for whom each emotion constitutes a new and vital experience. The Count,
however, does belong to this élite, as was immediately evident to Amalia. Hence it
was entirely natural that she should help him — and equally natural that she should 4
admit to having done so. The "return" which Amalia may confidently expect consists
in the shared edification — one is tempted to say intoxication — to be derived from
the awareness of her generosity and the shared enjoyment of the Count’s gratitude.
In her letter to the Count, Amalia makes it clear that she finds particular pleasure in 
the knowledge that the help she has rendered in securing the Count’s release will 
secure for her the love of the Countess. As is typical of Sensibility, Amalia expects 
friendship to be established between the two women, although they have never met.
Direct, personal communication is hardly necessary when unique individual qualities 
are less essential to a relationship than is conformity to the familiar pattern of selfless 
generosity and cultivated sensibility. The fact that Goethe was able to conduct an 
intimate correspondence with Auguste von Stolberg without having met the lady
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provides a useful parallel here. Significant in this context is also the contemporary 
habit of reading aloud letters addressed to one person for the benefit of entire 
assemblies. Letter and hearsay, the description of a noble character or single generous 
action is often sufficient to establish a basis for affection or love (as for example in 
Jacobi’s Woldemar) — a phenomenon of which Lenz’s Der Waldbruder supplies a 
final and grotesque example.
The âmes sensibles, then, delight not only in feeling as such, but also in the
awareness of their emotions:
Allen pessimistischen Anschauungen von der menschlichen Natur zum 
Trotz, wie sie die Theologen predigten, fiihlt sich der empfindsame 
Mensch innerlich ungeheuer aufgewertet, erhâlt im Gefiihl, in seinem 
Herzen, einen Garanten, daB er von Natur aus gut sei.^ ^
The ability to experience emotion is considered to be positive in itself. Whether the
feelings in question are themselves pleasant or unpleasant is largely irrelevant. The
sensitive individual is ever eager to expand and develop his capacity for emotion. The
loss of his ability to feel would be equivalent to the loss of his personal identity; it
would almost inevitably entail the loss of the much-prized gentler virtues — pity,
gratitude, unselfishness, benevolence. Hence the emotion cultivated is never allowed to
become overpowering.
Our analysis of Gellert’s moral viewpoint has already involved us in a consideration 
of his relationship to Empfindsamkeit; this relationship must now be examined in 
some detail. Important here is Gellert’s treatment of personal relations: love, 
friendship, marriage, parent-chüd relationships. The eighteenth century as a whole, it 
has often been pointed out, had more time for friendship than for love. Christian 
teaching, both orthodox-Lutheran and Pietistic, with its distrust of sexuality, was 
clearly influential here. Love was widely held to be a selfish passion, morally inferior 
to "pure" or unselfish friendship. As a result, that kind of love which corresponded
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most closely to the ideal of sentimental friendship tended to meet with most approval.
The erotic element, if it could not be eliminated, was certainly valued much less 
highly than it was by the Sturm und Drang generation. Since friendship was |
considered to be the nobler sentiment, and since friendship was distinguished by the 
absence of the "inferior" erotic element, the transition from the latter to the former 
can scarcely be regarded as the supreme feat of human sacrifice critics have often %
imagined. When the Count returns home to reclaim his wife, having been presumed 
dead for some ten years, Herr R. is able to assure him: "Hier... übergebe ich Ihnen 
meine Gemahlin und verwandle meine Liebe von diesem Augenblick an in 
Ehrerbietung" [p.253]. We have every reason to suppose that he is capable of doing %
just this. Walther Gebhardt sums up the situation most aptly with the sardonic 
comment "In der Verdrângung hat der Mensch des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts ja einige 
Übung."*® Instead of concentrating all or most of his emotional energies on a single 
beloved object, the sensitive soul of the eighteenth century tended to divide his 
feelings out among a larger or smaller circle of friends. The term "friend" was much 
used, abused and inevitably triviaKsed. Platonic relationships, or those generally 
accepted as such, were frequent. Nothing could be more innocent than the love of 
Miller’s Siegwart for his Mariane. Werther feels that Lotte is "ein Engel", "heüig". At #
the same time friendships between members of the same sex are described or 
conducted in terms we would nowadays consider more appropriate to the sphere of 
erotic love: "Ein jedes Wort von uns [Count, Countess, Herr R., Caroline, Steeley, 4
Amalia] war eine Liebkosung und anstatt zu essen, sahen wir einander zu" [p.309].
There is no very great difference in outlook, mode of experience, perception or 
feeling between Gellert’s male and female characters. The qualities which subsequent 
generations have tended to regard as specifically or principally feminine -  sensibility 
to pity and to tears, a tendency to spontaneous emotion and to sudden changes of 
mood, reliance on intuition -  these typical features of Sensibility are here common to
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both sexes. Indeed, Werther, Siegwart and Woldemar are much less able to preserve 
an emotional equilibrium, much less pragmatic than are Lotte, Therese and Henriette.
The more similar the two sexes are thought to be in their emotional make-up, the 
more the specifically non-sexual element in their relationship, i.e. aU that which they f
have in common, will be accentuated. And as that which they have in common is 
here sensibility, this forms the basis of Platonic love and of the cult of pure 
friendship between man and woman.
The friendship between the Count and Steeley is very much in the sentimental mould.
The grand, generous gestures, so central to Gellert’s concept of morality, are as we
have seen very much in evidence here. Tears and embraces are frequent; the strength
of feeling at moments of farewell or reunion can even be such as to make articulate
speech impossible:
Nunmehr durfte ich an der Hand meines Steeley, der noch wie in einem 
Traume war, und nichts als etliche abgebrochene Worte zu mir 
gesprochen hatte, nach meinem Behaltnisse eilen. Unsere erste 
BeschSftigung, als wir alleine waren, bestand darin, daB wir einander eine 
lange Zeit ansahen, ohne ein Wort zu sagen [p.284].
In Gellert’s novel sentimental friendships are established much less on a one-to-one
basis than in the context of a select circle, of an albeit limited community. New
arrivals, provided of course that they measure up to the required standards of
sensibility, are always welcome. The concept of friendship as a unique relationship
between two unique individuals — such as we find in Jacobi’s Woldemar -  is entirely
absent. As indicated above, what is important for Gellert’s characters is precisely this
sense of community, this sense of belonging to a closed group or society within
society, with shared interests and ideals. These interests and ideals are distinct from
and may even be contrary to those prevalent in the outside world. Gellert’s characters
have "opted out". They five according to their own philosophy, showing little interest
in whatever may fie beyond the horizon they have deliberately set for themselves.
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Outsiders may be objects of pity or of charity -  they are tolerated, but not without 
condescension. The gulf which separates natural rationalists such as Andreas from 
their more emotional contemporaries is accepted as an inevitable, unalterable fact.
Caroline’s somewhat rough-and-ready brother has no time for sentimental outpourings 
or extravagant demonstrations of feeling. He finds the cult of sensibility practised by 
his circle rather improper, scarcely compatible with feminine dignity. It is certainly 
not capable of engaging his own interest for any length of time. The portrayal of 
Andreas may perhaps be seen as an attempt on GeUert’s part to deal with, or at least 
to take account of, possible objections to his sentimental ideology — such as he might 
expect firom the ranks of the older, more exclusively rationalistic generation. For this 
generation, tears can betoken only sadness; and sadness, as an unpleasant emotion, 
should be avoided or at least restrained in favour of cheerful sociability. The Wollust |
der Trânen, the pleasure which may be derived from pain, simply because that pain 
offers proof of the individual’s capacity for feeling -  all this is incomprehensible to 
Andreas and those like him. The Countess carefully distances herself from such 
emotional Philistines. Andreas, for all his merits, is never included in the élite "we" 
which encompasses her other friends. Nor does any member of the circle attempt to 
convert Andreas to their way of thinking — or more precisely, of feeling. Emotion, 4
GeUert implies, cannot be taught.
Possible reasons for this emotional and ideological isolationism are not immediately 4
■iobvious. An unacknowledged need for security or reassurance may have some role to @
play. I have already suggested that the sentimental community, in fiction as in reality, f
had much in common with religious sects such as Pietism. Precisely this need to 
share all emotions is typical of Pietistic circles, whose members regarded faith as 
anything but a matter for isolated individuals. On the contrary, the group of feUow- 
believers must always be at hand to provide encouragement, comfort, reassurance and, 
if need be, a timely word of admonition to potential back-sliders. I would argue that
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the circle of friends Gellert’s Countess gathers around her performs a similar function. 
The catalogue of catastrophes courageously endured by the protagonists of this short 
work should provide sufficient proof that living up to the ideal of enlightened 
Tugendempfindsamkeit was no easy matter. Yet, come what may, there is always a 
trusted friend of confidant -  or more frequently a number of such friends -  at hand 
with a ready supply of spiritual sustenance. However great the disasters may be (and 
some of them are truly breath-taking) they need never be endured alone. Friends are 
comforters, sustainers, living exemplifications of all that is right and proper. Each is, 
in word and deed, confirmation of the values upheld, against no small odds, by the 
community as a whole.
As mentioned above, GeUert has been much criticised for his "shaUow" or even
"immoral" treatment of love relationships. Thus Hettner does not shrink from the
adjectives "greU", "beleidigend", "empdrend"^ ;^ and Briiggemann notes:
Wie konnte GeUert, der von aUen gepriesene Sittenlehrer, sogar kein Arg 
darin finden, daB eine wackere, feinempfindende, ffomme Frau von Mann 
zu Mann gewürfelt wird, ohne daB ihr sittliches Gefühl Einspruch erhebt 
Oder sich im mindesten verletzt zeigt?^ ®
That there is a marked difference between GeUert’s handling of love and that with
which we are familiar from the poetry of Klopstock or from Goethe’s Werther -  so
much is clear. For GeUert romantic love is by no means the pinnacle of existence, the
one essential aspect of human Ufe, to which all other considerations must be
subordinated. Those characters who experience love in this way and to this degree —
Carlson, Mariane, Dormund — come to a dire and, we are led to beUeve, inevitable
end.
Briiggemann regrets bitterly that "heiBblutige Leidenschaft" was a phenomenon as yet 
unknown to GeUert and his contemporaries. That GeUert was unaware of the existence 
of oveipowering emotions is disproved by the inclusion of the Carlson-Mariane-
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Dormund episode. Far from failing to recognise the presence of such emotions it is
here Gellert’s intention to depict and warn against their necessarily destructive effects.
He clearly does not intend that the reader should withhold all sympathy from the
miserable plight of these characters. They are not vicious, simply weak — too weak to
be able to deal adequately with their own emotions. Given character and
circumstances it is easy to see why they act as they do; to understand them, forgive
them, if not to approve. Their history demonstrates that
the human faculties are not themselves bad, but when not controlled and 
sublimated... they can be misused as the vehicles of selfishness, 
destructiveness and sin, and lead to unhappiness.^^
GeUert is well aware of such tendencies in the human psyche, but would wish to see
their role kept to a minimum. Carlson and Mariane are therefore "nicht Vertreter einer
neuen Haltung, sondem sie konnen sich in einer Art ethischer Unreife noch nicht zu
der neuen Haltung der Grafin und Caroline etwa durchdringen".^ Scholars such as
Hettner and Briiggemann miss above aU perhaps the element of inevitability "ein
deterministisches VerfaUensein"^  ^ in GeUert’s treatment of love. But it does not
necessarUy follow that if the growth of love is dependent on respect or on an
appreciation of the moral excellence of the beloved object that any moraUy exceUent
object will be equaUy beloved. The description of the Countess’s awakening feelings
for her first husband should alone serve to refute the argument that moral uprightness
would of itself be capable of engaging her affections. As we have seen, the physical
element of love is not neglected in GeUert’s novel -  the Countess is prompted to
think of a second marriage by her memories of "die SiiBigkeit der liebe" [p.221]. She
tries to convince herself that she is instead only anxious to escape unwelcome suitors:
Du wUlst, dachte ich, um diese Herren los zu werden, dich selbst zu 
einer Wahl entschUeUen. Diese Ursache zu einer Ehe ist etwas weit 
hergeholt. Indessen war es gewiB, daB ich sie bei mir selber vorwand, 
weU es mein Herz haben woUte [p.221].




present and love still lacking, as Herr R. argues:
Ich habe gewiB recht, daB er [one of the Countess’s admirers] ein 
Hebenswiirdiger Mann ist, allein diesem Urteile diirfen Sie darum nicht 
trauen. Ich betrachte den Mann zwar nach einerlei Begriffen mit Ihnen, 
allein nicht nach einerlei Empfindungen. Ich liebe ihn als einen Freund, 
und als ein Freund kann er Dinen angenehm und liebenswert vorkommen, 
aber darum noch nicht als ein Ehemann [p.221].
Moreover, if Gellert’s treatment of love appears superficial, we would do well to f
compare it with what would seem to have been the contemporary reality. In Gellert’s
time not only the aristocracy would appear to have contracted marriages for reasons
of state — among the bourgeoisie too it was considered infinitely more commendable
to marry for money than for anything as transient and undependable as love. GeUert
portrays marriage as a true partnership, as a community of interest in more than
merely the financial sense. For Herr R. "Eine recht zufriedene Ehe bleibt nach aUen %
Anspriichen der Vemunft die groBte GliickseUgkeit des gesellschaftlichen Lebens
[p.222]. None of the female characters in the work correspond to the ideal of the
courtly romances of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in which the
grande dame fulfils an almost exclusively ornamental function, seeking only to please
the masculine world by beauty, charm and wit. By contrast, GeUert’s Countess,
Caroline and Amalia are presented as complete human beings with wide-ranging |
interests, duties and responsibilities. SimUarly, whereas children were previously
expected to submit with unquestioning obedience to parental authority, with the |
growth of Empfindsamkeit the role of the ties of affection increased in this sphere
also. This new concept of the parent-child relationship is reflected in the enUghtened
views of the old Count: "Mein Sohn durfte in mir nicht sowohl seinen Vater, als
seinen Freund lieben und verehren" [p.201]. Thus the individual’s freedom of action is
theoretically unlimited. It is the duty of natural guardians such as parents and
educators to maintain order, to further the cause of reason and virtue, to convince 4
those under their protection that the moraUy correct alternative is also the more
rational and in the long mn the more pleasant.
1
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ITears flow plentifully in Gellert’s novel. Even soldiers, "Leute... denen die Wüdheit 4
und Unerschrockenheit aus den Augen sah" [p.2071 weep reverently at the few kind 
words spoken to them by the old Count on his death-bed. Nevertheless, such tears %
Ishould be carefully distinguished from those shed still more copiously in, for example, $
Miller’s Siegwart. The cause of such tears, as indeed of most suffering in the
Schwedische Grafin is almost invariably pity for others. The Wonne der Wehmut,
Wollust der Tranen, Anton Reiser’s "joy of grief is familiar to the Countess and her *
friends, but (Carlson and Mariane always excepted) their tears are never prompted by
selfish passion. Thus the Countess is greatly distressed on learning of the disgrace and
imminent death of her husband; but once she must accept his death as an
accomplished fact, once his sufferings are at an end, she is able to moderate her own.
Her feelings are concentrated on what he, not on what she herself must endure.
Diese Nachricht vergntigte mich, so betriibt sie war, doch unendlich. "So 
ist er als ein Held an seinen Wunden gestorben?" rief ich aus. "So hat er 
die traurigen Zubereitungen zu einem gewaltsamen Tode, welche ârger 
als der Tod selbst sind, nicht ansehen diirfen. Nunmehr bin ich ruhig"
[p.213].
Nor do Gellert’s characters weep for trivial causes. The deaths of beloved dogs, cats 
or canaries have as yet no part to play in the emotional fabric of the novel, just as 
solitary walks, graveyards and the weeping moon of Siegwart as yet make no 
appearance. For the early Empfindsamkeit to which Gellert is indebted, tears are a 
sign of virtue, a communal rite, a badge by which every sensitive soul at once 
becomes recognisable to his fellows. In Gellert’s novel, tears are still reserved for 
special occasions, especially by the older generation: the old Count has not wept for 
forty years, and is by no means ashamed of his apparent insensibility.
Gellert shares with Sensibility in general a distinct predilection for death-bed, farewell Î
and reunification scenes. Such scenes are productive of Riihrung and this is a 




death to approximately every ten pages of text. An exemplary death is considered to
provide the most decisive testimony to a virtuous life. An exemplary death therefore
has an educative function: it is symptomatic of the spirit of the age that m 1742 the
mother of Frederick the Great received from a certain Graf Henkel a work bearing the |
ominous title Sterbebettsszenen in vier Bândenf^ Gellert’s contemporaries witnessed a %
peaceful and virtuous end with little short of delight. The old Count is fully aware of
the responsibility he has towards potential onlookers:
Also habe ich nur noch drei Tage von dem Leben zuzubringen, von dem 
ich meinem Schopfer Rechenschaft bringen soU; ich werde sie nicht 
besser anwenden konnen, als wenn ich durch meine Freudigkeit den 
Meinigen ein Beispiel gebe, wie leicht und glückseüg man stirbt, wenn 
man tugendhaft gelebt hat [p.206].
Here the reader’s attention is once agam drawn to the practical benefits of virtue as a
prerequisite of the universally desired peaceful end. The old Count’s death-bed scene
lasts for three days and his daughter-in-law is duly appreciative: "Gott, wie lehrreich 3
war das Ende dieses Mannes !" [p.205].
Reunification scenes too lend themselves weU to sentimental treatment. The meeting
between the Count and Steeley is a particularly good example: "Der Graf zitterte, daB
er kaum von dem Sessel aufstehen konnte, und wir sahen ihren Umarmungen mit ii
einem freudigen Schauer zu" [p.305]. Such scenes would seem to place Gellert’s
novel firmly in the tradition of the cult of sentimental friendship. What is especially
typical of Sensibility is the way in which the very natural joy the two fiiends
experience on meeting communicates itself to the rest of the circle -  and all are
intoxicated together:
Oh, was ist das Vergniigen der Freundschaft fiir eine Wollust, und wie 
wallen empfindliche Herzen einander in so gliicklichen Augenblicken 
entgegen. Man sieht einander schweigend an, und die Seele ist doch nie 
beredter als bei einem solchen StiUschweigen... Caroline und Herr R. 
teüten ihre Freude mit der unsiigen, und wir traten alle viere um 
Steeleyn und waren aUe Ein Freund [p.306].
In the context of Sensibility pity ranks among the most frequently experienced as well
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as the most pleasurable of emotions. As the Countess experiences in Holland,
society’s unfortunates are always certain of a warm reception:
Ich erfuhr, daB ein groBes Ungliick in den Gemütem vieler Menschen 
fast eben die Wirkungen hervorbringt, welche sonst ein groBes Gliick zu 
verursachen pflegt. Man schâtzt uns hoch, weil wir viel erhtten und 
verloren haben, und man macht unsem Unfall zu unserem Verdienst 
[pp.217-218].
The sentimental propensity to pity for unfortunate fellow creatures is less altruistic |
than might at first appear. Pity is experienced above all as identification with #
another’s sufferings, as an opportunity to experience a kind or degree of emotion 
which would not otherwise be encountered. Since it is assumed that misfortune is 
itself proof of moral worth, it is natural that pity should often form the basis for love 
or friendship -  as is the case, for example, in the relationship between Steeley and 
Amalia. As is typical of much of the literature of the time, GeUert aims to produce an é
emotional response in his readers by depicting the sufferings of virtuous people. Hard- 
luck stories are frequent in the novel of sensibility. AU realism is abandoned in the 
hope of arousing the reader’s pity and preferably also his tears. The sad tale of 
Steeley’s first engagement -  the bride is struck by Ughtning on the way to the altar - 
- is an obvious example. It would no doubt be correct to assume that the more 
frequent contemporary response to such incidents, particularly fi*om the young ladies 
of good famUy who were among GeUert’s most fervent admirers, would have been 
tears, not laughter.
GeUert’s characters display a devotion to Uterature which is typical of SensibUity..
Their approach to reading is largely subjective: "Und ob ich’s gleich nicht aUemal 
sagen konnte, warum eine Sache schôn oder nicht schôn war, so war doch meine 4
Î
Empfindung so getreu, daB ich mich selten betrog" [p.205]. Literature for the Countess '4
and her circle is most enjoyable when it is shared, when the feelings to which it 
gives rise can be exchanged and compared. The characters’ appreciation of Uterature 




feelings. That Gellert should have created hterary-minded characters is in itself 
scarcely surprising. In his Moralische Vorlesungen (delivered at the University of "4
Leipzig) and in his capacity as a valued correspondent, he was active in the cause of 3
literature, compiling reading-lists for the edification and entertainment of the young f|
and especially of the Frauenzimmer, His comedies contain frequent references to, 
indeed advertisements for literary works. Here his characters are judged according to 
their attitude to literature. His Betschwester, for instance, could give no more cogent 
proof of her own hypocrisy and narrow-mindedness than by her rejection of Pamela 
and the Moralische Wochenschriften.
Shared delight in literature is important in establishing personal relationships, in 
Gellert’s own novel, as later in Werther and Siegwart. The Countess’s two marriages 
are aU the happier for this shared interest. Indeed, life for the adherents of Sensibility 
is very much a literary affair. Reality is often experienced very much in terms of 
literary associations and references. There are obvious dangers inherent in this 
tendency to vicarious experience through literature. However intense the enjoyment of 
sentimental literature may be, however direct or overwhelming, it is nevertheless true 
that literature can only provide a second-hand experience. When literature becomes 
aU-important, when the æsthetic dimension is over-emphasised, everyday life becomes 1
stylised, and contact with reality is made more difficult: the very directness and 
spontaneity of response sought in the original confrontation with literary works is 
necessarily lost. Gellert’s characters, unlike for example Siegwart and his friends, not
only select their reading matter carefully -  they even submit it to critical analysis. A 
"correct", objectively verifiable response to literature is here presupposed, a response 4
'  f;which will be similar for all educated readers, endowed as such readers are assumed 4
to be with reason, virtue and a "noble heart". Literature gives rise to Empfindungen
but these Empfindungen are (with modifications) common to all. Gellert’s characters’ 
preference for reading aloud within a small circle of close friends is itself entirely
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Briiggemann states his case as follows:
An der AuMchtigkeit dieser Erzahlung ist nicht zu zweifeln. Es ist allés 
mit so viel Natiirlichkeit geschrieben, daB nichts den wahren 
Lebensverhaimissen Widersprechendes und kiinstlich Erfundenes darin 
gesucht werden kann.“
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typical of Sensibility: their conviction that this should be conducted principally with a 4
view to moral improvement, rather than simply to arouse emotion, is more 
characteristic of Enlightenment thinking.
Empfindsam also — indeed reminiscent of Richardsonian psychology — is the portrayal 
of Amalia’s growing love for Steeley. Amalia, however, has more faith in the positive 
value of emotion than does Pamela. Far from calling upon reason, or even virtue, to |
protect her from the dangers inherent in sensibility, Amalia decides to let reason well 
alone, to allow her feelings to run their natural and (the implication is) desirable 
course:
Ich merkte, je mehr er redte, daB etwas in meinem Herzen vorging, allein “
ich hatte keine Lust, es zu untersuchen, und ich hiitete mich zugleich, 
mein Herz nicht zu stdren [p.313].
Steeley’s and Amalia’s love develops cautiously and uncertainly. Even when they
have found the courage to admit their feelings to themselves, they have by no means
overcome their shyness sufficiently to be able to confide these emotions to one
another. Each can only guess at the state of the other’s heart and attempt to establish a
the tmth by every possible indirect means. It is a task made all the more difficult by
the fact that both are equally determined to disguise their love.
To what extent, if  at all, does GeUert’s novel reflect contemporary reality? To argue, 
as Briiggemann does, that the acts of supreme generosity and self-sacrifice depicted in 
the novel, and the world-view which gives rise to them, were entirely typical of #
GeUert’s time would seem to be dubious to say the least.
I
And further:
Dafur spricht der Erfolg des Romans, der auf die Leser des achtzehnten 
Jahrhunderts also nicht unwahrscheinlich gewirkt haben kann, und das 
heiBt, daB er ihren eigenen seeUschen Dispositionen mithin nicht 
widersprochen hat.^
This thesis is unacceptable. The undoubted popularity of Gellert’s novel does not by 1
any means indicate that the men and women of the 1740s and 1750s saw in the 
Countess and her friends people very like themselves. Indeed, the opposite might 
equally well be true. The catalogue of calamities which makes up the plot of the 
novel is certainly extreme -  and surely the characters are "extremes’* also. Gellert’s 
intention, crassly stated, is to propagandise an idea of selfless behaviour. And such an 
ideal w ill of course best be exemplified by perfect or near-perfect characters. Such #
Icharacters can appear extreme to the point of psychological impossibility -  they are 
aU the more unambiguous for that. Moreover GeUert’s novel has something in 
common with modem "escapist" Action. This type of Uterature provides both 
entertainment and an opportunity for the reader to forget for a time the harsh realities
of everyday life. In the 1740s, as today, the reader might derive considerable pleasure M
Îsimply from reading about the rich and beautiful. The literature of SensibUity provided |
an outlet for surplus emotion, a chance to indulge freely in emotional exaltation. 4
Everyday life, with its burden or work and practical cares, rarely provided such 
opportunities. The bourgeois lifestyle adopted by the Countess is clearly intended to 
be something of an idyU: it is idealised, as the characters are idealised. Indeed, one 
might argue that GeUert’s novel may have enjoyed such immense popularity precisely ^
because the middle class saw in it not a reflection, but an ideaUsation of its own 
attitudes and way of life. Paul Mog sees in the discrepancy between bourgeois ideal 
and bourgeois reality the most likely explanation for the popularity of the 
philanthropist figure -  Count, Countess, the Count’s father, Caroline, Herr R. and the %




birgt in sich diese Sehnsucht nach Abweichung von der dkonomischen 
Rationalitat. In ihrer Selbstlosigkeit, ihrem Mitleid konzentriert sich die 
Essenz der Empfindsamkeit als Reaktion auf die unempfindsame soziale 
Wirklichkeit.“
I
We would be equally mistaken to draw from the attitudes personified by Gellert’s |
characters any very clear conclusions as to the true state of public morals in
eighteenth-century Germany. We would, it has been suggested, be wrong in supposing
daB das Leben der Burger im achtzehnten Jahrhundert ein besonders 
hohes moralisches Niveau gehabt hatte. Wir glauben vielmehr, daB 
infolge des wachsenden Reichtums und auch der stândigen Zunahme des 
Luxus unter den Biirgem, dann auch infolge des Beispiels der 
sogenannten finmorahtgt des Hofes, gerade das GegenteU der Fall war 
und die Diskrepanz zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Moral in der 
zweiten HHlfte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts grôBer war denn je.
JedenfaUs in den Stadten.^
One is indeed tempted to deduce from the eighteenth century’s constant invocation of 4
4virtue that vice was rather more prevalent than might have been considered desirable. |
It should not be forgotten, however, that while the possession of material wealth may
in some instances lead to moral depravity, the pursuit of riches is not infrequently
accompanied by a distinct Puritanism. Moreover, the influence of court circles on the
bourgeoisie was of course complicated by the eagerness of the middle class to
establish an independent identity and independent values. The fact that the aristocracy
was reputedly immoral thus tended rather to encourage the bourgeoisie in its pursuit
of virtue. Nevertheless, it cannot be over-emphasised that Gellert’s ideal of
Tugendempfindsamkeit was an ideal and not a reality. The plain facts must have been
very different. A bourgeoisie consisting principally of sensitive souls would scarcely
have been capable of economic survival, still less of a rise to prosperity and eventual
relative political influence:
Die VorsteUung von einem riihrend aufrichtigen, handlungsunfâhigen 
Bürgertum widerspricht die aktenkundige Tatigkeit bürgerücher 
Kapitaüen, die adligen Gutsbesitze in wachsender Zahl in bürgerllche 
Hânde übergehen lieBen: wâhrend in der Literatur sich die moralische 
Überlegenheit des Bürgertums bekundet, manifestiert sich im praktischen 
Leben in zunehmendem MaBe seine okonomische. Damit aber tritt gegen 
die unokonomische hofische RationaHtât eine okonomische bürgerllche 
Rationalitat auf, von der die Gefuhlskultur abweicht, ohne sich zunâchst 
aus der Verklammerang mit ihr zu losen.^’
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Briiggemann believes that the phenomenon of Empfindsamkeit was symptomatic of an
entire social revolution: "Die IsoHerung des Individuums schwindet. Es steht nicht
mehr einer gegen den anderen. An die Stelle von Betrug und Bosheit treten
Aufrichtigkeit, Redlichkeit und Treue... Das Ergebnis ist ein ganz neuer Typ
Mensch."^ This assumption of a sudden, by no means clearly motivated change in
the mass of humanity from cold and hard to warm and soft borders on the absurd.
Rather more convincing is Pikulik’s argument, that the change is not to be sought in
people’s feelings as such, but in their attitude to these feelings:
Was die Empfindsamkeit von der scheinbar gefilhllosen Zeit, die ihr 
vorausging, unterscheidet ist... die Tatsache, daB in ihr sich die Menschen 
zum ersten Mai des Gefühls bewuBt wurden... Geftihle batten sie auch 
vorher, und vielleicht echter, und st&rker als die nachfolgenden 
Generationen, doch war dieses Fiihlen naïv, d.h. sie fiihlten, ohne es zu 
wissen.^ ®
Yet this interpretation too leaves some questions unanswered. Apart from the fact that 
it is difficult to imagine how one can be said to experience emotion without knowing I
it -  one inevitably wonders why these emotions should suddenly become conscious 4
when previously they were unconscious. Even if we substitute "problematic" for 
"conscious", this puzzle remains. I would rather take the view that whüe 
Briiggemann’s pre-subjective man must have had as many and varied feelings, he felt 
with greater spontaneity, was content to feel without wondering why, wherefore or to 
what degree. There was no sudden transformation in 1750, 1760 or 1770. A new 
theoretical interest in the nature of feeling and the gradual decline in the importance 
in orthodox religion combined to produce a shift of emphasis. What was new was a 
growing realisation that the emotions were of supreme and universal importance, that 
they were worthy of analysis in phüosophical works and m imaginative literature.
To what extent Gellert’s concept of Sensibility -  and Sensibility per se -  was a 
specifically bourgeois phenomenon is a question to which we must now turn our 4
attention. In the very first paragraph of the novel, GeUert presents his heroine as
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The Countess introduces her guardian and educator as "mein Vetter, der auch ein
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bourgeois by inclination, if aristocratic by birth °^. Little attention is paid to her 
lineage. She is not proud of her noble birth, mentioning only that her father "ein 
rechtschaffener Mann gewesen ist und wenig Mittel besessen hat" [p. 191]. Gellert is 
careful to distinguish his novel and its ethic from the galant tradition of romance- -j
writing. "Vielleicht wiirde ich bei der Erzâhlung meines Geschlechts ebenso beredt 
Oder geschwâtzig als andere gewesen sein, wenn ich anders viel zu sagen wüBte"
[p.l91]. Significant here is not only the Countess’s eagerness to dissociate herself 
from "andre", her words also contain a slight but unmistakeable note of irony. Pride 
in noble ancestry and social prestige is here imphcity dismissed as Geschwatz [p.l91].
Of the bourgeoise Caroline the Countess says "Ich sahe beinahe keinen Vorzug, den 
ich vor ihr hatte, als dafi ich adlig geboren war. Und wie geringe ist dieser Vorzug, 
wenn man ihn vemunftig betrachtet" [p.202]. These words are all the more convincing 
for being spoken by an aristocrat. Nor does the Countess restrict her open-mindedness 
to words alone. She chooses her second husband, the middle-class Herr R., on account 
of his personal merits: she attaches no importance to the fact that as her social 
inferior he would generally be thought unworthy of her. Indeed, the entire life-style 
favoured by the Countess is specifically middle-class. She and her two husbands reject 
the world of the court, with its galanterie and intrigue, for the sake of a quiet life in @
thoroughly bourgeois Holland. They create for themselves a veritable middle-class 
idyll. "Wir lebten, ohne zu befehlen und ohne zu gehorchen. Wir durften niemanden 
von unseren Handlungen Rechenschaft geben als uns selbst" [p.224]. On arriving in 
Holland, the Countess chooses to conceal her rank, turns her family jewels into hard 
cash and sound investments -  on the flourishing state of which she frequently reports 
-  and divides her time between charitable works, study and the education of her own 




Landedelmann war, und doch in seiner Jugend studiert hatte" [p.l91]. This doch is 
significant, suggesting as it does that a university education might have been 
considered more appropriate for the sons of the middle classes than for the 
aristocracy. The landed nobility to which the Countess’s enlightened guardian belongs 
had little in common with the court aristocracy. Lacking the means to indulge in 
luxury and corruption, the Landadel would in many cases be scarcely distinguishable 
from the wealthier farmers. Given this rural lifestyle and lack of interest in higher 
education -  the Ritterakademien provided precisely the sort of education the name 
suggests -  it would be suiprising if this class, any more than the Hofadel, would 
have provided many models for Gellert’s ideal of cultivated, reflective 
Tugendempfindsamkeit. Thus the Countess’s guardian is educated, enlightened, not 
because of, but in spite of his rank.
The "enlightenment" of which this guardian approves has very little to do with book- 
learning: it is his intention that his pupil become "Nur Idug und gar nicht gelehrt"
[p.l91]. He is to receive a "moral" education, no doubt in the style of Gellert’s 
Moralische Vorlesungen, the purpose of which was to help form the young men of 4
Leipzig into honest, industrious, "rational" citizens, husbands and fathers, capable of 
making a practical contribution to society. In other words, the Countess is to receive a 
middle-class education — a point which becomes entirely clear if we compare her 
upbringing with that destined for the daughters of the vain and silly Frau von 
Hohenauf in Nicolai’s Sebaldus Nothanker. For this lady the only instruction which #
seems either desirable or necessary consists in dancing, hat-trimming and the 
creditable conduct of love affairs and intrigues at court. Gellert clearly wishes to 
present the Countess’s education as corresponding closely to his own ideal. The early 
inculcation of sound bourgeois principles is shown to serve her well in later fife; in 
proving her exemplary virtue in each new trial she proves also the merits of her 
education.
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As Meyer-Krentler has shown, Gellert writes with a specific type of reader very much 
in mind. This reader was familiar with the courtly romances^\ Here love is a game, 
an art, an intrigue, virtue is hrelevant or even ridiculous. At first sight, Gellert’s novel 
might seem to promise a reader of such romances more of his customary fare. The 
title, at least, is reminiscent of romantic adventure tales in the courtly genre, 
suggestive of scandalous confessions or amorous intrigue in an aristocratic milieu. We 
are told almost at once that the Countess is young and beautiful, and such 
expectations would thereby appear to be confirmed. Yet all hopes of this kind are 
consistently and systematically disappointed.
There is much to suggest that Gellert hopes to convince his reader of the validity of a 
new ideal of virtuous enlightenment, sensibility and philanthropy. Straightforward 
moralising would be inappropriate for the communication of such ideas, considering 
the nature of the public Gellert presupposes. Such readers would simply close the 
book and resort to something more immediately palatable. Thus concessions must be 
made to the reader’s taste. The inclusion of adventure story motifs wül ensure the 
continued interest of large sections of the public. At the same time, through the 
introduction of gradual and subtle deviations from the popular pattern, Gellert can 
hope to persuade the reader of the merits of his alternative to the courtly ideal. Again, 
as Meyer-Krentler has convincingly shown, this is achieved above all through ironic 
treatment of the clichés of the adventure story. The reader’s expectations are 
encouraged up to a certain point, only to be disappointed, even mocked. The question 
of the heroine’s rank brings just such a disappointment. She is indeed a "Countess in 
name only", an aristocrat who chooses to live a retiring, virtuous, thoroughly 
bourgeois existence. In creating this character GeUert is able to provide his middle- 
class reading public with the glamour it wants, and at the same time give added 
authority to the bourgeois ideal. The Countess is faced with a real alternative: she
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chooses to renounce what the reader would probably consider to be distinct 
advantages, and by so doing she challenges that reader to think again about the real 
value of aristocratic luxury and pleasure-seeking.
When her eagerness to report the truth requires her to disappoint the reader’s
expectations, the Countess adopts an almost apologetic tone:
Ich hatte noch nie geliebt. Wie unglaubUch wird dieses Bekenntnis vielen 
von meinen Leserinnen vorkommen. Sie werden mich deswegen wohl gar 
fiir einfHltig halten, oder sich einbilden, daB ich weder schôn noch 
empfmdlich gewesen bin, weil ich in meinem sechzehnten Lebensjahr 
nicht wenigstens ein Dutzend LiebeshSndel zShlen konnte. Doch ich kann 
mir nicht helfen. Es mag nun zu meinem Ruhme oder zu meiner Schande 
gereichen, so kann man sich darauf verlassen, daB ich noch nie geliebt 
hatte [p. 196].
The Countess regrets that she must report the truth, "unexciting" though it is. With 
the emphasis on authenticity typical of the time, she is concerned to distinguish "what 
really happened" from what might have happened and in a "novel" probably would 4
have happened. An abduction before her marriage would no doubt have made for 
interesting reading but -  incredible as it may seem -  she arrived safely in Sweden, 
without interruption or misadventure. In other words, a new type of novel is being 
created, in which accepted conventions and expectations no longer apply. It is a novel 
which can hope for a favourable reception from those sections of the public normally 
suspicious of literature in general and of the notorious novel form in particular; from 
those whose reading-matter would hitherto have been restricted to texts of a 
devotional nature. Among criticisms most often levelled at the traditional romance -  4
apart from the charge of gross immorality -  was the assertion that fiction was simply 
"hes" and should, therefore, be dismissed as a waste of time and money, and as 
ungodly into the bargain.
One of the main reasons for Gellert’s popularity was surely his ability to be all things 
to aU men. As we have seen, his novel is indebted both to the Enlightenment and to
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Sensibility. Gellert is no polemicist. All forms of religion win his respect and 
sympathy, provided only genuine piety is present -  and genuine virtue, for the two 
are closely related in Gellert’s estimation. The actual content of religious belief 
concerns him but little. He lets questions of dogma well alone, and extends tolerance 
to Christians, Jews and free-thinkers alike.
As regards questions of morality, Gellert is convinced that while reason and emotion 
need not conflict, neither reason nor emotion should be permitted to gain exclusive 
control over the individual’s behaviour. Yet, while emotion may be un-rational, that is 
to say separate from reason, it should not be and need not be irrational or contrary to 
reason: harmony between the two forces is attainable. Gellert believes that feelings 
should not be suppressed, but rather channelled into the service of virtue -  restrained 
and guided, not overpowered by the intellect. If emotions are schooled in this way 
they win serve to complement reason. The result should be a balanced, useful, 
virtuous and hence necessarily also happy individual. As Meyer-Krentler states: "Das 
Herz steht nicht auf der Seite der dunlden, irrationalen Krafte, sondem iiberwindet 
diese gerade, indem es sich mit der Vemunft vereinigt"^ .^ Only that love which is 
sanctioned by reason gains Gellert’s approval, since the rational course of action is 
not only the morally correct one, but also that most likely to be productive of 
happiness. Happiness is both a duty and a clearly defined end which can be attained 
without undue difficulty; all that is required is consistent adherence to a number of 
entirely reasonable mles.
There are, of course, striking differences between Gellert’s brand of 
Tugendempfindsamkeit and the Sturm-und-Drang-Empfindsamkeit of a Werther or 
Woldemar. Gellert’s cult of Sensibility, tempered as it is by reason and virtue, is 
cultivated, civilised, restrained. The Countess and her circle enjoy their emotions; only 
the unfortunate misguided trio -  Carlsson, Mariane and Dormund -  allow themselves
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to be overwhelmed by them. GeUert’s exemplary characters find that this measured 
sensibility makes life more comfortable, easier, more aesthetically gratifying. Martin 
Greiner rightly draws attention to the "rokokohaften Charakter"^  ^ of this cult of 
feeling. In the words of Carsten Schlingmann: "Er selbst ist nicht eigentlich der 
empfindsame, er ist der zËrÜiche Gellert... fur ihn ist die Grenze der Empfindsamkeit 
dort, wo die Schwarmerei beginnt."^ '^  At the same time it should be noted that 
Gellert’s characters tend their feelings with great care and subject them to the most 
subtle analysis. Their personal relationships are decidedly gefiihlsbetont. They indulge 
in a cult of friendship not so very different frorh that practised by Miller’s Siegwart 
almost thirty years later. They have a preference for solitude, for the enjoyment of 
literature and of the emotions to which that Uterature gives rise. They are ever eager 
to experience new kinds, new degrees of emotion and welcome aU opportunities to 
indulge in pity or gratitude. Yet aU this only to a limited extent. There would always 
seem to be an invisible barrier beyond which Gellert and his characters are unwUling 
or unable to pass. This boundary is fixed not by religion, to which the characters are 
more or less indifferent, but by "virtue". This concept of virtue is fundamental: it is 





1. Quoted from Max von Waldberg, "Goethe und die Empfindsamkeit". In Berichte 
des freien deutschen Hochstiftes. N.F. 15, 1899, pp. 1-22; here p.22.
2. Quoted from the Afterword to C.F. Gellert, Leben der schwedischen Grafin von 
G***. Edited by Jorg Ulrich Fechner, Stuttgart 1968, p.l65.
3. See the Afterword to Gellert, Schwedische Grafin, ed. Fechner.
4. Johann Heinrich Voss, edited by A. Voss, 1840, V ol.l, p.5.
5. Christian Fürchtegott GeUert, Das Leben der schwedischen Grafin von G***. In:
GeUert, Samtliche Schriften (10 vols.), Leipzig 1839; vol.4, p.327. AU subsequent 
references to the novel are to this edition.
6. Israel S. Stamm, "GeUert, reUgion and rationalism". In The Germanic Review, 28, i  
1953, pp.195-203; here p.200.
7. Wolfdietrich Rasch, Freundschaftskult und Freundschaftsdichtung in deutschen 
Schrifttum des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, vom Ausgang des Barock bis zu Klopstock.
HaUe a.S. 1936 = Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift Buchreihe, vol.21., p.48.
8. Joseph Freiherr von Eichendorff, Der deutsche Roman des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts 
in seinem Verhaltnis zum Christentum. In: Eichendorff, Samtliche Werke, Historisch- 
kritische Ausgabe, vol.8, Literar-historische Schriften, n , Abhandlungen zur Literatur.
Regensburg 1965; here p.88ff.
9. Kurt May, Das Weltbild in Gellerts Dichtung, Frankfurt am Main 1928. Deutsche 
Forschungen 21, p. 132.
10. Richard Newald, Die deutsche Literatur vom Spathumanismus zur Empfindsamkeit 
1570-1750. Munich 1950, p.520.
11. Robert H. Spaethling, "Die Schranken der Vemunft in GeUerts Leben der 
schwedischen Grafin von G***. Em Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte der Aufidarung." In 7 
Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, 81, 1966, pp.224-235.
12. Spaethling, Die Schranken der Vemunft, p.226.
13. May, Das Weltbild in Gellerts Dichtung, p. 124.
14. Erich Schmidt, Richardson, Rousseau und Goethe. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 
Romans im achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Jena 1875, p.29.
15. Lothar PikuUk, BUrgerliches Trauerspiel und Empfindsamkeit. Cologne-Graz 1966,
p.80.
16. Walther Gebhardt, Religionssoziologische Problème im Roman der deutschen 
Aufklarung. Diss. GieBen 1931, p.98.
17. Hermann Hettner, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im achtzehnten Jahrhundert,
Munich 1970, p.362.
18. Fritz Briiggemann, Gellerts Schwedische Grafin. Der Roman der Welt- und 
Lebensanschauung des vorsubjektivistischen Bürgertums. Eine 
entwicklungsgeschichtliche Analyse, Aachen 1925, p.35.
:
% . ■ ■ . . . ^ ^  .  ■ ■ ' - ,  .1. -'  -
19. David Hill, "Die Schwedische Gri^ im  notes on early bourgeois realism." In: 
Neophilologus 65, 1981, pp.574-584; here p.576.
20. Eckhardt Meyer-Krentler, Der andere Roman. Gellerts Schwedische Grâfin. Von 
der aufklarerischen Propaganda gegen den "Roman" zur empfindsamen 
Erlebnisdichtung. Gdppingen 1974 = Goppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik 128, p.68.
21. ibid., p.67.
22. WiUy Bremi, Der Weg des protestantischen Menschen von Luther zu Albert 
Schweitzer, Zurich 1923, p. 127.
23. Briiggemann, Gellerts Schwedische Grâfin, p. 15.
24. ibid., p.35.
25. Paul Mog, Ratio und GefUhlskultur. Studien zur Psychogenese und Literatur im 
achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Diss., Tübingen 1976, p.56.
26. Leo Balet/E. Gerhard, Die Verbiirgerlichung der deutschen Kunst, Literatur und 
Musik im achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Edited and introduced by Gert Mattenldott. 
Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Vienna 1973, p.289.
27. Mog, Ratio und GefUhlskultur, p.47.
28. Fritz Briiggemann, "Der Kampf um die burgerliche Welt- und Lebensanschauung". 
In Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift, 3, 1925, pp.94-127, here p.98.
29. Pikulik, Bilrgerliches Trauerspiel und Empfindsamkeit, p. 5.
30. John van Cleve, "A Countess in name only. Gellert’s Schwedische Grâfin." In:
The Germanic Review 55, 1980, pp. 152-155.
31. Meyer-Krentler, Der andere Roman, p.52.
32. ibid.
33. Martin Gremer, Die Entstehung der modernen Unterhaltungsliteratur. Studien zum 
Trivialroman des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Edited and revised by Therese Poser. 
Reinbek bei Hamburg 1964, p.50.
34. Carsten Schlingmann, Gellert. Eine literar-historische Revision. Diss. Frankfiirt am 
Main \961=Franlfurter Beitrâge zur Germanistik, 3, Bad Homburg v.d.H. 1967, p.28.
73
3. SOPHIE VON LA ROCHE; DIE 
GESCHICHTE DES FRÂULEINS VON 
STERNHEIM
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Sic wissen, dafi die Ideen, die ich in dem Charakter und in den Handlungen des 
Frduleins von Sternheim und ihrer Eltern auszufUhren gesucht habe, immer meine 
Lieblingsideen gewesen sind; und womit beschaftigt man seinen Geist lieber als mit dem, 
was man liebt?^
75
Mein ganzes Ideal von einem Frauenzirmner, sanft, zârdich, wohltatig, 
stolz und tugendhaft und betrogen. Ich habe kostliche, herrliche Stunden 
beim Durchlesen gehabt.^
Herder shared her enthusiasm, for he quoted the novel from the pulpit, an honour only 
rarely accorded to a work of fiction.
There aie a number of possible reasons for the immediate success of the book. La 
Roche, like Gellert with his Schwedische Grâfin, offered something for every taste. The
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Die Geschichte des Fràuleins von Sternheim. Von einer Freundin derselben aus 
Originalpapieren und anderen zuverlassigen Quellen gezogen, the first novel of Sophie f
Marie von La Roche, was originally published in 1771 by Christoph Maitin Wieland, 
without the prior consent of the authoress. Wieland also supplied a preface and 
footnotes, in which he both praised the work and pointed out what he considered to be 
its weaknesses. He took particular exception to stylistic defects and to the (in his 
opinion) excessive subjectivity of its heroine. Neither preface nor footnotes explicitly 
named La Roche as the authoress. However, since Wieland was by then well known in 
the literary world, and since it was furthermore common knowledge that he maintained 
close ties with the La Roche family (dating from the time when the young Sophie had 
been his fiancée and Muse) the apprentice novelist could not expect to remain 
anonymous for long.
The book was an instant success. In 1771 alone three editions appeared, to be followed 
by a further edition in 1772, and by four more in the course of the next fifteen years.
The reception from almost every quarter was favourable. Most reviewers had nothing but 
praise for the work. Soon La Roche was known throughout Germany simply as die 
Sternheim.^
A typically enthusiastic response to the novel came from Caroline Flachsland, a member 
of the Darmstadt circle of Empfindsamen, in a letter to Herder:
novel’s pedagogic tendency, the treatment of questions relating to social and educational 
refoim, must engage the interests and approval of the Aufklarer. Moreover, the heroine’s 
subjectivity, her emotional fervour, could not fail to appeal to the young Stürmer und 
Dranger. Moreover Sophie von La Roche herself was a person of potential interest to 
the reading public: not only because she was known to be a friend of Wieland, but also 
as the wife of Johann Michael von La Roche, whose Briefe iiber das Monchswesen 
(1771) had recently caused no small scandal in CathoHc circles; and as the adopted 
daughter-in-law of the notorious sceptic and hedonist, Graf Stadion. Thanks to her 
husband’s position as friend, assistant and (very probably) also illegitimate son of the 
Count, Sophie was accustomed to move in the highest circles, both on the Count’s 
estates and at the Court in Mainz. She must, therefore, have had access to "inside 
information", and readers might hope to become informed through her writings of the 
activities of the rich and famous. The fact that both novelist and heroine were women 
may also have contributed to the success of the book. Most readers of fiction tended to 
be women, who in general had more leisure-time at their disposal than did men. Women 
surely tended to identify with the heroine of a sentimental narrative — with Richardson’s 
Pamela, for instance, whose attainment of wealth, social status and marital bliss must 
have corresponded fairly closely to the day-dreams of many female readers. The same 
might equally well be said of La Roche’s Sophie Sternheim, who is also rewarded with 
happiness and tranquillity, after the patient endurance of many cruel blows of fate.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the novel, we would do well to consider Wieland’s
preface in some detail. If this preface is to be believed, the work succeeded m engaging
Wieland’s sympathies to a greater degree than he would have thought any senthnental
narrative capable of doing. His initial scepticism was soon overcome:
alle meine kaltblütige Philosophie... konnte nicht gegen die Wahrheit und 
Schonheit Ihrer moralischen SchUderungen aushalten; mein Herz 
erwarmte sich: ich hebte Ihren Sternheim, seine Gemahlin, seine Tochter 
und sogar semen Pfarrer. [p.21]
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These remarks should not perhaps be taken at face value. It must be remembered that La 
Roche was a close Mend, whom Wieland would have been reluctant to injiue or offend 
by too critical a reception of her first novel. On the other hand, his decision to have the 
book published at all does suggest that he was on the whole favourably impressed. 
Wieland’s qualified enthusiasm is significant. If even this sceptical man of the world 
was impressed, how much more likely was it (hat the work would be well received by 
those sections of the reading public predisposed in favour of Sensibility.
It should be noted that Wieland does not expect tlie novel to gain universal acceptance.
He implies that some degree of conformity with the opinions and tastes of the heroine
win be required if the public is to approve the work. A more critical response might
perhaps be expected from the professional reviewers and from the Weltleute; fiom  those,
in short, whose world-view was more exclusively rationalistic, even materialistic, than
La Roche’s own. Wieland hhnself sees it as a fault that Sophie Sternheim shows such
undisguised hostility towards die grofie Welt. While he does not explicitly identify
himself with the ideas and tastes of contemporary high society, Wieland does imphcity
accept the standards of this class as the norm. He finds Sophie Sternheim’s moral
fervour exaggerated; greater flexibility, more willingness to conform, would win his
approval. He criticises
die Singularitat unserer Heldm, ihr Enthusiasmus fur das sittliche 
Schone, ihre besondem Ideen und Launen... und was noch ârger 1st als 
dies allés, der bestandige Kontrast, den ihre Art zu empfmden, zu 
urteüen und zu handeln mit dem Geschmack, den Sitten und 
Gewohnheiten der groBen Welt macht [p.24].
Wieland suggests that the heroine’s caprices should be forgiven, overlooked, by the 
indulgent reader; he proposes that Sophie Sternheim be called "die liebenswürdige 
GriHeiifaiigerin'' [p.24]. This assessment would necessitate a distanced, even 
condescending attitude on the pait of the reader, an attitude which would be dhectly 
opposed to La Roche’s intention, since it would of course prevent the reader accepting 
the Frauleitt as an ideal, or example, to be followed.
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In the letter to Wieland which he quotes in his preface, La Roche emphasises the
pedagogical purpose of her novel. She expresses the hope that her readers w ill be
insphed to emulate Sophie Stemheim’s exemplary conduct;
wenn diese [unsere Kinder] durch ihre Bekanntschaft mit jener [Sophie] 
in tugendhaften Gesinnungen, in emer wahren, allgemeinen, tâtigen Güte 
und Rechtschaffenheit gestarkt warden, welche WoUust fhr das Herz 
Ihrer Freundin [p.20].
Wieland is convinced that the novel wül be able to exercise an influence for good:
Ich habe nicht vonnbten, Ihnen von dem ausgebreiteten Nutzen zu 
sprechen, welche Schriften von derjenigen Gattung, worunter Ihre 
Stemhehn gehort, stiften kOnnen... [Ich woUte] alien tugendhaften 
Müttem, allen liebenswürdigen, jungen Tbchtem unsrer Nation ein 
Geschenk... machen, welches mir geschickt schien, Weisheit und Tugend 
unter Direm Geschlecht, und selbst unter dem meinigen, zu befordem
[p.20].
La Roche aims to influence the reader for good by providing him both with examples to |
imitate and with warning examples to avoid. Sophie Steinhehn’s story is the story of the 
triumph of virtue over vice. Each of the characters is rewarded or punished as he or she 4
deserves. Derby dies in the prime of hfe, his health destroyed by remorse and dissolute 
living. Sophie is rewarded with the most desirable of husbands, a melancholy English 
lord, and is permitted to spend the rest of her days in the idyllic setting of an English 
country-house.
Like Richardson, Gellert and Hermes, La Roche beheves that the public will be most
receptive to a moral message when it is delivered in the form of a gripping and
entertaining narrative. Her heroine’s views on education in general reflect La Roche’s
attitude to the reading and writing of novels:
Wh vergessen nur die Sachen geme, die mit keinem Vergnügen 
verbunden sind, und die lachelnde, zu der Schwachheit der Menschen 
sich herablassende Weisheit will daher, daB man die Ffade der Wahrheit 
mit Blumen bestreue. Die Tugend braucht nicht mit emsten Farben 
geschildert zu werden, um Verehmng zu erhalten; ihr inneres Wesen, 
jede Handlung von £hr ist lauter Würde. Würde ist ein unzertrennbarer 
Teh von ihr, auch wenn sie m der Kleidung der Freude und des Glucks 
erscheint. In dieser Kleidung allein erhëlt sie Vertrauen und Ehifurcht 
zugleich [p.218].
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Equally revealing is Sophie Stemheim’s answer to the question whether an intending
governess such as Madame C. should permit her charges to read such novels.
Ja, zumal da Sie es ohnehin nicht werden verhindem fcbnnen. Aber 
suchen Sie... nur solche, worm die Personen nach edlen Grundsâtzen I
handeln und wo wahre Szenen des Lebens beschrieben sind [p.219].
La Roche can recommend such novels with a clear conscience: indeed, it is precisely 
such a novel she is attempting to write.
The true significance of this view of the novel and its function becomes clear when we
compare it with tlie traditional attitude to the genre. One of the criticisms more
frequently levelled at the novel form, above aH by Pietist writers, was that it consisted
entirely of lies, Wolfgang Schmitt quotes an anonymous treatise Vom Romanenlesen
(1742) hi which the novel is attacked for propagating falsehoods:
Es sind ja keine wahren Geschichten... sondem erdichtete Dinge, und ein 
zusammengesponnenes Gewebe vergeblicher Einbildungen.
These are, it is claimed, all the more dangerous
je wahrscheinMcher die Lügen oder, wenn man ja das derbe Wort allhier 
nicht brauchen soil, die auf alien Blattem und Seiten angebrachten 
Eifindungen seien.'^
Significantly, the writer does not concede the possibility that realistic fiction might be 
uniquely capable of conveying a moral message.^
We must remember that the public, or more precisely the middle-class public (for the
peasants were ahnost invariably illiterate and the aristocracy more likely to be receptive 4
to the gallant romances which mirrored its own lifestyle) was accustomed to turn in its î
leisure hours to devotional literature, to religious tracts and to the autobiographies of f4,
pious persons, at most to the Moralische Wochenschriften.^ f
It was widely held that only faithful accounts of actual happenings could be morally %
justifiable, since mere fiction, it was aigued, could not inspire the reader to emulate
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exemplary patterns of conduct. In order to be accepted by this middle-class public, the 
novel must therefore present itself as truth. La Roche’s narrative puts forward an 
emphatic claim to authenticity: the editor and sources are both identified and their 
reliability underlined.
Such then was the background against which La Roche was writing; an understanding of 
it goes some way towards explaining her relationship to the novel as a genre. Yet, 
however profoundly she was convinced that the novel ought to serve a didactic purpose, 
considerations of a more personal nature also influenced her decision to write. These 
factors too must be named. In his preface, written in the form of a letter to the 
authoress, Wieland describes the book as "ein Werk Ihrer Einbildungskraft und Ihres 
Herzens... geschrieben zu Ihrer eigenen Unterhaltung" [p. 19]. It is clear that La Roche 
neither intended nor expected her work to reach the general public; the readership she 
had in mind was composed of personal friends. Wieland suggests that the book was 
written to provide Gemiitserholung for the novelist. He cites a letter from La Roche hi 
which she attributes her decision to write to an emotional urge: "Ich hatte Stunden, wo 
diese Beschaftigung eine Art von Bedürfnis fur mehie Seele war" [p.20].
Much as La Roche benefited fiom the advantages of rank she obtained in marrying 
Johann Michael, much as she enjoyed her hfe as a lady of fashion, her position was not 
altogether an easy one. In the circles in which her husband moved sensibility was hkely 
to meet with ridicule, or at best (as from Johann Michael himself) with good-humouied 
indulgence. Here French culture, French wit and sophistication governed all questions of 
taste. Frivohty, superficiality, sensuality were more hkely to be tolerated than was an 
excess of feeling. In order to hold her own, Sophie was obhged to suppress what had 
hitherto been her most characteristic Halt. However successfully she did so her 
sensibility evidently remained with her. When it could no longer find a suitable outlet m 
her everyday hfe, as it had done in her relationship to the young Wieland, she sought to
81
express herself in literature. The moment of decision came when her two daughters left 
the parental home to complete their education:
Ich woHte nun einmal ein papieraes Madchen erziehen, weil ich meine
eigenen nicht mehr hatte, und da half mir meine Einbildungskraft aus der
Verlegenheit und schuf den Plan zu Sophiens Geschichte.^
The emphasis on pedagogy is something which La Roche clearly shares with the current 
of Enlightenment thinking. There is much in the novel to suggest that in many important 
questions her sympathies are very much with the adherents of the Enlightemnent. La 
Roche’s exemplary characters are exemplary at least in part by virtue of their adherence 
to the ideals of the age of reason. Colonel Sternheim, in particular, may be regarded as 
representing the ideal of enlightened benevolence. He has a natural respect for learning 
and his bourgeois scholarly background -  his father was a professor — is shown to have 4
exercised a very positive influence in shaping Sophie’s character. Colonel Sternheim 
devotes much time and energy to improving the condition of the tenants on his estates.
He has an enthusiasm for social and educational reform which clearly has its roots in the 
thinking of the Enlightenment. He is eager to establish a progressive system of poor 
relief on his own and neighbouring lands. Unlike many less enlightened contemporaries, %
he does not hold the poor responsible for their plight. Instead of allocating blame, he 
wishes that the poor may be taught skills so that they may change their lot by virtue of q
their own diligence. The solution which he proposes to the problem of poverty is, in the 4
best enlightened tradition, both effective and humane. Significantly, all improvements on 
the Colonel’s estates are implemented from above. AH his plans are designed to hnprove 4'
the lot of his tenants, yet we learn nothing of Hie tenants being permitted to participate ÿ
in the decision-making. La Roche believes that everyone has his divinely-ordained place 
in the feudal liierarchy. If the peasant is prepared to do his duty, he wiU be cared for 
from from the cradle to the giave. Thus the ideal of social hfe is propagated by die 
Colonel and, through him, La Roche herself has much in common with the thinking of |
the so-called enhghtened despots. It takes the form of a real desire for reform of a 
sometimes quite radical nature, but always initiated from those in positions of authority 4
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as dictated by their birth.
The colonel is of the opinion — an opinion derived from the economic theories of the
Enlightenment -  that he too wHl benefit in financial terms if his peasants are content:
Was ich ihnen anfangs gebe, tragt mir mit der Zeit die vennehrte Zehnte 
ein und die guten Leute werden durch die Erfahrung am besten 
überzeugt, daB es wohl mit ihnen gemeint war [p.46].
Like Gellert, La Roche believes in enlightened self-interest, that philanthropy is to be 
recommended not least because it pays good dividends. Sternheim directs matters on his 
estates in a spirit of enlightened or benevolent despotism: the miniature state of which 
the Colonel is "ruler" even has its own laws. Dnmkards, gamblers and idlers are 
punished for their misconduct either by the imposition of a fine or by being obliged to 
work without payment for the benefit of the community.
The Colonel’s dedication to progressive reform is typical of the Aufklarer, as is indeed 
his belief in the power of a progressive form of education to shape a population worthy 
of the new society and its ideals. La Roche shares the Enlightenment’s belief in the 
perfectibility of die human race. She is convinced that education can produce some quite 
radical changes in society. Like Gellert’s model characters, her Colonel Stemhehn is an 
active pedagogue. His pedagogical efforts are approved and assisted by the more 
enlightened members of the community. His aristocratic neighbours urge hhn to take 
mto his house young men just returned from their travels, in order that he may acquahit 
them by theory and example with the best method of managing their estates. In 
accordance with La Roche’s profound respect for learning, Sternheim also encourages 
liis pupils to read — above aU books of a scientific or historical nature. For La Roche’s 
characters knowledge is a source of supreme contentment. As Touafilon comments, 
"Gluck, das von ihrem Scliicksal unabhangig ist, schOpfen ihre Gestalten nicht allein aus 
dem Gefuhl, sondem auch aus dem Wissen"*. The religious views expressed by Colonel 
Stemhehn also owe much to the Enlightenment. Dhectly followhig his marriage he
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elucidates these in some detail to his wife. It is his belief that the teaching of the
principles of enlightened Chiistianity should form an integral part of any programme of
reform. Colonel Stemhehn has no sympathy for those who regard Enlightenment m
religious questions as the prerogative of the privileged classes and who would seek to
maintain the existing social order by keeping the masses in ignorance and superstition. f
La Roche is convinced that the spread of knowledge can only benefit the community,
since increasing enlightenment must serve to impress upon the common man his duties 4
towards hhnself and his neighbours. It is a view she shares with relatively few
contemporaries. As Sh Leslie Stephen has pointed out, in the eighteenth century
scepticism often went hand in hand with pragmatism:
The English sceptic of the upper classes... had no desire to propagate his 
creed, still less to attack the Church, which was a valuable part of his 
property... Voltahe was not intentionally destmctive in politics, whatever 
the real effects of his teaching... Hume, the great English sceptic, was 
not only a Tory in politics, but had no desire to affect the popular belief.
He could advise a clergyman to preach the ordinary doctrines because it 
was paying far too great a compliment to the vulgar to be punctilious 
about speaking the truth to them. A similar indifference is characteristic 
of the whole position. The select classes were to be perfectly convinced 
that the accepted creed was superstitious, but they were not for that 
reason to attack it. To the statesman, as Gibbon was to point out, a creed I
is equally useful, true or false,^
Believing as he does in the natural goodness of man, the Colonel rejects entirely the
orthodox concept of original sin:
Ich habe mich grtindlich von der Güte und dem gutem Nutzen der 
Wahrheiten unserer Religion überzeugt; aber die wenige Wirkung, die ihr 
Vortrag auf die Herzen der groBten Anzahl der Zuhbrer macht, gab mir 
eher einen Zweifel in die Lehren als den Gedanken ein, daB das 
menschhche Herz durchaus so sehr zum Bbsen geneigt sei, als manche 
glauben [p.43].
This emphasis on the "usefulness" of religion is typical of Enlightenment thinking, and 
reminiscent of Gellert’s standpoint. Gellert, however, at no point mentions the possibility 
of doubting the truth of established Lutheran dogma. La Roche does not develop this 
line of thought; she does not attack the doctrine of original sin with the righteous 
indignation of a Nicolai. Yet the Colonel’s belief in Man’s intrinsic goodness, we must
assume, coixesponds to her own view -  Sternheim is after all an ideal figure, intended
to serve as a model for our reader. Colonel Sternheim asserts that the truths of
enlightened Christianity can best be communicated to the common people if then
relevance to everyday hfe is made apparent. Meditations on the natirral world are, he
beheves, particularly well suited to impress upon a rural population the goodness of God 4i
the Creator. A good pastor whl, therefore, be one who concerns himself with the day-to-
day needs of his flock. Questions of dogma are, he maintains, much less important. He
outhnes the role of the pastor as follows:
Der Weg zu ihren Herzen [the reference here is to the peasants on 
Stemheim’s estates]... konne man am ehesten durch Betrachtungen über 
die physikahsche Welt finden, von der sie am ersten geriihrt werden, 
weil jeder Bhck ihrer Augen, jeder Schritt ihrer FüBe sie dahin leitet...
Wenn er [the pastor] die Besserung der Gemute nur durch sogenannte 
Gesetz- und Strafpredigten erhalten will... so wkd er auch nicht mein 
Pfarrer sein. Wenn er aufmerksamer auf den FleiB im Kirchengehen ist 
als auf die Handlungen des taghchen Lebens, so werde ich ihn fur keinen 
wahren Menschenfreund und fur keiuen guten Seelsorger halten [p.44].
La Roche’s conviction that the ideal pastor must play the part of a general educator in 
the community is one we will encounter again iu connection with Friedrich Nicolai’s 
Das Leben und die Meinungen des Herrn Magister Sebaldus Nothanker.
The religious views presented by the exemplary Stemhehn as worthy of adoption by La
Roche’s readership are very much those propoimded by the Enlightenment. Walter
Gebhardt’s assessment of Neologist Christianity also provides a fitting description of the %
position advocated by the Colonel:
Gott ist in erster Linie nur noch der Belohner und Richter unserer Taten, 
und zwar Richter nach bürgerhch-vemünftigem MaB, Sünde oder 
Verdienst sind schon hier auf Erden veraunftgerecht und einleuchtend zu 
erkennen und abzuwagen. DaB man ein Sunder von Geburt an sei, ist 
dem Burgermenschen eine abstruse Behauptung, die nicht widerlegt zu 
werden braucht. Der Mensch ist ihm ein unbeschriebenes Blatt, auf das 
im Laufe des Lebens Tugend und Laster ehigetragen werden. Und das 
Bose braucht man auch nicht so schwerwiegend zu beurteilen als 
Beleidigung Gottes und Weg zur HoUe. Wie Leibniz das Übel in der 
Welt als ein Negalivum, ein nicht Existierendes, ein Fehlen des Guten 
erklart hatte, so denkt jetzt die populare Ethik die Sünde als ein 
unvemünftiges Handeln aus Mangel besserer Einsichten. Ein aufgeklarter
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Yerstand niirnnt von selbst von solchen Torheiten Abstand/®
Sophie Sternheim too has many ideas and convictions which show clearly the influence 
of tlie Enlightenment, and since she, even more than her father, is conceived as the role- 
model for the reader, it is evident that these ideas and convictions are those which La 
Roche is seeking to propagate by means of her novel. Sophie is an avid reader. As 
Derby remarks: "das Fraulein Sternheim liebt Yerstand und Kenntnisse" [p. 104]. She 
concerns herself only with "mstmctive" readmg-matter, for the utilitarian principles of 
the Enlightenment are never far from her mind. She is convinced, as is Colonel 
Stemhehn, that knowledge — practical, useful knowledge — is capable of reshapmg 
society fiindamentally and for the better. Herr R., the author, understands her well:
Mit aller Frehnütigkeit sagte er mh emst: Ob sich schon Fahigkeiten und 
Wissensbegierde in beinahe gleichem Grade in meiner Seele zeigten, so 
wSie ich doch zu keiner Denkerin geboren: hingegen konnte ich 
zufiieden sein, daB die Natur durch die glücklichste Anlage, den 
eigentlichen Endzweck unseres Daseins zu erfuHen, dafür entschadigt 
habe: dieser bestehe eigentlich hn Handeln, nicht im Spekulieren [p. 109].
It is, of couise, Sophie’s ability to direct her energies into purposeful activity which
enables her to cope with the distress of behig deceived, humiliated and abandoned by the
hifamous Derby. In helping others she finds an anchor in trouble and a reason for living.
Religious faith alone can no longer supply this raison d’etre for La Roche’s characters.
For Sophie Stemhehn active philanthropy becomes a substitute for faith. Sophie is not
alone in finding consolation hi social activity of this kind. Walther Gebhardt sees La
Roche’s proposed answer to the problem of finding a meaning and purpose in hfe as |
being entirely typical of bourgeois attitudes of the thne:
Er [the new enlightened citizen] hat noch Fühlstaike und 
Empfindungsfahigkeit und das Bedürfnis nach einer Shingebung fiir seine 
Gefiihle. Sie in der Rehgion, hn Glauben zu finden, dazu ist er zu 
aufgeklart, viehnehr schafft er sich nun neue Gotter, neue Idole, die er 
mit gefühhger Innbmnst heben kann. Etwa das Ideal der 
Menschheitsvervohkommnung oder der Tugenderziehung.”
Sophie Stemhehn and her father both have a typically Enhghtened view of Nature. For 
them contemplation of the natural world is valuable because it serves as an exhortation
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to thoughts of the Creator. Sophie learns to venerate the power and vision of God
through admiring the splendour of the universe.
Es ist eine Pflicht des guten Geschopfs, die Werke seines Urhebers zu 
erkennen, von denen wir aHe AugenbHcke unseres Lebens so viel Gutes 
geniefien: da die ganze physikahsche Welt lauter Zeugnisse der 
Wohltatigkeit und Güte unseres Schbpfers in sich faBt, deren Anbhck 
und Kenntnis das reinste und voUkommenste, keinem ZufaU, keinem 
Menschen unterworfene Vergnügen in unsere Seele gieBt [p. 140].
The ideal course of study which Sophie prescribes for the children of Rat T. includes
mstruction in geography and in the natural sciences. "Je mehr Geschmack ihre Kinder an
der natUrhchen Geschichte unsers Erdbodens, je mehr Kenntnisse sie von seinen
Gewachsen, Nutzbarkeit und Schonheit erlangen, je sanfter werden ihre Gesinnungen,
Leidenschaften und Begierde" [p. 140]. Sophie loves Nature less because it is beautiful 4
than because it is conducive to moral improvement. She sees in the natural world a
pattern and a purpose, since God has created all in accordance with the principle of
utihty. Her viewpoint is teleological, typical of Wolffian rationalism.
Wie einnehmend bewies mein Papa mir diesen Grundsatz, da er mich in 
dem Naturreiche auf den Gedanken fühite, daB die Gattungen der 
Blumen, welche nur zur Ergbtzung des Auges dienten, viel weniger 
zahlreich und ihre Fruchtbarkeit weit schwacher ware, als der nützUchen 
Pflanzen, die zur Nahrung der Menschen und Tiere dienen [p.94].
Here the influence of Enlightenment thinking is of course clearly evident. Yet Sophie
von La Roche’s attitude to Nature would also appear to have been influenced by
Rousseau’s ideas on the power of civilisation to corrupt. Sophie Sternheim believes that
man has been increasingly corrupted by urban -- and, in particular, court -  society, as he
becomes increasingly alienated from the natural world. Society, La Roche argues
through her heroine, is no longer governed, as is everything in the world of Nature, by
the instinct for what is light.
Die ganze physikahsche Welt bleibt diesen Pfhchten getreu... nur die 
Menschen arten aus und Ibschen dieses Geprage aus, welches in uns viel 
starker und hi groBerer Schbnheit glanzen würde, da wir es auf so 
vielerlei Weise zeigen kbnnten [p. 175].
La Roche sees Man as one small pait of the general harmonious pattern which is Nature.
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Precisely Man, who could be the pride of this creation, insists on going his own way 
and destroys the harmony. "Warum [Sophie asks] ist die moralische Welt ihrer 
Bestimmung nicht ebenso getreu als die physikahsche?" [p. 196]
Thus, La Roche’s view of Nature — for here, as elsewhere, Sophie Sternheim speaks for 
the authoress — is eclectic almost to the point of being self-contradictory. The influence 
of the Enhghtenment, here as elsewhere, is unmistakable. Yet it is not the sole influence 
at work. Sophie’s hostihty towards the society of the town and die court would rather 
seem to point in the direction of Rousseau and of Sensibihty. We must now examine hi 
some detail La Roche’s attitude to Empfindsamkeit, As was clear from our brief 
consideration of the reception of the novel, one of the principal reasons for the 
populaiity of the book was the fact that its heroine was seen as a person of exemplaiy 
sensibility.
Even Colonel Stemhehn, in many ways the prototype of an Aufklarer, owes much to the 
cult of sensibility. Important here is the Colonel’s attitude to love and friendship. He 
cultivates a typically sentimental friendship with Baron von P. The two men are almost 
inseparable, confidants in everything, each prepared to make any sacrifice if  it wül 
contribute to the happiness of the other. The greatest pleasure they know is "das mhige 
Vergnügen der Freundschaft" [p.26]. In La Roche’s novel friendship is valued not least 
because it is ruhig. Her characters are anxious to avoid aU that is harsh, strident or hi 
any way overwhehmng. Hence the model characters — Sophie, her parents, her uncle the 
Baron -  all tiy to preserve some degree of control over their personal relationships: an 
excess of feeling would threaten the balance and restrahit they so much value.
Friendship is by its veiy nature more amenable to control than love.
The course of the relationship between Stemlieim and the young Sophie von P. is hi 





seen him. Her brother’s eulogistic description of the Colonel’s character, the perusal of 
Stemheim’s letters to his friend is sufficient to convince her (hat he is a man of 
exceptional worth. Her enthusiasm for Stemheim’s moral qualities soon develops into 
enthusiasm for the man himself. Such is her love for virtue in the abstract that she can 
love only that man who is an embodiment of her ideals. She loves the Colonel because 
he deserves to be loved. At first sight emotion as such would seem to have very little to 
do with the matter. Yet both Sternheim md his future wife react to these new 
experiences in a manner which can only be described as sentimental. Both become 
lachrymose and unsociable. Neither dares to express his or her feelings, still less to hope 
that these may be returned. Unable to take any decisive action, they derive a kind of 4
pleasure from their sufferings. Indeed, even on learning that he is loved, Stemhehn is 
ready, even eager, to renounce aU hope of happiness, "Sophie mein? Mit einer |
freiwhligen Zartlichkeit mein? Es ist genug. Sie geben allés. Ich kann nichts tun, als auf 
allés freiwillig entsagen" [p.36].
It is not insignificant that Sternheim marries the sister of his best friend, his "brother", p
According to Ladislao Mittner, this triangle was a recurrent motif in the literature of 
Sensibility:
Es war eine geradezu tyrannische Konvention, eine Art soziales Gesetz, 
aber auch ein Zeichen besonderen Gefühlsadels und erlesener 
Sensibilitât, sich in die Schwester des Freundes oder auch — das jedoch 
weniger haufig -  in die Freundin der Schwester zu verlieben. Durch die 
Liebe zur Schwester des Freundes wurde den Bund mit dem Freund, dem 
idealen Bruder sozusagen auf dessen Schwester ausgedehnt. Tatsachlich 
wurde die Schwester meistens geliebt, wed sie die Schwester des 
Freundes war: oft zeichneten sich die Gesprache zwischen dem Jüngling 
und der Geliebten sofort durch eine hohe Intensitat des Gefühls aus.^ ^
We shall encounter this theme again in Johann Martin Miller’s Siegwart.
If Sophie’s parents owe something to the conventions of Sensibility, the heroine herself |
is distinguished precisely by her capacity for feeling, her conviction that the ability to 4Î
experience emotion is the hallmark of a noble character. Indeed, the whole course of
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Sophie’s fate is determined by this aspect of her character. The âmes sensibles are by 
their very nature incapable of disguise and deception, and are therefore very much at die 
mercy of the hypocrites — they cannot conceal their feelings. Every thought finds 
expression, either in words or by means of a tear, a pale cheek or a sigh. The 
Empfindsame cannot comprehend that others may be able to simulate emotion they do 
not genuinely feel. Since they are themselves pure at heart, they are seldom distrustful 
and as a result they often fall victim to intrigue. Of course, their opponents and 
opposites — the cynical, unfeeling men and women of the world -  know how to exploit 
tills innocence for their ends. This is Sophie’s fate. She shares with the Empfindsame an 
inability to disguise her feelings, hence Derby has no difficulty in divining the course of 
action she is likely to take in any given circumstances. Sophie is powerless to defend 
herself against his evil machinations, since she would have had to be wicked herself in 
order to suspect that his virtue is merely a pretence, adopted for the express purpose of 
winning her favour. "O Gott! wo soli ein Herz wie dies, das Du mir gabst, wo soil es 
den Gedanken hemehmen bei einer edlen, bei einer guten Handlung bose Grundsatze zu 
aigwohnen?" [p.l84]
The âmes sensibles select their friends with care. They can feel only for those they 
recognise at once as kindred spirits. As is entirely typical of the protagonists of the 
novel of Empfindsamkeit (compare especially Werther and Siegwart) Sophie is prone to 
judge those she meets according to sudden sympathies and antipathies. The briefest 
acquaintance is sufficient to convince her that she and her aunt Countess Lbbau can 
never mean anything to one another. "Die Grâfin Lobau ist nicht meine Verwandtin; ihre 
Seele ist mir fremde" [p.56]. Blood relationships she believes to be without significance 
unless they be sanctioned by the bonds of friendship and instinctive understanding. In 
the senthnental friendships of the time, the first moment of meeting was often decisive. 
A single glance was often enough to establish a love relationship. Thus there is no need 
for Seymour to speak for Sophie to know tiiat he is of her kind. The âme sensible
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communicates his entire emotional hfe through the eloquence of facial expressions;
indeed, he caimot but do so, for he is incapable of disguising his feelings.
Mylord machte nichts als eine Verbeugung; aber seine Seele redete so 
deuthch in alien seinen Mienen, daB man zugleich seine Achtung fur 
allés, was das Fraulein C. sagt, und auch den BeifaU lesen konnte, den er 
ihrer Freundin [Sophie] gab. [p.66]
And further:
Was ich Ihnen von ihm geschrieben, war nichts anders, als daB ich allés 
Edle, aUes Gute, so mii‘ das Fraulein von ihm erzahlt, in seiner 
Physiognomie ausgedrtickt sah. [p.67]
One of the most sahent features of Empfindsamkeit was preoccupation with thoughts of
death and the grave. One need only think of Young’s Night Thoughts and their
enthusiastic reception in Gennany; of Luise von Ziegler who had a grave dug in her
garden and found considerable pleasure m lying down in it to imagine how it must be to
be dead^ *; the Sterbegraf in T.G. von Hippel’s Lebenslaufe nach aufsteigender Linie
who filled his house with the mortally sick, in order to observe the progress of their
disintegration. Equally common was the practice of consecrating hiHs, rocks or trees to
one’s own memory, even when one had no tiiought of dying for years to come. Caroline
Flachsland and Luise Ziegler both did so, as did Goethe while on a visit to the court at
Darmstadt, Sophie Sternheim thinks with pleasure of her own death. Confident that
neither her vhtue nor the intensity of her suffering wiU be forgotten, she hnagines how
her friends wiU mourn her. She writes to Emilia:
Pflanzen Sie, meine Liebe, in Ihrem Garten eine Zypresse, um die ein 
einsamer Rosenstock sich winde, an einen nahen Felsstein. Weihen Sie 
diesen Platz meinem Andenken; gehen Sie manchmal hin, vieUeicht wird 
es mir erlaubt sein, um Sie zu schweben und die zartliche Trane zu 
sehen, mit der Sie die abfaUende Blüte der Rose betrachten werden.
[p.257]
Sophie goes frequently to visit the grave of her parents. No sooner has she married 
Seymour than they undertake together a journey to this beloved spot. These visits move 
Sophie profoundly; yet her object is not only to mourn the dead. The memory of the 
exemplary lives lived by her parents will lend her, she hopes, the necessary moral
strength to retain her integrity in the corrupt atmosphere of D. It is in this spirit that she 
gathers a handful of earth from each of the graves, before giving herself up to the new 
world she both fears and despises. As ever in La Roche’s novel, when Sensibihty is S
presented as deserving of the reader’s commendation, it is Sensibility which has been 
tempered and restrained by a moral imperative.
Sophie Stemheim’s concept of love merits consideration m any discussion of the role of 
Sensibihty in the novel. As was entirely typical of Sensibility, Sophie believes friendship 
to be superior to love. This is her reason for rejecting the proposal of marriage made to 4
her by Lord Rich: "Teurer Lord Rich, Sie betrhgeri sich; niemals hat die Veraunft fur 
die Liebe gegen die Freundschaft gesprochen" [p.235]. As in every other aspect of hfe,
Sophie has been profoundly influenced in her attitude to love by the principles and ?
inclinations she has inherited from her parents. She has her mother’s sensitivity, and hke 4Ï
her mother she can love no man whose enthusiasm for virtue does not equal her own. |
The misfortunes of others move her to pity, but she is capable of love only when she 
sees in another the embodiment of her own principles. Colonel Stemhehn had 
recognised this at an early age:
Besonders wird die Liebe, bei aller der Zartlichkeit, die sie von ihrer 
würdigen Mutter geerbt hat, wenig Gewalt über sie erhalten; es müBte 
denn sein, daB das Schicksal einen nach ihrer Phantasie tugendhaften 
Mann hi die Gegend ihres Aufenthalts führte. [p.52]
It is significant that Derby accuses Sophie of something to which scholars have often |
taken exception when discussing the concept of love peculiar to Sensibility '^^ :
Ich sehe wohl..,, daB sie das Gluck meiner Liebe und meines Herzens 
niemals in Betrachtung gezogen, indem sie mir nicht den geringsten Zug 
meines eigenen Charakters zugut gehalten und mich nur dann geachtet 
habe, wenn ich mich nach ihien Phantasien gebogen und meine Begriffe 
mit ihren GiiUen geputzt. [p. 186]
In other words, Sophie cannot love a unique and imperfect human being, shnply a set of 
abstract ideas and virtues. Lother Pikulik’s analysis of the treatment of love m the f
Riihrende Komodie also shed light on the novel of Empfindsamkeit-.
92
i
Es fallt auf, daB überall... wo das Thema Liebe behandelt wird, auch 
iminer von Tugend die Rede ist, und meist offenbart sich dabei, daB das, 
was die zârtlichen Liebhaber an ihren Partnem lieben, nur dessen 
sittlicher Wert ist. Sie lieben den anderen nicht ganz, mit aUen seinen 
Eigenschaften, sondem vomehmlich und in den meisten Fallen 
ausschlieBlich seine Tugend. Deshalb erscheinen Liebeserklërungen so 
haufig als Ausdmck gegenseitiger Wertschâtzung. Liebe kann man also 
verdienen, wenn man namlich seinen Wert erweist... Man kann sie aber 
auch verlieren, wenn man seinen Wert einbüBt.^ ’
Such is precisely the course taken by the relationship between Sophie and Lord 
Seymour. For Gellert’s characters, too, love was dependent on virtue; mutual respect 
was thought to be the most essential prerequisite for a happy marriage. The same is true 
for the figures in La Roche’s novel — but here the presence of virtue is a still more 
necessary ingredient hi love relationships, because the authoress (unlike Gellert) strongly il
disapproves of the erotic form of love.
No discussion of La Roche’s attitude to Empfindsamkeit would be complete without 
detailed examination of the character of Lord Seymour, an âme sensible par excellence.
He has some of the characteristics we noted m Gellert’s Herr R., the same tendency to 4
melancholy, the same unsociabihty and preference for solitude. Sophie notices at once 
the "durch etwas Melancholisches gedëmpfte Feuer semer schdnen Augen" [p.66].
Seymour’s natural mclination towards melancholy is not, as is the case with Herr R., 
held in check by reason. Seymour is turned in upon hhnself -  inevitably so, for his 
enthusiasm for the ideal of virtue does not find expression in practical activity until after 
his marriage to Sophie at the end of the novel. Seymour positively indulges in his 
melancholy and despair. Like his successors Werther and Siegwart, instead of shniggling 
to overcome his unhappiness, he allows hhnself to shik ever deeper into gloom and 
despondency. When he begins to fear that Sophie may be dead, he returns to his mother 
at Seymour House, not in the hope tliat thne wiU heal his wounds, but expressly "dem 
Übel meines Korpers and meiner Seele nachzuhangen" [p,258]. Just as he had expected 
perfect happiness -  claimed it as his right — so he now believes hhnself to have been 
singled out for absolute and eternal misery. Seymour is very weU aware that he
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possesses an unusual capacity for feeling. In conversation, as in his correspondence, he 
rarely misses an opportunity to stress the difference between hhnself and "others". His 
sensibility is an end m itself; it is not subordinated to a moral system, as it is m 
Sophie’s case. Unlike Sophie, he is not actively concerned with the welfare of his fellow  
men, hence he can have real communication only with those few âmes sensibles whom 
he acknowledges as kindred sphits.
Seymour suffers from spleen. He is unhappy without knowing precisely why, and
despite all the advantages afforded hhn by bhth, wealth and personal merit. He feels that
the world is not quite as it should be. He cannot accept it as it is, but knows that he can
do little to change it. The extent and nature of his alienation become apparent when we
compare him with his brother, Lord Rich. Rich is a philosopher, a man of the world,
who has suppressed all inner conflict and attained the state of Gelassenheit. Without
being unfeehng, he is cahn, rational, moderate and therefore capable of Hvhig in peace
and contentment in a less than perfect world. He has a profound understanding of the
psychology of Sensibility. He recognises that Seymour and those like him are by tlieir
very nature incapable of accepting compromise. Such a man, Rich realises, cannot
moderate his wishes or resign himself to an imperfect world. For him there can only be
extremes, no half-measures; whatever is not perfect he must reject as worthless. And if,
Rich maintains, this man fails to attain his ideal in life, then life itself wiU become
intolerable to him and he will long for death. The philosopher Rich is less demanding,
less presumptuous. Because he has learnt to content hhnself with a less than perfect
happiness, Rich is able to renounce his hopes of marrying Sophie.
Wie uneimeBlich ware meine Gltickseligkeit gewesen. Aber ich ersticke 
meine Wunsche auf ewig. Mem Bruder soli leben. Seme Seele kann den 
Verlust ihrer Hoffhungen nicht noch einmal ertragen; meine Jahre und 
Erfahiung werden mir durchhelfen. Seymour muB das MaB der 
Zufriedenheit voU haben, sonst genieBt er nichts, mh reicht ein Teil 
davon zu, dessen Wert ich kenne. [p.271]
Typical of Empfindsamkeit is Seymour’s antipathy to active involvement in political Hfe.
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Like Werther he is secretary to an ambassador, whom he dislikes. Like Werther, he
experiences considerable difficulty in suppressing his feelings when professional
considerations would normally require him to do so. He feels that he is completely
unsuited to the demands of a diplomatic career. He is not ambitious; not even the desire
to do good would make him so. Seymour could have a brilliant career as an ambassador
or ininister if  he wished. He is not only of noble birth, even with the best of coimections
(his immediate superior is his uncle); he is also an Englishman, and La Roche is so
enthusiastic in her praise of England not least because she believes that country’s social
and political circumstances to be such as to enable every man of merit and integrity to
accomplish much good, if  only he is willing. Seymour refrains from active involvement
in political life, not because those in power refuse to allow hhn to participate, but
because his sensibilities are too tender and his nerves too weak, because he considers the
analysis and cultivation of his own personality to provide the most worthy employment
for his more than ordinary talents. La Roche’s presentation of Seymour reveals the
erroneous reasoning of the Marxist interpretation of Empfindsamkeit. I quote W olf
Lepenies as an exponent of this narrowly sociological standpoint:
Im Gegensatz zu Frankreich, wo der Beamtenadel neben den Hof und 
Landadel tritt, wird in Deutschland die Aristokratie selbst zum 
Beamtenadel, und das Bürgertum muJ3 sich mit den subaltemen 
Fositionen bescheiden. Daher riihrt seine Passivitat, und weil die 
Intelligenz sich aus den mittelstëndischen, eben dkonomisch schwachen 
Bürgem zusammensetzt, greift diese Passivitat auf das ganze Kulturleben 
über und fuhrt zur totalen Trennung von Privatheit und Politik.
AusschluB von der realen Machtausübung und der daraus resultierende 
Druck zur Rechtfertigung der eigenen Situation erzeugen Weltschmerz, 
Melancholic, Hypochondrie.^*
As Seymour’s example proves, the truth is in fact rather the reverse. Seymour does not 
become (over-) sensitive because pariicipation in political affairs is denied hhn. On the 
contraiy, he holds himself aloof from politics because he wishes to have sufficient 
leisure to lead a purely private, reflective life: "Innerlichkeit und Leiden sind bei den 
Empfindsamen nicht Folge des Mangels an Aktivitat, sondem dessen Ursache."^^
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iAlthough he is aware that Sophie is in considerable danger, at the mercy of her
intriguing, self-seeking family, Seymour makes no attempt whatever to come to her
assistance. He does pity her and the prospect of her humiliation does cause him intense
personal anguish; yet he does nothing. The motives for his silence are not entirely clear.
It is possible that he is incapacitated by the typically empfindsam tendency towards
apathy and procrastination, which values thought above action; perhaps also because he
is eager that the steadfastness of her principles should be put to the test. It would seem
to be more important to him that he win a wife whose exceptional virtue has been
proved to the world than that Sophie should be preserved from peril and suffering.
Seymour adheres to the Richardsonian concept of Woman, according to which her worth
is determined by her chastity, and by that alone. He appears to feel more for himself
than for Sophie. When he believes she may be in danger of succumbing to the
machinations of the courtiers, he thoughts are aU for the distress tiiis spectacle must
occasion to himself. The egoism which would rather inflict suffering upon a beloved
friend than compromise an ideal or forgo the pleasure which may be derived from 4
witnessing the spectacle of a few moving scenes, is typical of sensibility in its more
extreme form of Empfindelei or AfterempfindsamkeiP^. Merciless in his dealings with
Sophie, Seymour shows no indulgence for natural human weakness. No sooner had he
formed the suspicion that she may be favourably disposed towards the Prince, than he 4
begins to despise her as exclusively and as intensely as he had hitherto loved her. The
possibility that some mistake or misunderstanding may have prompted him to pass an
unjust or over-hasty judgement on Sophie does not occur to him. He requires that Sophie
coirespond to his ideal of perfection, for he wül admit of no compromise here or
elsewhere. For Seymour, SopMe must be either an angel of virtue, or the most
degenerate and shameless of women. He feels
die heftigste auBerste Verachtuug über ihre vorgespiegelte Tugend, und 
die elende Aufopferung derselben, über die Frechheit, sich vor dem 
ganzen Adel zum Schauspiel zu machen und die vergnügteste Miene 
dabei zu haben. [p. 117]
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Count R .’s reproachful words to Seymour are smely entirely justified:
Wie konnte ein Mann, dem die weibliche Welt bekannt sein muB, dieses 
auserlesene Madchen miBkeimen und den allgemeinen MaBstab 
vomehmen, um ihre Verdienste zu prüfen? [p.214]
La Roche clearly does not intend to set Seymour up as a model of exemplaiy conduct.
His failings aie made obvious to the reader and even to Seymour himself -  Rich,
Colonel Sternheim, Sophie’s uncle. Count R. aU supply a corrective. They do not have 
Seymoui ’s sensibility, but neither do they have his egoism or indecisiveness. Seymour’s 
sensibihty is questionable because it is feeling for himself and not for otliers. La Roche 1
and her heroine can countenance only altruistic sensibility:
O, wie sehr habe ich den Unterschied der Wirkungen der 
Empfindsamkeit fur andere und der fiir uns allem kennengelemtl [p. 174]
Seymour possesses many of those fadings most often singled out by the critics of 
Empfindsamkeit.
Nicht stoische Gefiihllosigkeit wird gewiinscht, sondem temperiertes 
Mitempfinden. So macht man dem Empfindsamen auch weniger sem 
Gefiihl als den Mangel an innerer Festigkeit zum Vorwurf, das 
Schwanken zwischen extremen ÂuBerungen.^ ^
Salvation comes for Seymour only with his marriage to Sophie. Under her influence he
learns to moderate his feelings, he becomes calm and content and dedicates himself to 4
social and agricultural reform. Once convinced of Sophie’s innocence, Seymour again
swings to the opposite extreme and, instead of despising her utterly, now venerates her
almost as a supernatural being. He indulges in what amounts to a cult of her memory —
for he derives a bitter pleasure from imagining her dead -  in a manner entirely typical
of Empfindsamkeit:
Ich nahm das Zimmer ihrer Jungfer, weil ich darin den Platz bemerket 
hatte, wo sie gekniet, wo sie den unaussprechhchen Schmerzen gefiihlt 
hatte, betrogen und verlassen zu sein. Trosdose Zârthchkeit und ein 
Gemische von bitterm Vergnügen bemâchtigten sich meiner mit der 
Empfindung, welche rah' sagte: hier lag das liebenswürdige Geschopfe, 
in dessen Armen ich alle meine Glücksehgkeit gefunden hatte; hier 
bewehite ihr blutendes Herz die Treulosigkeit des verruchtesten 
Bosewichts!... Vergnügen, ja ein schmerzhaftes Vergnügen genoB ich bei 
dem Gedanken: daB meine verzweiflungsvoUe Trânen noch die Spmen
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der ihrigen antreffen und sich mit ilmen vereinigen würden. Ich stund 
auf, ich kniete auf dem namHchen Platz, wo der stumme, zerreiBende 
JaiTimer über ihre Emiedrigung sie hmgeworfen hatte. [p.212]
Seymour wishes to experience Sophie’s grief vicariously. He wallows in thoughts of her
sufferings in a manner reminiscent of the Pietistic cult of Christ the innocent lamb
brought to the slaughter. He experiences at one and the same time pity, repentance and
satisfaction that his sensitive soul is permitted to taste such exquisitely intense pain.
Balet and Gerhard summarise this situation thus:
Das LustvoUe war*... gerade das LeidvoUe, wed das Leid 
begreiflicherweise die tiefsten Rührungen und Erschiitterungen 
hervorzurufen imstande 1st. Man wuhlte derm auch damais fonnlich im 
Leid herum. BewuBt malte man sich das wirkliche Leid in grelleren 
Farben aus, als es in Wirldichkeit besaB. Und wenn sich nichts 
Qualvolles ereignete, dachte man sich irgendein môgüches Leid aus, 
steigerte sich dieses Phantom maBlos, um sich an der wohligen Wollust 
des Fühlens hingeben zu koimen.^ ®
Christine TouaUlon argues that La Roche’s novel has in fact been influenced profoundly
by Pietistic thinking:
Die nahere Betrachtung der Handlung zeigt, daB sie auf theologischen 
Grundlagen beruht: im Leben der Heldin sind deutlich drei Stufen zu 
unterscheiden, namHch Versuchung, Emiedrigung, Erhbhung dieselben 
drei Stufen, welche schon die Grundlage des chrisdichen Mythos 
bilden... Die Seele der Heldin muB durch einen bestimmten 
Durchgangspunkt der Verzweiflung gehen, einen BuBkampf erleben, 
dem... der Gnadedurchbmch folgt; und diese Stufenleiter entsprich der 
Lehre August Hermaim Franckes, welche verlangt, daB jeder, der zum 
wahren Christentura koramen wolle, zuerst verzweifeln mûsse wie der 
Verbrecher, den man zum Hochgerichte führe.^ ^
It is tme that there are certain parallels here. Sophie’s pride is succeeded by a fall, 
which in turn is succeeded by the triumph of her best qualities, by a new tolerance and 
humanity. However, the similaiities with Pietistic thmking should not be 
overemphasised. We have no reason to suppose that in writing tire novel La Roche 
deliberately set out to illustrate in the form of a par able the teachings of Francke, or of 
any oürer thinker for that matter. TouaiUon greatly overstates her case: "Die ganze Luft, 
welche den Roman durchweht, 1st pietistische Luft"^ .^ The reality is considerably more 
complex.
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La Roche’s portrayal of the court aristocracy is critical, even harsh, but without the 
sensationalism in which Hermes too frequently indulges. She can neither understand nor
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Sophie shares with tlie Pietists a strong disapproval of everything frivolous. Life at the 
corrupt and immoral court at D. makes her very wary of dancing -  especially, of course,
Jof the waltz -  and of the theatre and fine clothes. She regards the theatre as merely a f
source of entertainment, and hence as morally suspect. The possibility that it might also ij
serve a didactic purpose never apparently occurs to her. She believes that the theatre is 4
useless, and whatever is useless she condemns. Indeed, Sophie would appear to be ;
indifferent to art in aU its various forms. When asked for her opinion of a popular play t
she readily admits that she feels "nicht das geringste" [p. 84] for the hero and heroine. ï
The traditional Pietistic attitude to the arts tended to be one of scepticism, if not of 
outright hostility. Like the Pietists, Sophie disapproves of everything which merely f
serves as ornamentation -  in contrast to Gellert’s characters, who welcome everything 4
pleasant, including erotic love, as a gift from Heaven. We should no doubt be mistaken 
however to look for evidence of direct Pietistic influence here. Condemnation of the 
theatie, for example, could be heard as often from the representatives of orthodox 
Lutheranism as from the Pietists -  as is evident from the conflict between the young 
Lessing and his father, indeed, we have no reason to suppose that La Roche’s 
"Puritanism" has a religious basis. She rejects the frivolity of the court, not specifically W
because it is displeasing to God, but because it serves no useful purpose, because she 
believes that those who indulge in such a lifestyle would do better to devote themselves 
to study and charitable works. In short, her "Puritanism" is rooted in the idea of virtue.
The reader must be prevented from laying the book aside in favour of something less 
obviously didactic. La Roche — as die superior narrator — need not have recourse to 
such tactics: the development of her plot is by no means lacking in interest, even 
suspense.
excuse the frivolity and superficiality wliich she sees as an almost unavoidable aspect of 
court life. In seeking to portray a principle of evil over which Sophie’s virtue can 
triumph, she selects the court and courtiers as die most suitable representative of a 
lifestyle devoted to nothing but intrigue, ease and empty pleasures. She is on the whole 
successful in avoiding the sensational or fantastic; thus her representation of the evils of 
aristocratic society is not unconvincing, the more so because she delineates a psychology 
of vice a good deal more credible than Hermes’ simplistic polarities.
The Swedish Prince in Gellert’s novel pursues the Countess because she is beautiful and 
he desires her. His motives are unambiguous. Derby, La Roche’s villain, is rather more 
complicated. Clearly, he is a sensualist and a Don Juan. He lists his conquests with 
evident satisfaction. It is significant that he has devoted particular attention to proud, 
sagacious and pious women; a victory over Sophie’s virtue he would consider his tour 
de force. Derby has obtained no real satisfaction from having seduced so many women. 
Sophie constitutes for him an entirely new experience — or so he believes — a welcome 
challenge in a life now lacking in excitement. "Das Madchen macht eine ganz neue 
Gattung von Charakter aus" [p.l21]. It has been remarked that Derby’s wickedness is 
largely unmotivated wickedness for wickedness’ sake.^  ^ It is true that he does give 
himself no end of trouble to obtain a pleasure wliich is by its very nature transitory and 
which in this case turns out to be no veiy great pleasure after all. The end, in short, 
would scarcely appear to justify the means. We ought perhaps to ask, therefore, whether 
Derby’s aim is in fact simple physical fulfilment. Clearly, more is involved. He longs to 
humble Sophie’s proud virtue, to destroy her self-sufficiency. In convincing himself that 
even the most indomitable virtue can be overcome, Derby perhaps hopes to justify his 
own predilection for vice; it is perhaps because he feels threatened by virtue that he
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experiences the compulsion to destroy it  His attitude is certainly typical of tire villains
of the novel of Empfindsamkeit (again compare Hermes):
Die Lasterhaften handeln ebenso aus Piinzip wie die von ihnen 
Verfolgten. Das Piinzip des Bbsen, das sie verkbrpem, veranlaBt sie, die 
Tugend zu verfolgen, auch wenn sie nichts dabei zu gewinnen haben... 
die Schurken stellen der christhchen Moral der Guten ihren zynischen 
MateriaUsraus entgegen und legen ihre Grundsatze wie jene ausführlich 
in Briefen nieder, nebst ihren verbrecherischen Planen und Triumphen.^
Eva D. Becker’s analysis of the traditional structure of the Prilfungsroman is valid for 
La Roche’s novel, though it is worthy of note that Derby, somewhat unusually, is not 
shown to be wicked because he is an atheist or free-thinker. We are given no definite 
infonnation as regards Derby’s religious views — m La Roche’s novel vice, as well as 
virtue, exists independently of religious belief.
Derby is very much a standard aristocratic villain, perhaps owing much to Richardson’s 
Lovelace, He helps to convince the reader that the world of the great and poweiful is 
one of immorality and corruption. Indeed La Roche is severe in her criticism of court 
and courtiers. As in Gellert’s Schwedische Graf in the criticisms here levelled at the court 
aristocracy carry aU the more conviction for being voiced by a member of the ruling 
class, who has personal experience of life at court and whose disapprobation of court 
practices could scarcely be ascribed to envy. Sophie Stemheim has every opportunity to 
observe die grofie Welt at close quar ters once she is obliged to take up residence with 
her aunt and uncle. From the outset her relations with this couple are fraught with 
tension. Sopliie is critical of the Lbbaus and their friends not least because she considers 
that they fulfil no useful function is society, their sole purpose in life being to amuse 
themselves. Sophie envies Emilia, the simple pastor’s wife, because modesty, innocence 
and vhtue are still respected in the middle-class society to which she is confined. Sophie 
would gladly exchange all the luxury and pomp of the court for this quiet existence. 
Count and Countess Lobau regard Sophie’s belief in the superiority of merit over rank 
as a ridiculous eccentricity, a regrettable consequence of her middle-class heritage and a
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betrayal of the aristocracy. They are anxious to see those middle-class ideas replaced by 
others more appropriate to her projected status as the Prince’s mistress. It is their 
intention to conveit her to "eine ihrem Stande gemaBere Denkungsart" [p.92]. They 
likewise pour scorn on Sophie’s taste for scholarship, something they, in common with 
many eighteenth century aristocrats, consider an unworthy pursuit for people of rank. If 
Sophie is to avoid the ridicule of her equals in D. she must strive to conceal the greatest 
part of what she has learnt; when she fails in this, her aunt reproaches her: "ich hatte 
einen schonen Beweis gegeben, daB ich die Enkelin eines Professors sei" [p.95].
The style of life which Sophie favours is indeed typically bourgeois. Although it would
certainly be an over-simplification to equate morality with the middle class, it is
nevertlieless true that in the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie was particularly zealous
in the pursuit of virtue. In fact, virtue and morality were seen by the middle class as
qualities in which they could compete with and even outshine the aristocracy. Virtue and
morality were, or were perceived as, bourgeois qualities and strengths. Moreover, the
bourgeoisie of course in general lack the means to indulge in extravagant living, and the
economic supremacy to which it aspired could only be assured if it practised temperance
and thrift. Jürgen Jacobs has provided us with a plausible, if partial, explanation of the
uneasy relationship between aristocracy and bourgeoisie.
Die bürgerüche Lebensfonn unterscheidet sich vor allem dadurch von 
der adligen, daB sie eine intime private Sphare von der bffentJichen 
deutlich trennt. Diese Treimung ist der hofischen Aristokratie nicht |
voUziehbar. Berufs- und Privadeben koimen nicht auseinanderfalien, weil 
der Adel selbst als Beruf gelten kann und wed den Mitgdedem der |
Aristokratie die Betatigung in bürgerlichen Professionen wie Handel und |
Gewerbe verboten ist. Das Standesethos verpflichtet den Adel zu |
dauemder DarsteUung des gesellschafüichen Ranges und regiert auch |
solche Bereiche, die nach bürgerlichen Yorstedungen ganz privât sein |
soden: die Heirat etwa dient vor adem der Stabidsierung des Ranges, |
den Glanz des Hanses, nicht der BegrUndung eines Lebensbereiches, in |
dessen vertrauensvoden, gefuhlsgetragenen Indmitat sich die Existenz J
erfüden kbnnte.^  ^ iIDespite her hostidty towards court and courtiers, La Roche is favourably disposed to tlie |
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aristocracy as an institution. She is critical of the morals of the aristocracy because, like 
many of her contemporaries, she wishes to see this class return to its original "purity". 
"Man wodte, wie Klopstock zum Beispiel uns verrât, einen sittlichen Adel begründen, 
der den stëndischen Adel überlegen wai."^ *^  La Roche’s ideal is similar: it is her wish 
that the actual aristocracy and the aristocracy of merit — or of feeling — may become 
one and the same. Contemporary aristocrats have, she believes, fallen short of the high 
standards of behaviour established by their ancestors and have thus proved themselves 
unworthy of their noble inheritance. Families were originally raised to the nobility as a 
reward for exceptional merit; La Roche argues that the class should endeavour to remain 
an ethical elite. It is with such thoughts in mind that Bar on von P. defends the proposed 
marriage between his sister and Stemheim.
La Roche is severe in her criticism of court and courtiers, yet the Prince himself, as
head of the feudal hierarchy of which she in principle approves, remains sacrosanct.
Like the Prince in Lessing’s Emilia Galotti (1772) he is not himself vicious. Both rulers
are merely weak, at the mercy of their own sensuality and of scheming, self-seeking
courtiers. It cannot be said that La Roche’s apparent unwillingness to deliver an outright
attack on an absolute monarch is due to the deshe to escape censorship, since she never
intended her novel for publication. We should rather look for an explanation in the fact
that La Roche was very well aware of the advantages — advantages to herself and others
-  inherent in the prevailing social order. She wished to see this order improved -  not
abolished. Seymour excuses the Prince’s apparent insensitivity to the plight of his
poorest subjects with the words: "Sie mtissen den Fürsten nicht verurteilen, man
unterrichtet die groBen Heiren sehr selten von dem wahren Zustande ihrer Untertanen"
[p.72]. The Prince gladly makes use of the opportunity to do good, on those few
occasions when others place such an opportunity before him,
Er versprach mir [Sophie] allés Gute, lobte mich wegen meinem Eifer 
und setzte hinzu, wie geme er UngliicMichen zu HiUfe komme, aber, daB 
er wohl einsehe, daB diejenigen, die ihn umgaben, immer zuerst fur sich 
und die ihrigen besorgt wMren; ich wiirde ihm vieles Vergniigen machen,
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weim ich ihm noch mehr Gegenstënde seiner Wohltatigkeit anzeigen 
woHte. [p. 133]
It is also significant that as soon as he is enlightened as to Sophie’s real character and 
principles, the Prince willingly renounces aU claim upon her.
As we have seen, La Roche favours far-reaching changes in the life-style of the court |
aristocracy; she wishes virtue, usefulness and philanthropy to take the place of idleness %
and intrigue. She does not attack the nobility as an institution, merely its corruption and «
abuse by self-seeking opportunists. She wants no very radical changes in the structure of 5Î
society. Indeed, her concern for reform is reminiscent of Maria Theresa’s efforts to 
improve the morals of the Imperial Court; or of the opinions of Joseph II, who abhorred 
the debaucheries of Versailles not least because he recognised that the aristocracy must 
conform (at least to some degree) to generally accepted moral standards, if it was not to 
destroy itself.
Sophie argues that the poor should be content with their lot, since being poor they are
spared many anxieties and responsibilities. She believes modest circumstances to be
entirely compatible with happiness, albeit with happiness of a rather different kind from
that generally enjoyed by the rich and powerful. She advises her protégé. Rat T.:
Die Geschichte der moralischen Welt soHen Dire Kinder auch kennen: 
die Verandeiungen, welche ganze Konigreiche und erhabne Personen 
betroffen, werden sie zu Betrachtungen leiten, deren Wirkung die 
Zufriedenheit mit ihren emgeschrënkten Umstanden sein wird. [p. 140]
The idea that the aristocracy had particulai’ duties and responsibilities was not 
uncommon at the time. One need only think of Frederick the Great’s definition of the 
ruler as the first servant of the state. Similarly, Joseph IX believed that the aristocracy Ç
should, in accordance with its piivDeges and superior education, show an example to the
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rest of society. Thus in Josephioian society members of the aristocracy tended to be
punished more severely for breaches of the law than did the ordinary populace — the
reason being that Joseph believed that society might have been entitled to expect better
conduct from the highest classes. In all her dealings with the poor, Sophie is concerned
to instUl in them the conviction that they have no reason to regret their modest position
in die world. They have, she fhmly believes, been placed in their respective stations by
God, and they must accept then allotted places in the scheme of things with equanimity:
Ich stehe wirldich in dem Kreise armer und dienender Personen, also 
achte ich mich verbunden, diese durch Unterricht und Beispiel zu ihrem 
MaB von Tugend und Gluck zu fiihren, wobei ich aber sehr vermeiden 
werde, ihnen Begriffe oder Gesinnungen einzuflôBen, die meinen 
glanzenden und angesehenen Umstanden gemaB waren, weil ich furchten 
würde, daB aus der vermischten Denkensart vermischte Begierden und 
Wiinsche entstehen môchten, [p.220]
La Roche would appear to regard poverty as some kind of metaphysical necessity.
Sophie believes it should be alleviated, not abolished completely:
Die bauerliche Not... wird nicht als eigentliches soziales Phanomen 
gesehen und als solches auf die noch immer bestehende Leibeigenschaft, 
den Dmck des Frontendienstes, der Steuem und Abgaben oder auf 
andere Rehkte der überkommenen Feudalordnung zurückgeführt. Sie 
erscheint ihr... als Konsequenz natürHcher Umstande, d.h., als Teil der 
physikalischen Welt.^ ^
That La Roche should adhere to this standpoint is, after aU, scarcely surprising. Precisely 
what we should not expect from her is a revolutionary message. She had herself 
benefited in no small degree from her husband’s good connections.^ ® Frequent visits to 
the court at Mainz had familiarised her with the best which aristocratic circles had to 
offer in tenns of intelligence, wit and cultivation. Moreover, one finds few voices in 
eighteenth-century Germany raised in favour- of the abolition of all class distinctions. 
(Even Goethe’s Werther, despite his radicalism in other areas, accepts that differences of 
rank are "necessary"). This evident conservatism cannot simply be ascribed to the 
restrictions imposed by censorship, or by the desire to avoid it. La Roche paints a 
somewhat idealised picture of rural poverty.
Die auf den Feldera sitzenden Kinder verleihen dem Bild der armen
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Weiber eine versbhnende, riihrende Komponente, und die gleiche 
Versohnung wird anch geleistet durch die Beobachtung der geduldenden 
Gelassenheit der Bauero... es bleibt offen, ob die Relation von Leiden . 
und Geduld als adversative, additive oder gar kausale zu verstehen 
sei.^
La Roche’s peasants are resigned, industrious and grateful for the assistance Sophie 
affords them; these commendable qualities of course form a marked contrast to the I
intrigue and self-indulgence prevalent at the court in D. Indeed, the peasants might be 
regarded as providing an example to be followed by the reader and by Sophie Stemheim |
herself -  Sophie too must learn to endure sirffering and hmniliation with patience.
It is scarcely surprising that La Roche concentrates on depicting rural, patriarchal 
society. Even in the 1770’s feudalism was still widespread in Germany. Yet her 
portrayal of England -  where the process of industrialisation, with the accompanying 
general migration to the towns, was weU under way — is very similar. Here too it is 
country life which engages her interest. The role of the enlightened, progressive country 
squire, she believes, offers unique opportunities for involvement in good works and 
schemes of social improvement. No mention is made in the novel of the new and severe 
problems of urban poverty, overcrowding and public health. Poverty as La Roche 
describes it is always clean and tidy. As companion to Lady Summers and subsequently 
as mistress of Seymour House, Sophie enjoys a positively idyllic existence in mral 
suiToundings. A country estate provides the perfect background for Sophie’s reforming 
zeal: it is large enough to offer plenty of scope for improvement, small enough for her 
to establish a personal relationship with the tenants, to familiarise herself with then 
individual needs. The owner of such a property, we are led to believe, can find on his 
own lands sufficient work to engage his energies for a lifetime. If he feels himself 
compelled to involve himself in matters outside his own estates, he may try to persuade 
neighbouring landlords to follow his example in instituting agricultural reforms — as M
Colonel Stemheim does and as Seymour learns to do. In involving himself fully in lois 
own society, a landlord can quite easily forget the wider, much less idyllic world beyond
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-  and this is precisely what La Roche’s characters do. Even the vexed question of 4
ÿenclosures, a reform which threw countless dispossessed farmers into the most desperate •$
plight, is not permitted to intrude on the idyll.
Wieland, as we have seen, took exception to what he termed Sophie Stemheim’s 
"Pradeliktion fur die Mylords" [p.24]. It is clear that La Roche indeed regards England 5
as constituting an ideal society. Since at the time of writing her Stemheim she had no i
personal experience of English life, her favourable conception of the country and its “
population can only have been derived from secondary sources — in particular from the 4
literature of Sensibility, from the writings of authors such as Richardson, Young and #
iGoldsmith. La Roche shares the then widely-held view that the English were a nation 
peculiarly prone to melancholy. Seymour speaks proudly of the "feurige
Einbüdungskraft" [p.Sl] which he believes to be characteristic of his compatriots. J
Sophie’s English grandmother, we are told, is frequently sad for no obvious reason; she 
seeks solitude and cherishes a secret which is never disclosed to the reader. These Î
character traits are inherited, albeit in a less pronounced fonn, by her daughter and 
granddaughter. Seymour, as we have seen, suffers from spleen. He feels thoroughly iU at 
ease in the world; he is weary of life, even before his love for Sophie brings him 
genuine distress. Sophie Stemheim is predisposed in favour of the English even before 
she has had an opportunity to determine whether their conduct actually corresponds to î
the ideal of Tugendempfindsamkeit she holds so dear. She does not quite regard 
Englishness as a virtue in itself; she certainly does consider that in no other country are 
social and political conditions so conducive to the general increase of virtue, justice and 
tolerance. For La Roche’s characters England represents naturahiess, simplicity and 
freedom. They consciously believe it to be a land in which the bourgeoisie enjoys all the 
privileges which elsewhere would be restricted to the aristocracy. Seymour and his uncle 
are convinced that Derby would be brought to justice in England. Here one is tempted to i|




very different. WMe Derby’s talent for conceiving elaborate schemes of deception can 
scarcely have been commonplace, it seems probable that, should such an instance have 
come to light, its instigator would have been treated with some degree of indulgence, 
with the justification that a young man must be allowed to "sow his wild oats". It seems 
equally questionable whether unequal marriages were regarded in England with quite the 
degree of approbation La Roche’s characters suppose. Even if some noblemen did marry 
middle-class girls, it seems probable that the prospect of material gain was more 
frequently instrumental in bringing about such matches than either love or esteem for 
exemplary virtue can have been. The middle classes were, after all, increasing in 
prosperity, while many members of the nobility were hr desperate need of money if they 
were to maintain a luxurious, even extravagant, lifestyle. In short, real social conditions 
in eighteenth-century England were, for the bourgeoisie as for the urban and rural poor, 
a good deal less pleasant than a reading of La Roche’s novel would suggest.
Sophie von La Roche is no tlieoiist and no very careful or logical thinker. Her book is a 
novel of ideas in the sense and to the extent that her main purpose in writing is to 
inculcate in her readers — for we must remember that, although La Roche did not intend 
to submit her novel for publication, she did wish copies to be distributed to those friends 
and acquaintances she believed would look favourably upon it — a variety of ideas and 
ideals of which she approved. These vaiious opinions could scarcely be said to 
constitute a philosophy of life which was systematic or even very coherent. If she had 
subjected her own world-view to rational analysis, La Roche might well have found 
that she possessed convictions which were, strictly speaking, mutually contradictory. She 
is an adherent at one and the same time of the Enlightenment and of Empfindsamkeit — 
a position which, while not impossible m itself, was an uneasy one nonetheless.
In matters of religion La Roche — and here her model characters, especially Colonel 




of the Aufklarer. She shares the Enlightenment’s traditional hostility towards dogma, in 
particular' dogma which is destructive of the tolerance she would wish to see extended to 
all shades of religious belief. For La Roche, as for GeUert, religion is — or should be -  
above all a matter of practical ethics. She considers that no one, however poor or 
uneducated, should be denied access to the fundamental principles of an enlightened and 
rational Christianity. Yet neither would she have men’s material needs neglected by a 
clergy too much occupied with metaphysical speculation. Her model characters insist 
that Volkserziehung constituted an essential part of that general responsibility which the 
educated classes naturally bear for the weU-being of theii' "inferiors". It should not be 
overlooked that this very rejection of dogma in favour of practical morality and social 
reform was also characteristic of Pietistic tlrinking. Yet this and, still more strikingly, a 
belief hi the paramount importance of individual emotional experience, should not blhid 
us to the profound differences between La Roche’s world-view and that of the Pietists. 
As I have already pointed out, La Roche’s dislike of doctrinaire intolerance had its roots 
not in the Pietistic conviction that aH genuine piety was worthy of respect, whatever the 
dieological principles behind it, but rather in a disthict indifference to all points of 
theory and in a regar d for human achievement typical of the Aufklarer.
If La Roche is a convinced adherent of the Enlightenment on all matters relating to 
religion and social improvement, within the sphere of personal morality and individual 
feeling her allegiances to many of the ideas typical of Empfindsamkeit becomes 
extremely clear. Sophie Stemheim’s moral code is a subjective one, deterrnined by 
deeply held personal convictions, without regard to and frequently in defiance of the 
ideas of most of Üiose around her. In questions of ethics Sophie will not allow her 
actions to be regulated by any form of higher authority. Her insistence on moral 
autonomy would have been approved in principle by the Aufklarer, but it is significant 
tlrat Wieland, as indicated in his introduction and footnotes to the novel, was disturbed 
by this refusal to correspond to the ideas favoured by the grofe Welt. Sophie holds fast
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to her subjective understanding of morality, with supreme strength of feeling. Her 
emotions are ever strong, yet ever concentrated on the need to care for others; it is 
primarily for others that Sophie feels, seldom for her own sufferings. The type of 
sensibility in which she indulges gains the whole-hearted approval of the authoress, in 
contrast to the egoistical self-pity practised by Seymour.
Finally, the concept of society contained in the novel similarly reveals the double 
influence of Enlightenment and Sensibility. La Roche favours social reform provided it 
is contained within certain limits; the miserable conditions of the poor — and in the 
context of La Roche’s novel this invariably means the deserving poor — are to be 
mitigated. The possibility of an eventual complete abolition of poverty is never 
discussed. While approving in principle the class distinctions governing contemporary 
society La Roche is dismayed by the thought of suffering in any form. Thus she at once 
commends aU pedagogical efforts which will better fit the poor for earning then living, 
while at the same time being reluctant to see any man educated to the point where he 
becomes discontented with his station in society.
In general, it must be said that La Roche tends to hold die middle ground between the 
ideas of the Enlightenment and the emphasis on feeling which characterised 
Empfindsamkeit. She supports a religion which is irrational, which claims to remain as 
close as possible to the roots of the common people in everyday life and which sees its 
main raison d’etre in the encouragement of its adherents on the path of exemplary 
virtue. This morality m turn always regards itself as following the dictates of reason but 
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4. FRIEDRICH NICOLAI, DAS LEBEN UND DIE 
MEINUNGEN DES HERRN MAGISTER 
SEBALDUS NOTHANKER
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Die gesunde Vernunft Nicolais [war] weder abstrakt-philosophischer Intellektualismus 
noch enghorizontige Gewohnheitsweisheit, sondern eine klare, selbstbegriindete und 
weitblickende prdktisch-sittliche Weltanschauung}
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If we remember Friedrich Nicolai today, it is principally on account of his apparent 
inability to recognise any merit either in Weimar Classicism or in Romanticism; and of 
the ridicule to which adherents of both movements consequently subjected him .^ We 
know him as the parodist of Goethe’s Werther, as the determined if unequal opponent of 
Kant, as the Proktophantasmist of the Walpurgisnacht in Faust. This view of Nicolai 
and his achievements, while it is not without some basis in fact, is incomplete. Goethe’s 
and Schiller’s opinions of Nicolai are no more deserving of unquestioning acceptance 
tlian is Nicolai’s view of them. Undoubtedly Nicolai has suffered by comparison witli 
his contemporary Lessing, with whom he had so many ideas in common.
Hattest du Phantasie und Witz und Empfindung und Urteil,
Wahrlich dir fehlte nicht viel, Wieland und Lessing zu sein.®
Such at least was Goethe’s judgement in the Xenien. Lessing had indeed the more 
powerful intellect, to say nothing of "imagination" and "wit"; but Nicolai was not 
Lessing and he ought to be assessed according to his own merits and capabilities — 
rather than to be blamed for being as he was. Instead of castigating Nicolai for his lack 
of aesthetic sensitivity" ,^ we ought rather to ask how and to what extent he was 
representative of his time — what his writings can tell us about the literary, intellectual 
and social climate of the age. An Ehrenrettung of Nicolai’s novels lies outwith the scope 
of this thesis; it is to be hoped, however, that our discussion of Nicolai’s contribution to 
the intellectual life of his time may go some way towards a fairer and more balanced 
appraisal of his literary output than those to which we have been accustomed.
Nicolai’s novel Das Leben und die Meinungen des Herrn Magister Sebaldus Nothanker 
was first published in three volumes, successively in 1773, 1775 and 1776. By 
eighteenth-century standards the work proved to be a very considerable success^. Even 
before the second volume was issued in 1775, a second edition of the first volume had 
become necessary. Within a veiy few years four editions had appeared. Translations
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were made into French and Danish dining the three years after the initial publication, 
soon to be followed by editions in English and Dutch, In the space of a few years 
12,000 copies had been sold — and the actual number of readers was about ten times 
that figure^, since many of those 12,000 copies would have been purchased by lendmg 
libraries and Lesegesellschafien, and others by private individuals who would then lend 
them out among family and friends. It may be regarded as a tribute to the immediate 
popularity of the novel that a literary opportunist courted public favour by producing the 
alleged second volume before Nicolai himself had found time to do so! A book 
purporting to contain the sermons of Sebaldus Nothanker also appeared and was widely 
considered to be genuine, until Nicolai revealed the fraud in his own second volume^. 
Equally indicative of the power of the book is the fact that it was at once fiercely 
attacked by the orthodox Lutheran Church: a Nürnberg pastor warned of its dangers 
from the pulpit, and in Holland the work was banned by the Church authorities.®
A number of factors may be said to have contributed to this success. The theological 
content of the novel was calculated to engage the interest of scholars, amateur 
philosophes and the Aufklarer. The romance between Marianne and Saughng, "em 
Vorlaufer des engHschen Gouvemantenromans"^, would please the Frauenzimmer, who 
formed so large a section of the eighteenth-century reading public. Even those who read 
simply for the excitement and suspense of the traditional novel of entertainment were 
unlikely to be bored, since Nicolai’s plot is by no means lacking in unexpected and 
dramatic developments.
Many readers were no doubt gratified by the circumstance that Sebaldus Nothanker was 
a Gegenwartsroman — set almost entirely in Germany, with one fairly brief interlude 
dealing with the hero’s shipwreck off the Dutch coast and subsequent persecution by 
intolerant clerics in Holland. The various settings -  Holstein and above aU Berlin —
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were immediately recognisable; there was plenty of local colour. Critics of the genre 
were calling for just such a "German" novel, while it seemed that the German novelists 
could only produce fiction m which the setting was "entweder auslândisch oder antik 
oder utopisch"^®. The message from the critics was unambiguous: "teutsch, teutsch, 
teutsch miissen Eure Produkte seyn"“ .
Some of the characters in Nicolai’s novel were as recognisable as the places. In the 
literary world of (he eighteenth century, everybody knew everybody else — if not in 
person, then at least by repute. Thus Saughng was soon identified as Johann Georg 
JacobT ,^ the author of a number of well-known poems and an Empfindsamer par 
excellence. Nor was it difficult to recognise the Superintendent Stauzius as a caricature 
of Hauptpastor Goeze of Hamburg. The social conditions portrayed in Sebaldus 
Nothanker were no doubt famihar to the reader from his own experience; the issues 
raised in the novel were those issues which occupied the reader’s mind.
A strong current of nationalism runs through the novel, something which would 
commend it to many readers. The excellent Sebaldus is a veritable Francophobe. He 
cannot think of Paris (a city he has neither seen nor wished to see) without a kind of 
dread, even horror. He goes so far as to believe the Book of Revelation to contain a 
symbolic representation of the history of the French nation, and spends many years and 
much intellectual energy in trying to prove his case to the world. Clearly there is a 
conscious attempt at comedy here; yet both Sebaldus and Marianne are in their different 
ways personifications of all that was then believed to be best in and most typical of 
German culture and German values. The representatives of French culture in Nicolai’s 
novel are without exception vain, frivolous and very silly. To Nicolai’s mind, "German" 
was in effect synonymous with "middle-class"; since his public would have been drawn 
largely from the bourgeoisie, we may safely say that the majority of his readers would
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have been likely to find his preference for "German" values thoroughly congenial.
As a publisher and book-seUer by profession, Nicolai doubtless knew very well which 
features of content or style could be relied upon to commend a work of fiction to the 
public. His experience of the world of book-selling may weU have prompted him to 
introduce his own novel as a sequel to Moritz August von Thiimmel’s highly successful 
Wilhelmim oder der verliebte Pedant (1764). Several of Thümmel’s characters do 
indeed appear in Nicolai’s novel, albeit in scarcely recognisable form — the arch-villain, 
Stauzius, was originally an amiable philanthropist — but in the main the links between 
the two works are tenuous. The device of presenting his novel to the public as a sequel 
to Wilhelmine was surely speculation on Thummel’s success, a strategy calculated to 
anest the attention of the potential reader.
It is scarcely to be expected that Sebaldus Nothanker would be of interest to any reader 
but the scholar today. It contains too many references to contemporary events and 
contemporary personalities to be comprehensible to a wider public without the benefit of 
exhaustive commentaries. Some considerable knowledge of eighteenth-century theology 
is essential if Nicolai’s satire is to be appreciated. Not only is this specialised knowledge 
lacking in the average modem reader, but the degree of interest he is likely to show in 
theological questions is considerably less than that which his eighteenth-century 
counterpart would have felt. Not only has religious belief declined in the past two 
centuries, in Nicolai’s time the theological and social or political spheres were much 
more closely integrated than is the case today. The authority of the Church was tightly 
bound up with the authority of the State. It was widely held that if faith in religious 
authority were to decline substantially, secular rule too would be underrnined; hence any 
theological statement also had political implications.
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In theory, Nicolai could have chosen any one of a number of issues around which to
construct the plot of the novel. His main aim is to promote the cause of intellectual
independence. He demands that each individual be permitted to form his own views and
make his own decisions without pressure to conform to a general pattern or submit to
the dictates of some "higher authority". He could have taken some social or political
question as his starting-point. That he did not do so -  believing that the struggle
between the rationalist Christianity of the Enlightenment and dogmatic, intolerant
orthodoxy constituted the most impoitant case for discussion — is sufficient proof that in
the eighteenth century religion was still far-reaching m its effects:
eine Einübung in kritische Rationalitat wâre ja grundsatzHch auf jedem Gebiet 
moglich gewesen. Sie ist aber auch dadurch motiviert, daB in der Theologie der 
Stieit zwischen Autoritat und Rationalitat, zwischen Dogma und dem Piinzip des 
Zweifelns, am starksten entfacht wai*.^ ®
We should not forget that in the 1770s Lutheran orthodoxy still maintained a strong hold
on the lives of most ordinary people. Werner Schütz has outlined those factors which
combined to sustain the authority of the Church:
Die Wirkung der radikalen freigeistigen Literatur auf das allgemeine Denken des 
Volkes ist [,..] nicht allzu groB. Neben ihr gibt es auch in dieser Zeit eine 
weitverbreitete Literatur zur Verteidigung des Christentums. Allein 1770, dem 
Erscheinungsjahr von D. Holbachs Système de la Nature, sind in Frankreich 
neunzig Bûcher apologetischer Ai t erschienen.^ "^
In any case, it was but a small section of the population that could afford to buy books of 
a scholarly nature, since these would seem to have been extremely expensive in relation 
to wages.^  ^ It is true that there were some circles, particularly at some of the courts, 
where more radical views were fashionable; but such attitudes were unlikely to be 
transmitted to wider sections of the population. As Nicolai’s friend Lessing discovered to 
his cost, the clerical and secular autliorities were very well able to silence those whose 
opinions they considered subversive. In short, the Lutheran Church stiU maintained a 
sti’ong influence over public opinion; and so the abuse of clerical power provided the
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most obvious target for Nicolai’s satire. Furthermore, the orthodox clergy were typical of 
the forces of reaction which he was eager to denounce.
Nicolai is concerned to prove that contemporary German society was greatly in need of 
reform. In order to prove this, he must provide his readers with an accurate reflection of 
that society. The representatives of corrupt and cynical Lutheran orthodoxy, or of narrow­
minded self-regar ding Pietism, must therefore be recognisable as common types; their 
deficiencies must be grave enough to shock and disturb, but not so extreme as to over- 4
stretch the reader’s credulity. In his preface to the novel, Nicolai emphasises that his |
characters are not ideal heroes and heroines, but very ordinary people:
AUe Begebenheiten smd in unserer Erzahlung so unvorbereitet, so unwunderbar, 4
als sie in der weiten Welt zu geschehen pflegen. Die Personen, welche auftreten, 4
sind weder an Stande erhaben, noch durch Gesinnungen ausgezeichnet, noch i
durch auBerordentliche GlücksfâUe von gewohnlichen Menschen unterschieden.
Sie sind ganz gemeine schlechte und gerechte Leute, sie strotzen nicht so wie die ?
Romanhelden von hoher Imagination, schoner Tugend und feiner Lebensart, und 
die ihnen zustoBenden Begegnisse sind so, wie sie in dem ordentlichen Laufe der 
Welt taglich vorgehen/^
Nicolai avoids, therefore, the romantic adventure-story elements of the traditional novel 
form. His social criticism will, he hopes, have all the more force for being included in a 
realistic narrative. Nor are the events he portrays merely "probable"; Nicolai employs the 
conventions of the genre for his own purposes -  he is no less concerned with 
authenticity than are GeDert and La Roche: "In dieser wahrhaftigen Lebensbeschreibung 41
[...] wollen wir nichts der Anmut oder des Wunderbaren wegen erdichten, sondem allés 
ganz einfaltig erzahlen, wie es vorgegangen ist" [p. 19]. Nicolai claims that he is in a 
position to prove the authenticity of his naiTative, for he is in the possession of a number 
of indisputably genuine documents: including the letters of Sebaldus, Wilhehnine,
Marianne, Saugling and sundry other individuals — to say nothing of Stauzius’s sermons ï|
and Saugling’s poems. So vast, indeed, is his resource of information that he can prove 
beyond doubt the truth of every word in the book: "An voUstandigen, diplomatischen
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IBeweisen wird diese Geschichte keiner anderen nachzusetzen sein" [p.20]. It is difficult 
to take such assurances entirely seriously: Nicolai would appear to be indulging m just a 
little irony at his readers’ expense (and at the expense of those other authors who were so 
much concerned to give their novels tlie appearance of authenticity); without, it must be 
added, himself renouncing the very considerable advantages to be obtained from 
adherence to that convention.
It is interesting to note that Nicolai, according to his preface, had a very specific public
in mind when writing his novel. He was not writing for die grofie Welt, but:
deutsch heraus zu reden — nur fur Gelehrte von Profession... Wir hoffen nicht, 
von der halbunangeldeideten Schonen am Nachttische gelesen zu werden... nicht 
von dem piruettierenden Petit-maître... nicht von dem Hofrnanne, der den Wink 
des Fürsten und des Ministers zu studieren versteht; nicht von dem Spieler; nicht 
von der Betschwester [p.21].
The assumption — and the apparent regret — that he cannot hope to engage the interest of 
these sections of the reading public is unmistakably ironic; for not only might they have 
disdained his book, he would have been at least as contemptuous of them as they could 
have been of hnn. Large sections of the novel are given over to biting satire on what 
Nicolai regards as the false pride and shallow sophistication, the self-seeking opportunism 4
or bigoted hypocrisy of precisely those categories of readers.
Sebaldus Nothanker, Nicolai claims, is destined for quite a different public:
1st aber irgendwo ein hagerer Magister, der das ganze unvermeBhche Gebaude 
der Wissenschaften aus einem Kapitel seines ontologischen Kompendiums 
übersieht; em feister Superintendent, der aUe Fatten der Dogmatik aufhebt, worm 
eine Ketzerei verborgen sein kOnnte; ein weiser Schuhnann, der auf Universitaten 
die Kunst aus dem Grunde studiert; ein belesener Dorfpastor... so mbgen sie I
herzutreten und sich an dem Mahle weiden, welches hier ihrem Geiste aufgetischt 
wird [p.22].
In urging the "feister Superintendent" to read his novel, Nicolai is (it would appear)
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openly inviting Üie clerical authorities to condenm a work in which heresies are not 
concealed, but resolutely proclaimed to aU who care to read. Moreover, Nicolai can 
scarcely have coveted the good opinion of the academic world. Indeed, he positively 
scorns that type of scholarship which neglects vital practical matters in order to pursue 
points of theory -  theory often consisting, for Nicolai, of irrelevant trifles. The fact that 
Sebaldus is so exclusively concerned with intellectual pursuits is the chief cause of his 
miserable plight; had he a stronger sense of reality, he might be rather better equipped to 
contend successfully with his many persecutors. In short, Nicolai cannot but have been 
aware that his book would provoke the wradi of the theologians -  of the orthodox 
Lutherans and the Pietists — and even if the novel were to be approved by the 
professional scholars, he would care but httle for their praise. Clearly there is irony here; 
but irony to what purpose?
It was far from uncommon in the eighteenth century, when theological questions were 
under discussion, to urge that debate be restricted to the ranks of the clergy and 
professional scholars — since these men, unlike the Pobel, could be relied upon not to 
extend their radicalism to the political sphere. Even Kant^ ’ took the view that, while a 
clergyman should be free to debate points of dogma with his colleagues, he should take 
care to preach to his flock only official Church doctrine. In stating so fhmly that his 
novel is designed for the perusal of scholars alone, Nicolai is perhaps using this 
traditional ar gument for reasons of his own. While die grofie Welt might indeed choose to 
ignore tire novel, the success of the book indicates that it must have engaged the interest 
of a substantial section of the bourgeoisie. We have aheady noted that discussions of 
theological issues, which today would be of interest only to a small irdnority of 
specialists, would in the 1770s have been considered inportant by a broad cross-sectioir of 
the public. Nicolai’s novel would not be read merely by scholars, as he well knew. His 
intention in stating the contrary may perhaps have been (among other things) to shield
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himself from accusations of demagoguery.
It is only when we have understood Nicolai’s attitude to novel-writing — for Nicolai, 
much more a matter of pleading a case than of telling a stoiy or analysing character -  
that we are in a position to consider the work in its intellectual context. A consideration 
of the author’s approach to the portrayal of character reveals that his principal concern 
was not to create a work of art; it was rather to convince his readers of the validity of tlie 
philosophical and (above all) the moral and social ideas of the Enlightenment.
To a considerable extent, Nicolai’s characters are mere types. We encounter Stauzius — 
the hypocritical, bigoted representative of all that was worst in eighteenth-century 
Lutheran orthodoxy; the Pietist, who (despite widely differing views) strongly resembles 
Stauzius in character and is only prevented from doing an equal measure of harm by the 
circumstance that he has less power; we meet Frau von Hohenauf, the personification of 
Frenchified German aristocratic culture. With the exception of Sëugling — who undergoes 
an entirely unconvincing transformation from effeminate versifier to dedicated 
agricultmist and pmdent père de famille — the characters are at the end of their various 
experiences precisely what they were before them.
We learn little or nothing of their inner lives. It is their ideas with which Nicolai is 
concerned, not their emotions. We are given little insight mto Sebaldus’s feelings on the 
deaths of his wife and younger daughter. The heatment of Marianne’s emotional life is 
equally sketchy; little is said of the nature or development of her love for Saugling. 
Nicolai instead concentrates almost entirely on the external circumstances which affect 
the cour se of this relationship, on the machinations which separate, and the co-mcidences 
which finally re-unite the lovers. It seems unlikely that such omissions are due solely to 
Nicolai’s limitations as an artist -  or even to a caution or reticence that might have
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resulted from awareness of such limitations. Heinz Stolpe argues with some justice that
Nicolai avoids the portrayal of strong emotions as a matter of principle:
Nicolai [befindet] diese Kargheit offenbar fur ganz in der Ordnung, 
polemisiert er doch... mehrfach direkt und indirekt gegen das, was ihm bei 
anderen Autoren schadlicher Gefühlsüberschwang zu sein scheint, wobei 
er verstandnislos den entscheidenden Unterschied verwischt zwischen der 
tandelnden Rokoko-Sentimentalitat eines Johann Georg Jacobi und den 
emsten Bemuhungen Goethes und Herders, dem Gefühlsleben in Kunst 
und Wissenschaft endlich starker Rechnung zu tragen.^ ®
The conviction that the novelist ought to avoid depicting an excess of feeling produces a 
tendency to the opposite extreme; Nicolai’s polemic against the theory and practice of 
Sensibility gives the appearance of artistic incapacity; a philosophical viewpoint takes 
precedence over formal considerations.
Nicolai does make his point rather too insistently. The novel contains numerous 
repetitions or near-repetitions of scenes, countless variations on the theme of the 
intolerance, dogmatism and hypocrisy of the orthodox Lutherans and of the complacency 
and inhumanity of the Pietists, The inevitable result is to render the plot of the novel not 
merely unbelievable but increasingly tedious. As with the depiction of character, æsthetic 
considerations are subordinated to Nicolai’s principal aim -  the communication of the 
belief that contemporary society is greatly in need of reform, as regards both social 
conditions and human attitudes.
The representatives of Lutheran orthodoxy in Nicolai’s novel — above ah, of course, 
Supeiintendent Stauzius, as cormpt and self-seeking a caricature of Hauptpastor Goeze as 
is the Patriarch in Lessing’s Nathan der Weise — are not so much irrational as indifferent 
to reason. Sebaldus Nothanker naïvely believes that if he can only succeed in engaging 
them in honest argument, he whl be able to refute the case for authority and even convert 
the orthodox clergy to his own ideals of reason, tolerance and humanity. In this attempt 
he is whohy unsuccessful, since liis powerful adversaries refuse to admit that there may
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be grounds for discussion. No response would be more likely to earn the contempt of the
Aufklarer tlian this unwillingness to debate the issues, indicative as it is that the creed
founded on authority and tradition will scarcely stand up to critical examination.
Im Nothanker geht es um die Aufhebung allein durch Tradition 
legithmerter Herrschaft hn Medium vemunftgeleiteten Rasonnements; 
auch in ihm leuchtet der aufkiarerische Glaube an die Konvergenz 
offentHcher Diskussion mit Vemunft auf,^ ^
The Lutheran Church is presented hi Nicolai’s novel as an institution jealously guarded in
a state of petrifaction. The orthodox clergy will not allow what progress is possible; they
insist that aU points of dispute have long since been settled, aU those new opinions of
which the Neologists are so proud have long ago been refuted. Regarding themselves as
custodians of a constant, unchanging canon of beliefs, they see every attempt by the
Church to adapt itself to meet the needs of the new Zeitalter der Aufklarung as an
hiadmissabie -  even sinful — concession to the forces of materialism and atheism. It need
hardly be pointed out that such dogmatists believe all men of enquiring minds to be
dangerous -  potential, if  not actual, atheists. Their understanding of their own role hi the
scheme of things is conservative hi the extreme. "Man mu6 keine Neuerungen gestatten"
[p .2il]: such is the principle accordmg to which all religious questions are judged.
Sebaldus is urged to curb his inclination to question the sacred tradition: "Auf die
Vemunft müsse man hi Glaubenssachen gar nicht achten. Man müsse sich dem fiigen,
was die Yoreltem festgesetzt haben" [p.211]. Of course this conservatism has a clearly
discernible political basis. One must avoid "unchristJiches Vernünfteln" [p.213], for "Es
mul3 ein Glaube, ein Hht und eine Herde hn Lande sein, sonst kommt allés in
Vei-whrung" [p.213]. The authorities, both clerical and secular, have a panic fear of
confusion.
For Stauzius and those like him, Christianity is very much a matter of Realpolitik. They 
benefit to no small degree from the prestige and material prosperity which their
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respective positions in the orthodox hierarchy afford them, and they seek to safeguard 
these benefits by insisting that then authority and the foundation on which it rests must 
never be subjected to criticism. The Lutheran clergy as depicted by Nicolai is quite 
indifferent to the moral welfare of the populace; provided only that they may exercise 
power, they are content. They aie certainly indifferent to human suffering; and very often 
accomplished hypocrites. Continuing respect for the Church among the common people 
leaves the clergy free to do as it pleases; the semblance of propriety alone is sufficient to 
sustain its authority. When Sebaldus’ newly appointed successor comes to evict the 
Nothanker family from their home, having given no prior warning and despite having 
been infoimed that Wilhelmine is ÎU, he passes the time while waiting for tliem to 
remove themselves and their possessions into the street in writing his sermon for the 
following Sunday.
Nicolai deplores the inhumanity of those who neglect their fellow human-beings in order 
to perform what they consider to be their duty to God — if indeed they are sincere, which 
his orthodox characters rarely are. Thus Stauzius, instead of employing men and 
resources to build homes for those who have lost theirs in a fire, insists that the town’s 
first priority must be the building of a large and splendid church. Those left destitute by 
the fire and now abandoned by the autliorities are forced to emigrate to Russia as 
colonists. Those occasions on which the orthodox clergy are tmly zealous in the 
performance of their duties are generally occasions when they will be well rewarded for 
their zeal. Sebaldus’ successor is Christian enough to be able to overcome liis natural 
feelings of hostility towards the family of heretics and declare himself ready to preach at 
Wilhehnine’s funeral, but only if  Hieronymus is prepared to pay his fee.
Superintendent Stauzius has almost an allegorical significance. He has every conceivable 4
fault and no redeeming virtues whatsoever. When he shows himself other than arrogant, d
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cruel and vindictive, then it is only in die hope of increasing, by a hypocritical display of 
benignity, Ms own wealth and prestige. He has attained the status and enjoys the 
privileges of a GeneralsuperMtendent by virtue neither of superior intellect nor of 
exemplary dedication to the performance of Ms clerical duties, but merely by marTying 
his predecessor’s widow. He is not alone in gaining promotion by dubious means. 
Sebaldus’ successor is engaged to be married to Demoiselle Stauzius: Frau von Hohenauf 
promises that Rambold — and a less suitable candidate for the ministry can scarcely be 
imagined — will be rewarded with a comfortable living if he can induce Saugling to 
satisfy Ms aunt’s ambition by marrying Frâulehi von Ehrenkalb.
Nicolai’s novel is thorougMy polemical. Unlike Gellert and La Roche he seldom seeks to 
influence the reader by providing Mm with models of exemplary conduct. Instead, he 
warns him through the medium of satire and caricature against particular tendencies and 
ideologies. By means of observation of the cruelty and corruption of which orthodox 
churcMneri such as Stauzius are capable, the reader is enabled to construct for himself a 
pattern of thought and behaviour worthy of emulation.
There is of course much that is exemplary in the life and in the opinions of Sebaldus 
Nothanker. In contrast to the representatives of Lutheran orthodoxy, Sebaldus is a true 
friend to Ms parisMoners, and a wise counsellor in all matters wMch affect their welfare. 
He is a trusted conciliator and valued comforter, a frequent and always welcome visitor 
in the homes of the peasants. Like La Roche, Nicolai considers that the clergy are ideally 
situated to act as the educators of the common people. They should not, both authors 
suggest, be content to give instruction hr religion, or even in morality: a good pastor 
should be able to deal with any problem, be it theoretical or practical, wMch may arise in 
Ms parish. By setting up the modest, retmng and sympathetic Sebaldus as a model, 
Nicolai is attacking the arrogance and mordmate pride in their station wMch he believes
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to be characteristic of the orthodox clergy. His representatives of orthodoxy are 
excessively haughty individuals -  it is only Sebaldus who regards his calling not as an 
opportunity to gain power and prestige, but as a responsibility, as a chance to serve his 
fellow men in a variety of ways.
Yet Sebaldus is by no means an ideal character in the sense hi which Gellert’s Countess 
or the Frauleiu von Stemheim are ideal. We can by no means identify Nicolai too closely 
with his character. Sebaldus is unworldly in the negative as well as in the positive sense. 
He is generous, unselfish and foolishly trusting. His experience of the worst in human 
nature — sufficient, one would have thought, to make a misanthropist of any man — does 
nothmg to daunt his naive optimism, does not render him suspicious or even cautious hi 
his dealings with strangers. Each new betrayal of trust, each new encounter with 
intolerance, avarice, cmelty takes him by surprise, like Voltaire’s Candide; so much so 
that in wondering at the inhumanity of which man is capable, he quite forgets to regret 
his own distress, and certainly does nothing to improve his lot. That he does not entirely 
staiwe is due to chance — or to Providence -  rather than to his own efforts. He has his 
hobby-horse too, in the manner of Sterne’s heroes. It is in Sebaldus’ case the Book of 
Revelation on which he is writing an exhaustive commentary. (It is o f course ironic that 
Sebaldus — a convinced rationalist and in all matters not affecting his own well-being a 
thorough pragmatist -  should have a passion for the Book of Revelation). These studies, 
by making him forget more immediate concerns, involve him in no end of trouble. 
Sebaldus is as much a comic figure as he is a tiaditional hero. His absent-mindedness is 
largely responsible for the entertainment value of the novel. It is in his philosophical 
convictions that he is close to Nicolai, in his spirited defence of the ideals of the 
Enlightemnent. In standing up for the ideals of tolerance and humanity, Sebaldus is very 
much Nicolai’s mouthpiece, wldle his complete inability to defend his own rights at once 
increases the comic effect of tlie book and makes his orthodox persecutors, of whose
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machinations he is a very passive victim, appear all the more despicable.
In the light of Nicolai’s reputation as a narrow and inflexible rationalist, it is perhaps 
somewhat surprismg that his objections to Lutheran orthodoxy are by no means 
exclusively of a rationalistic nature. He has, rather, a two-fold aim; he wishes to promote 
a Christianity at once more rational and more humane. He is repelled by die doctrine of 
eternal damnation because it is so obviously incompatible with the belief in a good and 
loving God. When interrogated by his superiors on this crucial point, Sebaldus 
"antwortete ganz gelassen, Er glaube nicht, daG es Menschen gezieme, der Güte Gottes 
MaG und Ziel zu setzen" [p.38]. He believes that God loves all good men equally well, 
irrespective of creed, and that He whl judge them according to their actions, not 
according to (heir beliefs. Nor can Nicolai-Sebaldus accept that the heathen whl be 
damned without exception, for many alleged heretics and infidels have, it is argued, led 
more vhtuous lives than many who profess themselves Christians.
The doctrine of eternal damnation is not, Nicolai believes, merely inhumane in itself, it is 
also liable to be abused by the clergy. His orthodox figures look upon hell-fire as the 
only fitting end for their personal enemies. Secure in the knowledge that everlasting 
punishment awaits those who have refused to submit to clerical domination, they are 
content to forego vengeance in this world. Thus the father of the Kandidat looks forward 
with evident satisfaction to the inevitable fate of his atheistic neighbour, not the least of 
whose crimes was to win a lawsuit, thereby inflicting financial loss on his God-fearing 
adversary. The established clergy largely derive their authority from their skill in 
exploiting the natural fear of death — Stauzius, entirely without scriptural audiority, 
proclaims (hat aU who will not assist in the building of his new church will be consigned 
to HeU. Walther Gebhardt rightly points out that only by capitalising on the basic human 
fear' of death and of what may he beyond it was the Church able to maintain the full
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force of its authority in an increasingly secular society:
Em Gedanke nur, den man moglichst zu verdrangen sucht, macht 
Unbehagen: die Zeitlichkeit semes Glückes, das Ende durch den Tod. In 
dem Punkt geht alle Philosophie und Selbstsicherheit in erne ungewisse, 
unhehnliche Furcht fiber, hier üegt seme schwache Stelle, fiber der ihn 
alle Vemunft nicht weghelfen kaim. Und das erkennt die Khche wohl und 
benutzt diese Schwache als Einfallstor in des Bfirgers Seele/^
In the 1770s the power of the clergy was still considerable, yet the tide was against such 
men as Stauzius, particularly in the upper ranks of society. In order to sustain the 
attention of a comdy audience and to preserve his own prestige, Stauzius must have 
recourse to such tales of honor: if his listeners were as yet little inclined to radicalism, 
they were at least in danger of becoming indifferent to religion,
Nicolai regards freedom for the individual to deteimine the content of his own creed as 
perhaps the most essential feature of the Protestant heritage and as a right which must be 
zealously defended against the onslaught of orthodox authoritarianism. Herein lies his 
piincipal objection to the unquestioning acceptance of the Symbolische Bûcher.
Nicolai is opposed to Lutheran orthodoxy not least because he values, or professes to
value, differences of opinion for their own sake. He is contemptuous of the mindless
rigidity which Stauzius demands. Stauzius governs his subordinates
wie em Hauptmann bei einer wohleingerichteten Kompagnie Soldaten, bei 
der jeder Rock so lang als der andere, jeder Zopf so dick als der andere, 
jede Stiefelette so lang aufgeknfipft ist als die andere, und die sich nie 
nach ihrem eigenen Willen, sondem bloB nach dem Wink ihrer Obem 
beweget [p.37].
Nicolai differs from the orthodox Lutherans in that he is reluctant to accept the Bible as 
the highest sphitual authority and only means to salvation -- and for two different 
reasons. In the first place the Scriptures, having been written in an age now long past, are 
no longer obviously applicable to modem chcumstances. The Bible must therefore be 
submitted to critical examination and, if need be, to reinterpretation. Since this is so
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manifestly the case, it would be illogical to maintain, as the orthodox do, that the Bible is
die inspiied word of God; and if it is not the inspired word of God, it cannot be an
infallible authority:
Gott hat weder das alte Testament noch das neue Testament selbst 
unmittelbar aufgezeichnet. Er hat gute Leute ausersehen welche Bûcher 
geschrieben haben, die durch verschiedene Vorfalle... bei einem groBen 
Teile des menschHchen Geschlechts in solches Ansehen gekommen sind, 
daB es aus denselben seine Pflichten hat kennenlemen woUen [p.254].
Nicolai believes that modem man can scarcely regard the Bible as anything more than a
moral text-book. The matter is complicated still further by the fact that unscrapulous
scholais apply to the interpretation of Scripture a variety of dubious techniques which in
reality enable them to make the Bible mean whatever they want it to mean. The
Symbolische Bûcher too have become largely irrelevant:
Ich dachte, kein vemunftiger Mensch wUrde blindlings einem Wegweiser 
folgen, der vor mehr als 200 Jahien gesetzt worden; er würde bedenken, 
durch wieviele Vorfalle der Wegweiser seit 200 Jahren konne verrtickt,
Oder der Weg geëndert worden sein... Die symboHschen Bûcher sind für 
die Zeit und unter den Umstanden, unter denen sie gemacht worden sind, 
sehr gute. Aber wenn wir denselben bestândig anhângen woUten, so 
befUrchte ich, daB sich seitdem Regierungsreform, Wissenschaften und 
Sitten ganzlich geândert haben, wir wûrden endlich eine Theologie 
bekoramen, die sich fûr die Zeit, in der wir leben, auf keine Weise 
schicken wûrde [pp.152-3].
Nicolai adheres to the three basic principles of natural religion, believing in God the
Creator, in a beneficent Providence and in the immortality of the soul. If he also believes
in the divinity of Christ we learn nothing to this effect. In short, he ignores "das
Wesentüche, wenn nicht das Einzige, was das positive Christentum von der natmlichen
Religion unterscheidet."^  ^ Sebaldus Nothanker is in his practical concem for his
parishioners the ideal pastor, despite his scholarly obsession over the Book of Revelation.
Throughout his distressing experiences he demonstrates exemplary moral qualities. Yet
his character would appear to be lacking in all specifically religious traits. He is an
exceptionally honest, sincere and benevolent man; yet we would scarcely call him pious.
Karl Aner misses in Nicolai’s novel
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das Erzittem einer zart gestiinmten Seele in BewuBtsein eigener Schuld, 
das Emporrecken der Arme nach dem Licht der Erlosung und das 
Aufjauchzen des Herzens, wenn es den Grund gefunden hat.^ ^
Aner’s analysis certainly implies a value-judgement; he regards Nicolai’s evident lack of
piety as a serious limitation. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to pass judgement
on Nicolai’s religious experience, Aner’s argumentation is nonetheless deserving of
consideration, relevant as it is to the question of Nicolai’s allegiance m the conflict
between Christianity and Deism. We should remember also that the only obviously pious
character in the novel, the Pietist Sebaldus encounters on the road to Berlin, is portrayed
as a fanatic and a hypocrite. In the religion of the other characters, emotional
commitment, real or feigned, has no part to play.
It would, I believe, be wrong to deduce drat because Nicolai is apparently lukewarm in 
Ills feelings towards the specifically religious as distmct from the ethical content of 
Christianity, he must therefore have been an unacknowledged Deist. There is no real 
evidence that this was the case, and we should be wary of drawing positive conclusions 
from merely negative evidence. The influence of Nicolai’s personality is clearly I
discernible here. It was in his nature to distrust unbridled emotion: "Unter der Maske 4
dunkler Gefiihle schien ihm der Aberglaube einzustromen und die geistige Freiheit zu 
bedrohen." '^^ . His personal experience of Pietism as a boy m the orphanage in Halle had 
been sufficient to make him for ever after suspicious of unrestrained irrationalism in the 
reahn of religion; his extreme coolness may perhaps be seen as a reaction against what he 
regarded as Pietisdc excesses (see below). Moreover as a citizen of liberal Berlin (liberal 
at least in religious matters) and as an independent businessman, Nicolai had no very real 
reason to conceal his opinions, be they ever so controversial. He might find it 
advantageous to sales to temper his sathe with a little romance and more than a little 
hinocent humour, to amuse himself with the convention of "authenticity", he might even 
hope to outwit his critics by announcing in his preface that his novel was for the pemsal
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of none but theologians and ecclesiastics -  in reality, he had no overpowering reason to 
disguise his actual convictions. Such conceahnent would in any case scarcely have 
accorded with his typically enlightened passion for the pursuit of truth.
Gustav Sichelschmidt has suggested that Nicolai’s novel should be seen as an attempt to
reconcile Christianity with rationalism, an attempt undertaken in the hope of holdhig up
the advance of materialism and atheism:
Nicolai empfand es wie wenige, daB die Zeit vorüber war, in der man an 
die blinde Glaubensbereitschaft der Menschen appellieren konnte. Da für 
ihn mit der Existenz des Christentums aber die abendlândische Kultur 
stehen oder fallen müBte, setzte er allés daran, den drohenden 
Agnostizismus durch die Verteidigung eines positiven Christentums 
abzufangen, das auch den Argumenten ernes analysierenden Verstandes 
standhielt.^ ^
Sichelschmidt perhaps exaggerates Nicolai’s fear of agnosticism; there were, after ah, 
more immediate threats to enlightened Chiistianity, in the shape of Lutheran orthodoxy 
and of the more extreme forms of Pietisdc irrationalism. He is, however, entirely correct 
in emphasising the ethical aspect of Nicolai’s Christianity. As indicated above, Sebaldus’ |
religion has a firm foundation in practical ethics. He believes that men should do good 
not so much because it is God’s wdl — though God, being a beneficent and loving God, 
can wdl only that which is good — but also because the general well-being of all men in 
society is a desirable end in itself. In support of Sichelschmidt’s thesis, one might cite the 
example of Sebaldus’ speech to the dying Major. Hie Major is a man of courage and of 
principle, who believes in God the Creator and in beneficent Providence — but not in the 
immortality of the soul. Sebaldus is eager to convince him that a belief in eternal life is 
necessaiy if men are to be virtuous. If, he argues, there were no certain prospect of 
reward or punishment beyond the grave, neither would there be any very compelling 
reason to lead a virtuous life. Every man could — and would — be as wicked as he 
pleased. Unlike Lessing, Nicolai is far from supposing that man is ever likely to reach a 
stage in his development at which he would be capable of altruistic good, of performing
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just and benevolent actions out of inner conviction, without reference to some superior .
Ï
authority. Nicolai, so much an adherent of the Enlightenment m other respects, has 
surprismgly little faith m the natural goodness of human nature.
Naturally enough, Nicolai is a fierce critic of the Pietists’ pronounced irrationalism. The 
Pietistic concept of faith leaves no room for reason. They do not, in contrast to the men 
of the Enlightenment hke Sebaldus, believe ihuinmation to be the fruit of mature 
reflection -  rather they consider it a gift from God. There is nothing man can do in order 
to obtam wisdom, they argue; one must wait for God to enlighten one in his own good 
time. "LaB dich von der allemwirkenden Gnade ergreifen. LaB dich von der Kraft des 
Bundesblutes anfassen" [p. 120], urges the Pietist. Many Pietists believed the all-important 
moment of illuinination, the Durchbruch der Gnade, to be a definite happening, an 
experience which could be reliably reported to have taken place at a precise pomt in then 
lives. Nicolai exploits this idea for reasons of satire, by taking it to its logical extreme.
His Pietist is able to name the day and even the hour of his rebirth: "vor drei Jahren, den i
elften September nachmittags um fünf Uhr" [p.l21]. This "grace" produces a state of 
Gelassenheit which for Nicolai is synonymous with spiritual and intellectual inertia: "Wer
in der Gnade ist, der ist so ruhig, der ertrhgt allés, der stellet allés Gott anheim" [p.l23].
•Î
As things turn out, the Pietist’s Gelassenheit is in any case mere rhetoric, for on the 
appearance of a band of robbers, just when he has completed this homily, his fear is only 
too evident, and contrasts sharply with Sebaldus’ quiet resignation. When aU else fails, he 
even takes to cursing the culprits, until embarrassed by Sebaldus’ gentle rebuke. Nicolai 
believes that in denying reason the Pietists would rob man of his highest faculty, limiting 
his freedom to improve and develop — an error which has disturbing implications for the 
entir e life of society, since men who wdl not think and argue are an easy prey to 
deception, in the Church and out of it.
Der Pietismus war in den siebziger Jahr en des achtzehnten Jalirhunderts
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sowohl wegen seiner immer dentUcher zutage tretenden 
Vernnnftfeindschaft als wegen seiner Leugnnng jeglicher Verantwortung 
des Individnuins und dainit im Grmide der Menschenwürde zu einem 
womoghch noch bosartigerem Widersacher der bürgerHchen 
Emanzipationsbewegung geworden als es die damaHgen aldutherischen 
Ordiodoxen... waren.“
Nicolai’s Pietists abuse the doctrine of die alleinwirkende Gnade, making it an excuse for 
idleness and indifference to the needs of others. Such an attitude, which underrnines 
energy and the desire for self-improvement, deprives man of the wdl to act and hence 
also, Nicolai believes, of his natural dignity. Sebaldus wdl not swerve from the 
conviction that since God has given man the precious faculties of reason and wdl, to say 
nothing of the pensions, it is man’s duty to use these powers to do as much practical 
good as he can, "Wh besitzen Krafte zum Guten. Wer dieses leugnen wodte, würde 
Gottes Schopfung schanden, der uns so viele Vodkommenheiten gegeben hat."
The Pietist is very fond of singing hymns, especially those in which the torments of the 
damned ar e depicted in horrifying detad. He obviously derives distinct pleasure from die 
thought that this is the fate awaiting so many of his feUow men, whde he hhnself has 
been "saved" to enjoy eternal bliss. The consciousness of his own happiness is all the 
more delightful for the contrast it forms with the sufferings of the wicked. Nicolai 
satirises in this figure the excessive asceticism of the more rigid Pietists, who were likely 
to condemn even the most innocent pleasure as a sin deserving heU-fire. According to 
such thinking, every action which is not performed in the service of God is necessaiÜy 
sinful; all time which is not devoted to the generaUy unavoidable business of earning a 
living should be taken up with prayer and worship.
Equady abhorrent to Nicolai is the substantial element of sensuality typical of Pietism 
and particularly manifest hi the Cult of the Lamb, The Pietists certahily did tend to 
indulge m what we might consider to be an unhealthy preference for the bloodier aspects 
of Christianity. A glance at those hymns written and sung by the Pietists should be
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sufficient to convince us of this: the wounds of the crucified Oirist form the content of |
many ecstatic poems and songs. This cult was frequently taken far beyond the limits of 
good taste: "Denn ich will stets ein Bienenlein /  Auf des Lammes Wunden sein" [p. 121], 
sings Sebaldus’ travelling companion, comforted by the knowledge that even in atheistic 
Berhn there are
ehnge erwahlte Seelen, die bis über den Kopf in den Wunden des 
Lammes sitzen, die zu einem Piinktlein, zu einem Staublein, zu einem
Nichts geworden sind und sich in das blutige Lamm verliebt haben i
[p.l29].
Yet Pietism was by no means the antithesis of the Enlightenment Nicolai wishes to 
popularise. However different the philosophical basis of the two movements may have 
been, they had more than one idea in common. Pietism, hke the Enlightenment, had as 
one of its aims the Hberation of the individual from the constraints imposed by authority 
and tradition: both movements were concerned that man might attain greater intellectual 
and emotional independence. Both, furthermore, laid particular emphasis on good works.
Distrusting a priori reasoning, aware that they could do much to alleviate suffering hi 
this world, Aufklarer and Pietists ahke valued and practised philanthropy. Walther 
Gebhaid rightly points out that the Pietists’ preoccupation with practical ethics was one 
of the most important factors which separated Pietists and orthodox Lutherans and linked 
the former with a movement towards a more secular society.
Entscheidend war hier, daB man... das Tun des Worts hoher schatze als 
das Bekennen mit dem Munde. [Des PietLsten] Streben nach praktischem 
Christentum hatte ihn von der Orthodoxie abgelôst und führte ihn immer 
ausschlieBHcher zu der Anschauung, daB allein die Bewahrung im Leben, 
die edlen Taten und Geshmungen der Menschenhebe ein Kriterium fur 
das wahre und richtige Christentum sein konnen.^ ^
If Nicolai was aware that at least the orighial aims of Pietism were very close to his own 
aims, he fails to make this explicit. Yet tlie eaiiy Pietists had tried, as Nicolai believed 
the Church must try, to travel further along tlie path on which Luther had set out. Taking 
his ideas as their starting-point, they adapted and developed Luther’s original teaching to
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meet the needs of a new age. They adhered to the spirit of Lutheranism rather than, as
orthodox Lutherans tended to do, to the letter;
Der Grundgedanke, um den sich seine [des Pietisten] Ideenweit dreht, [ist] 
der Kemgedanke des Luthertums, die Sündenüberwindung durch die 
Glaubensgerechtigkeit. Er drangt auf die tiefste Empfindung des 
Sündenelends und der Ohnmacht des natiirhchen Menschen, auf innere 
GewiBheit der Gnadenannahme bei Gott, die jeder selbst ohne Priester 
und kirchhche Vermitdung aus eigener Lebensberührung mit Gott 
gewinnen muB. Er empfindet die unmittelbare Nahe und Gegenwart... 
der... Liebe offenbarenden Leiden... ahnlich wie Luther von dem 
Einswerden mit Christo, von der Welt in Christo und der Welt auBer 
Christo gesprochen hatte.^ ®
Ernst Troeltsch argues with some justice that the difference between Luther’s Chiistianity
and Pietism were less differences in content or dogma than m  expression, Luther’s faith
being expressed with "mannlicher Kraft und Keuschheit"^ ,^ while the Pietists could not
affirm theirs but with "aUerhand tandehiden Bddem".^  ^It was precisely this Tandelei,
this combination of sentimentality and sensuality, which Nicolai so disliked. And it was
perhaps this dislike which bliuded him to the fact that the Pietists, in theoiy at least, were
committed to some of the ideas, tolerance, philanthropy and the liberation of the
individual from ecclesiastical tyranny, which were closest to his own heart.
At the same time we must remember that the Pietists of the 1770s were in many ways 
different from the Pietists of Francke’s day. Nicolai believed contemporary Pietists to be 
just as rigidly dogmatic as were the orthodox Lutherans, Before the movement had 
become firmly established, its members had preached and practised tolerance of all 
branches of the Christian church; provided only genuine piety and personal commitment 
were present, they believed, then the dogmatic differences between Lutherans, Calvinists 
and other Protestant groups were of veiy little importance. But as the sect grew stronger 
and more self-confident, its members also became less tolerant of other creeds. If it did 
not evolve a hierarchy on the model of the orthodox Lutheran church, its adherents did 
sometimes fall victim to pride and self-conceit, regarding themselves as "saved" and all
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those who did not share their views as iiTetrievably damned. From here it was but a short 
step to blamuag those others, to despising them rather than merely pitying them. It was, 
of course, Pietistic dogmatism which contrived the expulsion of Christian W olff from 
Halle in 1723, when he dared to challenge the assumption that the heathen were 
incapable of disinterested virtue. Nicolai’s Pietist is not merely dogmatic, he is also a 
hypocrite, utterly selfish and unfeeling. It seems unlikely that the Pietists were any more 
prone to such basic human failings than any other group of people. Nicolai’s success as a 
satirist -  for satire need not be just -  is determined at least in part by this confusion of 
faults specific to religious fanatics and those natural to human beings of all shades and 
varieties of belief. He refuses to recognise that the moral worth, or lack of moral worth, 
of individual Pietists provides not the slightest proof of the objective tmth or fallacy of 
Pietistic teaching; the success or failure of his satire is dependent on his ability to render 
his readers equally forgetful of this distinction.
Nicolai’s portrayal of Pietism is very much a caricature. It is neither fair nor intended to 
be fail. Those aspects of the teaching and the practice of the movement which conflict 
with Nicolai’s own world-view he exaggerates and distorts. Those aspects — above all the 
emphasis on practical ethics which for example led to the founding of schools, hospitals 
and orphanages, where he might have been thought to share common ground with tlie 
Pietists -  he chooses to ignore. Great as may have been the failings of the Pietistic 
movement and of some of its adherents, there was also, surely, much that was good: if  
there was complacency and hypocrisy, there was also much genuine piety. Nevertheless, 
Nicolai’s position is an understandable one. His novel is a piece of sathe: as such it was 
designed to focus attention on all that was undesirable in contemporary society, iu the 
sphere of religious as of social life, and by so doing to convince the reader that he ought 
to lend his support to Nicolai’s ideals of tolerance and humanity. In short, Nicolai uses 
exaggeration, distortion and the unfairness resulting therefr om to provoke laughter and
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reflection and hence to prove a philosophical pomt.
Before leaving the subject of Pietism, we ought to make some mention of the reception
of Sebaldus Nothanker among Pietistic critics. These were no more favourably disposed
towards the work than were their orthodox counteiparts, Karl Aner has dealt with this
question in some detail; it may suffice here therefore to cite the response of Jung-Stdling
as being typical of the dismay which die book occasioned in Pietistic circles. Jung-
5 tilling feels sufficiently confident of the strength of his argument to select as his
spokesman none other than God himself:
Du hast ein Buch geschrieben. Die Ursache war, deinen Witz, deine 
Kunst zu zeigen, ein berühmter Autor zu sein. Die Mateiie dazu nahmst 
du nach dem henschenden Geschmack deiner Zeit aus der schwachen 
Seite meiner Anhanger, es waren doch meine Knechte und Diener, wie 
verdorben sie sem mochten; denn sie bekannten sich zu mir. Tausende 
Jünglinge und Jimgfrauen machtest du lachen, freutest dich mit îhnen, daB 
mein Reich so schwach und schlecht ausshhe, verdarbst voUends die 
zarten Keime zukiinftiger Besserung des Geistes nach meinem Sinne imd 
machtest also mein Heiligthum zugleich lacherlich. Weiche von mir, du 
gehorst in mein Reich nicht.^ ^
Nicolai was, at least in theory, prepared to tolerate any shade or variety of belief; but he
would not tolerate intolerance. This was the inevitable stumbling-block in his relations
with the Pietists, no less than with the orthodox Lutherans. The insistence of both groups
that they alone were in possession of the complete and absolute truth incensed hhn to
such a degree that he became incapable of recognising that he had any ideas in common
with either. Nicolai was in fact a good deal less tolerant than his enthusiasm for tolerance
might lead us to suppose:
Er steht der ortliodoxen Psyche gar nicht so fern. Auch ihn haftet etwas 
Starres, dogmatisch Rationalistisches an, das ihm ein Verstehen 
Andersdenkender unmôglich macht. So hat er eigenthch nur die so heftig 
bekampften Verhaltnisse umgekehrt. Jetzt vertritt er stair und streng 
semen Standpunkt und wdl die Gegenpartei nicht dulden: m seinem 
Hhnrael ist für Orthodoxen und asketische Pietisten kern Platz. So wird 
seine eindringliche Toleranzpredigt selbst zur Intoleranz.^ ^
Nicolai is scathing in his attacks on what he considers to be Catholic superstition and
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irrationalism, particularly in his Reise durch Deutschland und die Schweiz'P he 
contemptuously ridicules Catholic pomp and pageantry, being either unwilli ng or unable 
to admit that where he sees only empty ceremony others may be moved to genuine 
reverence. In effect, he is himself tolerant only of Neologists, deists and free-thinkers, 
perhaps understandably so, since precisely these groups were most in need of his support, 
tlieh views being least likely to be tolerated in the prevailing circumstances.
It is significant that Nicolai’s Pietistic critics, notably Jung-Stdhng, base their objections 
to the novel on the assumption that genuine piety and tolerance are incompatible: they 
equate tolerance with indifferentism, with an opportunistic vacillation between belief and 
scepticism. Christianity, they insist, must claim supremacy over all other systems of 
thought — otherwise it is worthless. According to strict logic, they are quite right: 
"Dogmenglaube und Toleranz konnen nicht nebeneinander existieren, weil diese immer 
schon ein relativiertes Religionserlebnis voraussetzt." '^^  Such is Jung-Stilling’s Une of 
argument:
Es gibt kein Mittel, das Christentum mit dem Deismus zu verehngen, well 
eins den anderen gerade widerspricht. Es ist deswegen vergebUche Arbeit, 
wenn man nachgibt, den Sozianismus unterstützt, bloB die Sittenlehre 
treibt und also eines mit dem anderen vermischen wUl. Wir miissen 
entweder Christen sein, oder wir miissen Deisten sein. Diejenigen welche 
zwischen beiden den Mantel nach dem Wmde hangen woUen, sind 
Nothankers.^ ^
Jung-S tilling beUeves that Nicolai is reluctant to decide conclusively in favour either of 
Christianity or of Deism, probably because he hopes to benefit from the supposed 
"advantages" of fiee-thought, at the same time enjoying the reputation of a good 
Christian. This, however, is by no means the case. Nicolai was sympathetic to the 
principal aims of the Neologists, namely the haimonious reconciUation of Christianity and 
rationaUsm, theology and philosophy. Yet there is nothing vague or inconsistent m Ins 
standpoint. He beUeves fhmly in the right of eveiy individual to fonnulate his own creed, 
witliout mterference from any supposed "higher authority". He remahis loyal to
141
I
Christianity, but only to that form of Christianity which is tolerant and undogmatic, 
rational and free from superstition.
Nicolai’s novel also contains a substantial element of social criticism, again chiefly in the 
form of satire. Like Gellert and La Roche he condemns the luxury, decadence and 
immorality which characterised life at many of the German courts, the idleness of the 
aristocracy, its false pride and slavish imitation of French culture and French fashions. 
Sebaldus’ wife Withehnine is pained by the fickleness of friends made at court, when 
following her departure into the country she discovers "daB man sich am Hofe um die 
nicht bekiimmert, die man nicht braucht" [p.23], until she learns to appreciate her honest, 
unsophisticated husband as he deserves and in her new independence ceases to regret the 
pleasure of looking on while others amuse themselves. Numerous telling details combine 
to create the impression of a society governed by grace and favour, prejudice and 
corruption. Through his parents’ coimection with the Hofmarschall, the Nothankers’ son 
is able to obtain not one scholarship to study at the university, but two. The consequences 
may easily be imagined; the young man is enabled to pursue his studies in die coffee 
houses and village inns and "überhaupt kavalierenmaBig in der groBen Welt" [p.29].
When Sebaldus suddenly finds himself deprived of his clerical office and miserably poor, 
those who had previously treated him with respect now subject him to all manner of 
indignities. Everyone to whom he applies for assistance keeps him waiting unnecessarily: 
Stauzius uses the familiar Er fonn of address, instead of the more formal Sie appropriate 
for a man of education. It is revealing that while Sebaldus and his family are facing 
destitution and the very real prospect of starvation, Count von Nhnmer, instead of 
offeiing to help them, is deploring the state of his digestion. No doubt on account of 
having over-indulged his appetite in the past, the Count now finds that he no longer 
enjoys his food as he once did. He is obliged, therefore, to have his favourite dishes
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tianspoited from Hanau and Frankfurt am Main. Instead of assisting Sebaldus to acquire 
the basic necessities of life, he offers him a lunch of caviar and truffles — one is 
mevitably reminded of Marie Antoinette’s famous remark.
Nicolai’s aristocrat par excellence is aptly named Frau von Hohenauf. Frau von Hohenauf 
cares for nothing in the world more than for the noble ancestry and connections of the 
family into which she has married, despite the fact that her own father was merely a 
tenant farmer. Her own humble origins do not prevent her regarding aU members of the 
bourgeoisie as "Geschopfe von einer anderen Gattung" [p.93]. The plan which Frau von 
Hohenauf envisages for her daughters’ education contains in essence all that Nicolai finds 
most objectionable in court life. The young ladies are to read only French, "denn das 
deutsche Zeug nützt den Frâuleins nichts, wenn sie nach Hofe kommen... Wahrhaftig, ich 
bekomme Vapeurs wenn ich nur die gothischen Buchstaben von feme sehe" [p.91]. 
Marianne as the governess must never forget that these young ladies are persons of rank. 
She must never scold or command, Frau von Hohenauf insists. She must be respectful 
and indulgent of their faults. Above all she must instil in them a tme sense of their own 
worth. Their intellectual powers are not to be overtaxed, the sole purpose of intellect 
being, in their mother’s opinion, to deduce the optimal method of pleasing the gentlemen 
of the court and — following success — to decide "ob die eroberten Herzen behalten, oder 
ob sie, nachdem damit eine ZeiÜang wie mit emem Balle gespielet worden, in dem 
Winkel geworfen werden sollten" [p.94]. Marianne in her naivety attempts to model her 
pupils’ education on the "bourgeois" principles of modest)^ benevolence and 
phüantiuopy. AU such attempts she must endeavour to conceal from her employer, for 
Frau von Hohenauf is horrified by her daughter’s suggestion that the middle classes 
{Lumpengesindel is her customary word for them) might be "Gottes Geschopfe,
Menschen wie wh" [p. 104]. Such figures are obviously caricatures, designed to amuse the 
reader as much as to provoke his righteous indignation. At the same time, Nicolai does
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have a very serious point to make. Frau von Hohenauf and her kind are foolishly 
pretentious, but their very frivolity makes them relatively harmless. Others are clever 
enough and serious-minded enough to cause great suffering to entire sections of the 
population. Herr F. has learnt through bitter experience to fear aU those who wield 
power:
Die Konige und die Priester haben den Erdkreis unter sich geteilt, so daB 
nichts mehr übrig ist. Auf dem Flecke, auf dem ich atme, regiert jemand, 
wohin ich mich wenden konnte, wird ein anderer regieren. Sowenig ich 
für mich unabhëngig bestehen, ohne Regenten sein, oder mir Regenten 
und Regierungsform nach meinem GefaUen einrichten kann, ebenso wenig 
kann ich für mich allein mit meiner besondem Religion leben... Ich 
kann... in die ganze weite Welt laufen, aber wohin ich trete, bin ich hn 
Zaune einer anderen [Religionspartei], die mich wieder ausstoBt. Wohl 
denn. Ich whl bleiben, wo ich bin, und dulden, was ich nicht andem kann.
[p.l45]
After much suffering, Heix F. arrives at the conclusion that since he is powerless to resist 
the tyranny of the Church authorities, he must submit and accept -  or appear to accept — 
aU Lutheran dogma, however hxational or inhumane. He must try to find fulfdment in the 
purely private sphere of personal relationships. The withdrawal from public life, prompted 
by the realisation of political weakness, is believed by some scholars to constitute one of 
the principal sources of Empfindsamkeit. This argument I consider largely irrelevant to 
the novels of Gellert and Sophie von La Roche. Yet it does seem to have some bearing 
on the rationalist Nicolai. The recognition that the individual could do little or nothing to 
change society did not produce Sensibility in any recognisable form, but it certainly did 
produce very real despair. Herr F. is not Nicolai’s spokesman — the fact that Nicolai 
constructed an entire novel with the aim of convincing his readers of the need for change 
indicates that he by no means shares Heix F.’s conviction that change is impossible -  yet 
he clearly does have some sympathy for this pesshnistic outlook.
Nicolai’s dislike of the Empfindsamen is well-known. His objections to the movement are 
clearly spelt out in his Freuden des Jungen Werthers and Leiden und Freuden Werthers
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des Mannes (1775). His portrayal of Hen Saugling in Sebaldus Nothanker is similarly 
intended as satire on the more frivolous aspects of Sensibility, its sweet sentimentality, its 
Rococo superficiality, its Tandelei. Saugling is vain as regards both his person and his 
poems, his "klehie Dingerchen" [p. 187], He is extremely susceptible to flattery, especially 
from the young ladies hr whose society he feels much more comfortable than in that of 
his own sex. The word Nicolai most frequently uses to describe Saugling is "Mein". This 
epithet is by no means exclusively applicable to his persorr — though his appearance does 
betray his character -  mention is even made of Saughng’s "kleines Herz" [p. 112].
Saugling has the egotism we discerned in some of Gellert’s characters and, in heightened 
form, in La Roche’s Seymoirr. He is incapable of real communication with others, for he 
is too self-engrossed to care to distinguish the motives which govern their actions. As a 
result, he generally misinterprets their words and then behaviour to himself; their 
behaviom- to others does not interest him. Provided only they wiU appear to admire his 
person and his poems he wdl ask no further questions, make no further demands. The 
portrayal of Saugling suggests that Nicolai was at the very least suspicious of that Mnd of 
literature which does not serve a moral or otherwise useful purpose. Saugling serves as a 
warning example of the dangers of indulgmg a predilection for the literature of 
Empfindsamkeit.
Nicolai satirises what he regards as the excesses of Empfindsamkeit, its tendency to 
encourage weakness and self-indulgence. He was no more opposed to feeling as such 
than were Lessing, Mendelssohn or any of the other Enlightenment thinkers. In prmciple 
aU — Aufklarer and Empfindsame -  were agreed that there was a distinction to be drawn 
between true and false Sensibility; differences only occurred when it came to deciding |
precisely where the dividing-line should be drawn. Nicolai was hostde towards the 
outward forms of Empfindsamkeit rather than towar ds its philosophical basis.
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His disapproval of certain features of Empfindsamkeit does not prevent Nicolai adopting 4
some of the conventions of the novel of sensibility. The hard-luck stories so characteristic 
of this type of fiction abound in Sebaldus Nothanker. Every probable and improbable 
misfortune befalls Sebaldus; Marianne too, until some fortunate coincidences combine to 
ensure her happiness, is constantly crossed by Fate; in the course of the novel both she 
and her father encounter people who have suffered persecution and humiliation at the 
hands of the clerical and secular authorities. As in the novels of Gellert and La Roche, 
one is left with the impression that the wicked invariably prosper, while the virtuous are 
inevitably condemned to suffer, Nicolai, however, unlike Gellert and La Roche, does not 
intend that such sad tales should merely move his reader to tears of pity. The cumulative 4
effect — and surely also the intention — of these hard-luck stories is rather to convince 
the reader that no society should permit such injustices; Nicolai’s intention, here as 
elsewhere, is not sentimental but satirical,
A further feature of the novel of Empfindsamkeit which Nicolai has taken over and 
adapted to suit his own purpose is the polarisation of his characters into exemplary and i
villainous types. If his caricatur es of the orthodox Lutherans are readily explicable as 
satire, as a critique of contemporary society, then the portrayal of the more than human 
gentleness and goodness of Sebaldus, the self-sacrificing generosity of the poor farmer 
who cares for the Nothanker family in his own home when they lose theirs, bring to 
mind the model conduct, the complete self-forgetfulness of Gellert’s characters. Yet m 
Nicolai’s novel we find none of the vaguely disturbing egotism, which seems to delight 
in doing good less for its own sake than to produce the pleasant consciousness of one’s 
own superior virtue. Nicolai’s characters do not speak of virtue, they practise it, quietly 
doing whatever is necessary, without thought of material reward, or even of reward in the 
form of gratitude from those they have assisted. Thus Hieronymus, on the death of 
WiUiehnine, offers sound practical advice and concerns himself with the physical weU-
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being of the despairing Sebaldus and Marianne. He tries to persuade them to moderate 
their grief, to accept what they cannot change and to hope for a brighter future. They 
typical âme sensible would rather have participated in, and thereby increased, their 
sorrow.
Here, in Nicolai’s treatment of Empfindsamkeit, we may observe in condensed form the 
various elements which make up his world-view. At the heart of Nicolai’s thought lies a 
typically Enlightened dislike and distrust of philosophical tlieories which have no firm 
foundation in practical hfe. For Nicolai, as for his friend Lessing, the path to truth did 
not involve speculation; hence they were ahke suspicious of academic scholarship at its 
most abstmse and of the dogmatic aspects of all contemporary movements, from the 
sphere of rehgion as of practical morahty and what might be called the theory of feeling. 
To Nicolai, Empfindsamkeit, Pietism and Lutheran orthodoxy were each too far removed 
from the sohd realities and inner essentials of everyday life. His rejection of aU three and 
the basis of his polemic lies in the conviction, so fundamental to the Enhghtenment, that 
man could find the right way if he would only follow his own native good sense.
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1. Karl Aner: Der Aufklarer Friedrich Nicolai (GieJBen, 1912), p.53.
2. A good many of Goethe’s Xenien refer to Nicolai. Let me quote two examples:
Nicolai reiset noch immer — noch lang wird er reisen,
Aber ins Land der Vemunft findet er nimmer den Weg.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Gedenkausgabe der Werke, Briefe und Gesprache; edited 
by Ernst Bender, Zürich 1962: II, p.467, n®.184.)
Willst du ailes vertilgen, was deiner Natur nicht gemSB ist,
Nicolai, zuerst schwore dem Schbnen den Tod.
(Ibid., n , p.468, n \ 188.)
The Romantics too inclined to this view, Eichendorlf maintains that Nicolai "hielt sich 
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5. JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE, DIE LEIDEN DES
JUNGEN WERTHERS
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Ein Befreier war er wie jeder Dichter und Schriftsteller durch die Erregung des 
Gefiihls und durch die analytische Erweiterung des Wissens vom Menschen}
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In terms of sales, the novel Die Leiden des jungen Werthers was Goethe’s greatest
popular success. Between the initial publication of the first version in 1774 and that
of the second version in 1787, no fewer than thirty editions appeared; while some
twenty-five editions of the revised second version were issued between 1787 and
Goethe’s death in 1832.  ^ The response of the public to this work — the phenomenon
of Wertherfieber, as contemporaries termed it -  has been too well documented to
merit much discussion here.  ^ The precise incidence of the wearing of Werther costume
or the perfume Eau de Werther, or the giving of the name "Wertherie"' ,^ can in any
case shed little light on the exact reasons for the effect of the novel on contemporary
sensibilities. It is, moreover, scarcely possible to determine how many of the suicides
allegedly inspired by a reading of Werther may have been really attributable to this
cause. What is evident is that Goethe’s novel was immediately much read; and much
feared. The angry response which the work provoked in some quarters provides
sufficient indication that its supposed message was widely believed to constitute a
serious threat to the moral fabric of society. The Theological Faculty at Leipzig
successfully campaigned to have the book banned there; the ban on sales of the novel,
as on the wearing of Werther costume, remaining in force as late as 1825.  ^ In
Copenhagen, likewise, a Danish translation was forbidden by the Church authorities.®
The reaction from those who regarded themselves as the custodians of Christian
morality amounted to little short of panic. Klaus Scherpe writes:
Zeitgenbssische Dokumente zur Werther-Rezeption erwecken den 
Eindruck, als hatte die nachhaltige Wirkung des kleinen Romans den 
Zusammenbruch aller geordneten VerhSltnisse und die Zerstbrung aller 
Errungenschaften des menschlichen Geistes zur Folge gehabt. Durch die 
Beschwbrung der Gefahr versuchte man, den Folgen zu wehren.^
Wolfgang Doktor, in his analysis of the contemporary criticism of Empfindsamkeit, 
argues with some conviction that around the year 1775 the content and tone of this 
criticism underwent a profound change. At this point (we are told) polemicists began 
to see in Empfindsamkeit not merely a passing fashion -  which despite some (it was
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confidently hoped) temporary adverse effects on the more highly strung, need not be g
taken too seriously — but a positive threat to the general well-being of the ■
community.
Bine prmzipieUe Auseinandersetzung mit der Empfindsamkeit selbst findet noch 
nicht statt, sie steht weiterhin über der Kritik, im Gegenteil kritisiert wird das, 
was sich den Anschein gibt, empfindsam zu sein, diesen Anspruch aber nicht 
genügt... Diese BinsteUung halt sich bis etwa 1775, bis die empfindsame 
Bewegung derartige AusmaBe erreicht hat, daB eine emsthafte Brôrterung 
unumganghch wird. Man spricht jetzt nicht mehr von modischer Manier, 
harmloser Sekte und literarischer Spielerei, die mit einem LScheln hingenommen |
werden kann, sondem von einer gefâhrüchen Bpidemie, von einer zerstbrenden 
Seuche, der Einhalt geboten werden muB. Die Toleranzschwelle ist 
überschritten.® I
Clearly, Goethe’s novel was instrumental in alerting the public to some of the dangers
inherent in unrestrained emotionalism. It would however scarcely be possible to |
determine to what extent Die Leiden des jungen Werthers was actually responsible for
(rather than merely a response to) a mood prevalent within certain circles in the early 4 |
1770s. Some consideration of the case against the work may help in answering this
question. Hauptpastor Goeze’s criticisms, as contained in the Freiwillige Beitrage zu
den Hamburgischen Nachrichten, may be regarded as typical. Werther must, Goeze
claims, be numbered among those works which have contributed to bring about the
moral decline of society.
Natürlich kann die Jugend keine anderen als diese Lehren daraus ziehen: 
folgt euren natürlichen Trieben. Verhebt euch, um die Leere eurer Seelen 
auszufiillen. Gaukelt in der Welt herum, will man euch zu ordentlichen 
Bemfsgeschâften führen, so denkt an das Pferd, das sich unter den Sattel 
bequemte und zu Schanden geritten wurde. Will es zuletzt nicht mehr 
gehen, wohlan, ein SchuB Pulver ist hinlânglich, aller eurer Noth ein 
Bnde zu machen, Man wird eurer GroBmuth bewundem, und den 
Schbnen wird eurer Name heilig sein. Und was ist zuletzt das Bnde von 
diesem Liede? Dieses: lasset uns essen und trinken und frbhlich seyn, wir 
kbnnen sterben, wann wir wollen. Ungefahr sind wir geboren, und 
ungefâhr fahren wir wieder dahin, als wSren wir nie gewesen.®
Goeze even goes so far as to argue that if suicide is condoned, it is then no very 
great step to die affirmation that there is no great harm m similarly terminatmg the 
lives of those we dislike.
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This indictment of Goethe’s novel, at first sight narrow-minded to the point of 
absurdity, becomes rather more comprehensible when we take account of the fact that 
the reading public of the 1770s was accustomed to find in its fiction a clear didactic 
purpose and models of exemplary conduct which it was explicitly encouraged to 
emulate. Such readers were inevitably unprepared for a novel in which the familiar 
moral element had given way to æsthetic considerations; in which "instead of a moral 
warning... we have an æsthetic enticement"^. Few critics were prepared to recognise, 
as Blanckenburg did, that "der Dichter ist nicht verbunden, uns immer ein 
s i t t l i c h e s  Buch zu geben"^ .^ Even Lichtenberg, who is scarcely to be 
identified with the forces of political, clerical or æsthetic reaction, rejected Goethe’s 
novel on the grounds that it made no contribution to the improvement of the human 
race. "Wer seine Talente nicht zur Belehrung und Bessemng anderer anwendet, ist 
entweder ein schlechter Mann oder ein auBerst eingeschrânkter Kerl. Eines von beiden 
muB der Verfasser des leidenden Werthers sein."^ ®
In the character of Werther there was much that was familiar; and much that might 
indeed appear exemplary -  which could not but appear so to a public accustomed to 
equate an unusual capacity for feeling with an unusual degree of moral worth. There 
was clearly a good deal in Werther of which even the Aufklarer might approve: his 
love for Nature, for children and for simple folk; his enthusiasm for traditional 
German domestic values. All this was both familiar and acceptable. Werther’s attitude 
to Hfe — and it was to this aspect of the novel that critics and admirers alike devoted 
the most attention -  had been evolved in accordance with the most basic doctrine of 
the Enlightenment: namely, the belief that the individual should be free to develop his 
own capacities in whatever fashion he himself might consider best. Werther differs 
from the Aufklarer only in that his desire for intellectual and emotional liberty is 




society as a whole. At first sight Werther seems little different from many young men |
of his time, in literature and in hfe. As Hans Reiss has pointed out,^  ^ he is accepted 
on equal terms by bourgeois society. He is liked by people of all classes; even the
Prince and the Minister are apparently eager to cultivate his acquaintance. The
«Amtmann has a sufficiently high opinion of his merits to welcome him into his family I
%
circle. We have no reason to believe that Wilhelm treats Werther as an incurable s
neurotic, despite taking issue with him on some points. Even Werther’s continuing 
attachment to Lotte after her marriage, "dangerous" as it was, was not without a 
precedent in Rousseau’s La nouvelle Héloïse (1761), in which just such a potentially 
disastrous situation is used to demonstrate the triumph of duty over passion.
Furthermore, the growth of Empfindsamkeit had hitherto produced effects of which 
bourgeois society could approve. In the shape of Tugendempfindsamkeit it had helped 
to create a climate conducive to mild social reform and to the performance of good 
works.
The type of morality preached by GeUert and La Roche exemplified the acceptable 
face of Empfindsamkeit. Some critics might find Sophie Stemheim’s moral fervour 
exaggerated, even ridiculous; yet La Roche’s intention in writing her novel could be 
recognised by all as entirely commendable. To those readers acquainted with the 
fiction of Gellert and La Roche, Werther must have appeared at once familiar and 
unfamiliar. Clearly Werther was not a villain; his sensibility tended rather to 
distinguish him as a figure worthy of emulation. The contemporary reader was 
therefore faced with a choice. On the one hand he could concentrate his attention on 
what he recognised as Werther’s moral failings; in this case he might well feel 
indignant that Goethe, by adopting the familiar form of the epistolary novel, had 
raised expectations of a moral tale only to disappoint them. As Scherpe has observed, 
"Die Reaktion war umso heftiger, da man sich dupiert fiihlte"^ ®. Alternatively, the 
reader could overlook Werther’s obvious indifference to the familiar concept of virtue,
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allowing himself to be intoxicated (as it were) by the power of the narrative and the 
seductiveness of the language. The latter response was not exclusively æsthetic. 
Sympathy for Werther, prompted by receptivity to his unusual eloquence, could easily 
become admiration; and the reading public of the 1770s was accustomed to imitate 
whatever it admired.
Not only did the authors of sentimental fiction recommend that the characters be 
accepted as models of exemplary conduct; the whole pattern of contemporary reading- 
habits favoured such a response. Even as late as the 1770s people tended to read a 
small number of books a good many times over,- rather than a large number of books 
only once or twice over, as most of us do today. It seems that the continuing high 
price of books was a determining factor here; though, given the incidence of public 
libraries and Lesegesellschaften, we ought perhaps to emphasise the effect of custom 
or tradition, which inclined to accord some books quasi-biblical status.^ ® Such books -  
whether practical or devotional in content — were then consulted in times of trouble, 
their advice taken, their message welcomed as spiritual sustenance.
A discerning critic such as Lessing might well fear that some readers would confuse
the æsthetic merit of the novel with a supposed moral superiority of the hero; the
more easily so, since the author/narrator nowhere distances himself explicitly from the
character’s view of the world.
Wenn aber ein so warmes Produkt nicht mehr Unheil als Gutes stiften soil; 
meinen Sie nicht, daB es noch eine kleine kalte SchluBrede haben muBte? Ein 
paar Winke hinteiher, wie Werther zu so einem abenteuerhchen Charakter 
gekommen, wie ein anderer Jüngling, dem die Natur eine âhnliche Anlage 
gegeben, sich dafiir zu bewahren habe. Derm ein solcher diirfte die poetische 
Schbnheit leicht fiir die moralische nehmen und glauben, daB der gut gewesen 
sein muB, der unsere Teilnehmung so stark beschaftigt... Also lieber Goethe, 
noch ein Kapitelchen am Schlusse, und je zynischer, je besser.^ ®
The form of Goethe’s novel indeed is such as to encourage identification with 
Werther. The conciseness of the work -  it is, of course a good deal shorter than the
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novels of Richardson, Rousseau and Hermes — together with a dearth of action or 
conventional "adventure", lend to it a peculiar intensity. Werther’s point of view has, 
as it were, a monopoly of the reader’s attention; the convention of the epistolary 
novel hitherto had been to include the letters of a number of correspondents, thereby 
presenting various perspectives on the action. Wenher writes to Wilhelm and on 
occcasion to Lotte, yet their replies to these letters are not made available to the 
reader. We may deduce that Wilhelm is far from sharing Werther’s ideas on certain 
important questions, but his critique of Werther’s outlook is rarely made explicit. As a 
result, the hero’s subjective perspective is invested with the authority of a single 
unchallenged voice. Even when Werther’s letters are interrupted by the "report" of the 
"editor", this "editor" does not (as Lessing and other critics would have wished him to 
do) present Werther as a warning example to similarly disposed readers. He does not 
present Werther’s suicide as a sinful, immoral or even foolish act.
The editor’s preface would appear to place the novel fairly firmly in the tradition of
Empfindsamkeit Goethe establishes an atmosphere of friendly intimacy, by addressing
his readers in familiar ihr form, as kindred spirits of whose sympathy for Werther he
may be assured. The public will not withhold from Werther (the "editor" is confident)
its admiration and love.“ The "editor’s" attitude to Werther is in fact highly
ambiguous. He both refers to his suicide as "die schrbckliche Tat" tp.357], a term
which clearly implies both horror and disapproval, and presents it (or so it seems) as
the result of sufficient cause:
Der VerdruB, den er bei der Gesandschaft gehabt, konnte er nicht 
vergessen... lEr] überlieB sich ganz der wunderbaren Empfind- und 
Denkensart, die wir aus seinen Briefen kennen, und einer endlosen 
Leidenschaft, woriiber noch endlich allés, was thStige Kraft in ihm war, 
verloschen muBte. Das ewige Einerley eines Umgangs mit dem 
liebenswürdigen und gehebten Geschopfe, dessen Ruhe er stôrte, das 
stürmende Abarbeiten seiner Krafte, ohne Zweck und Aussicht, drangten 
ihn endlich zu der schrbcklichen That [p.357].
Schiller, one of the more discerning critics,^  ^ certainly considered that Goethe had so
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Structured the novel as to make Werther’s suicide appear inevitable:
Es ist intéressant zu sehen, mit welchem glückhchen Instinkte allés, was |
dem sentimentalen Charakter Nahrung gibt, im Werther i
zusammengedrtingt ist: schwârmerische, unglückliche Liebe, i
Empfindsamkeit fiir Natur, Religionsgefuhle, philosophischer 
Contemplationsgeist, um nichts zu vergessen, die diistere, gestaltlose 
ossianische Welt, rechnet man dazu, wie wenig empfehlend, ja wie i
feindlich die Wiridichkeit dagegen gestellt ist, und wie von auBen her J
aUes sich veremigt, den GequHlten in seme Idealwelt zurückzudrângen, da 4
sieht man keine Mbglichkeit, wie ein solcher Charakter aus einem I
solchen Kreise sich hâtte retten kbnnen
The portrayal of Werther’s actual death is surely also relevant to the question: To «
what extent does Goethe explicitly or implicitly distance himself from his hero’s | |
emotionalism? The slow process of Werther’s dying is related in the most disturbing 
detail:
Als der Medikus zu dem Ungliicldichen kam, fand er ihn an der Erde ohne 4
Rettung, der Puls schlug, die Glieder waren alle gelahmt, über dem rechten a
Auge hatte er sich durch den Kopf geschossen, das Gehim war herausgetrieben.
Man lieB ihm zum Überflusse eine Ader am Arme. Das Blut floB, er holte 
immer noch Athem. Aus dem Blut auf der Lehne des Sessels konnte man 
schlieBen, er habe sitzend vor dem Schreibtische die That vollgebracht. Dann ist 
er heruntergesunken, hat sich konvulsivisch um den Stuhl herum gewâlzt, er lag 
gegen das Fenster entkrâftet auf dem Riicken, war in vblliger Kleidung, in 
blauem Frack und gelber Weste [p.381].
This description would scarcely have been expected to encourage the reader to follow 
Werther’s example, as some idealised account might conceivably have done. Benjamin 
Bennett has rightly drawn attention to the "utter useless disorder of Werther’s twelve 
hours of dying";^ while Eric Blackall, the first critic to base a substantial part of his 
argument precisely on this aspect of the novel,^ perhaps takes this interpretation rather 
too far. Nonetheless, Blackall does deserve credit for emphasising the discrepancy 
between heroic intention and pitiful execution in Werther’s final hours. This contrast, 
he suggests, is "aH the more striking when we consider how carefully he had himself 
stage-managed his death-scene. The act itself does not live up to expectations raised 
by the preparations. It is somehow weak. There is irony here, a conscious and 
purposeful irony. The purpose of this irony is to establish a critical distance
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1between narrator and character; hence also, if the reader is sufficiently discerning to i
recognise the irony for what it is, between reader and character.
The real difficulty raised by Werther’s suicide does not spring from any intention on
Goethe’s part to make the deed heroic, still less worthy of imitation; but from the fact
that the reader of the 1770s was quite unprepared to see suicide (especially suicide for
reasons such as Werther’s) depicted in the first place. The literature of Sensibility in
Germany was permeated with a vague longing for death, but this general weariness of
life was never shown to result in any positive action to terminate it. The Aufklarer
might no longer be influenced by the specifically religious argument against suicide;
they might even countenance it -  as Gottsched had done in his drama Der sterbende
Cato (1732) -  if it could be shown to serve the common good. Suicide prompted by
"mere" personal unhappiness, however, they scorned as revealing a deplorable lack of
moral courage. Such was Lessing’s view of Goethe’s Werther.
Glauben Sie wohl, daB je ein griechischer oder rômischer Jüngling sich so und 
d a r u m das Leben genommen? GewiB nicht... Solche kleingroBe, verâchtlich 
sch^tzbare Originale hervorzubringen, war nur der christlichen Religion 
vorbehalten, die ein kôrperliches Bedürfhis so schôn in eine geistige 
Vollkommenheit zu verwandeln weiB.^
Nevertheless, traditional Christian teaching abhorred suicide on account of its being 
the one sin of which no one can repent. This sin (it was widely believed) could not 
be too strongly condemned, for it contravened both God’s law and the principle of 
mutual co-operation upon which society was built. Only God (it was said) had the 
right to take away life, since only God could bestow it. It was, according to this 
thinking, man’s sacred duty to use the gift of life to the greater glory of God and for 
the greater benefit of society.
Of course there were other grounds, quite apart from the suicide issue, on which 
Goethe’s novel might be considered dangerous. In Werther, the hero is no more
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favourably disposed towards the fictional upholders of conventional moral values than 
their real-life counterparts were to be towards the novel. He is explicitly critical of 
those notions on which bourgeois self-esteem was founded: namely, devotion to duty, 
to hard work, and (by means of conscientious striving) to the attainment of wealth 
and prestige. "Allés in der Welt lauft doch auf eine Lumperey hinaus, und ein Kerl, 
der um anderer willen, ohne daB es seine eigene Leidenschaft ist, sich um Geld oder 
Ehre oder sonst was abarbeitet, ist immer ein Thor" [p.299]. Werther propounds the 
view that the individual exists in order to realise his potential: to develop his 
capacities -  especially his capacity for feeling. In writing to Wilhelm, he is also 
challenging the reader to accept or refute his argument. Werther’s style of living 
might perhaps be seen as constituting a challenge to the bourgeois work ethic, of 
which he is positively contemptuous: "Es ist ein einfbrmig Ding um’s 
Menschengeschlecht. Die meisten verarbeiten den grôBten Teil der Zeit, um zu leben, 
und das biBgen, was ihnen von Freizeit bleibt, angstigt sie so, daB sie alle Mittel 
aufsuchen, um’s los zu werden" [p.273].
Without being a member of the traditionally leisured aristocracy, Goethe’s hero for 
most of the novel engages in no recognisable form of employment. His attempts at 
philanthropy are too haphazard to represent a generally acceptable substitute for a 
conventional career. Nor does he embark on any very consistent programme of 
personal study. Were it indeed the case that Werther was designed to provide the 
reading public with a model of exemplary conduct, the novel would in effect 
constitute an enticement to subordinate professional obligation to personal caprice -  as 
Goeze believed that it did.
Werther has excellent career prospects. He is financially independent; he has good 
social contacts, many of those in positions of authority being favourably disposed 
towards him. The fact that he nevertheless fails to make his way in the world may be
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attributed to his disdain for professional success, rather than to any lack of
opportunities for advancement. He allows himself to be manoeuvred into his situation
in the Residenz; just as passively, he drops out of it again at the earliest opportunity.^
He can value work only as a narcotic, as a temporary and illusory means of escape
from his too oppressive awareness of the meaninglessness of life:
Manchmal wiinscht’ ich, em Tagelohner zu sein, um nur des Morgens beim 
Erwachen eine Aussicht auf den kiinftigen Tag, emen Drang, eine Hoffiiung zu 
haben. Oft beneid ich Alberten, den ich über den Ghren in Akten begraben 
sehe, und bilde mir ein, mir wâr’s wohl, wenn ich an seiuer SteUe würe 
[p.317].
Werther knows very well that this passing inclination for purposeful activity has its 
roots in something other than a typical bourgeois belief in the value of work for its 
own sake or for the sake of material reward. "1st nicht das Sehnen in mir nach 
Veranderung des Zustandes eine innere unbehagliche Ungeduld, die mich überaUhin 
verfolgen wird?" [p.317]
Such opinions must inevitably disturb many members of a society which felt itself to
be dependent for its very existence on the readiness of each individual to work for
the common good. Klaus Scherpe has analysed this attitude in some detail:
Die dem Binzelnen gewShrte Freiheit des Erwerbs von Bildung und Besitz 
verpflichtet ihn, sich durch erfolgreiche Tâtigkeit als nutzUches Mitghed der 
Sozietat auszuweisen. Seine Individualitât wird funktional begriffen, nach dem, 
was er leistet und produziert...
Arbeit gilt als Wert an sich. Sie wird um ihrer selbst willen geleistet und unter 
Bemfung auf ihre Gottgefalligkeit aus sich selbst gerechtfertigt. [...] Werther 
beschreibt den Zwang burgerlicher Erwerbtâtigkeit als Unterordnung der 
menschlichen Natur: um seine materiellen Bedurfiiisse zu befriedigen, muB der 
Mensch seine persbnlichen Ansprüche zurückstellen und seine Natur verleugnen. 
Beugt er sich diesem Zwang, so trennt er sich unweigerhch von seinen 
Ansprüchen und empfindet seine ursprünghchen Rechte nur noch als Last.^ ®
For all that he has been celebrated as a partisan of progressive middle-class values, it 
is characteristic of Werther that, in direct defiance of contemporary bourgeois thought, 
he lacks respect for Man in his social function. For the soHd middle-class citizens
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who are his equals in rank, he feels mingled pity and contempt. It must therefore |
seem to many readers as though Goethe wishes to expose to ridicule values to which 
they themselves clung; clung all the more tenaciously for being well aware that their 
advancement -  social, political and economic -  was under threat. That threat came 4
not only from aristocratic power; it was also perceived as coming from those inclined %
,'sto be sceptical about the real value of the progress achieved by the generation of the t
Aufklarer.
Werther’s attitude to life is largely conservative. "Ich weiB wohl, daB wir nicht gleich 
sind, noch seyn kbnnen" [p.272]. At times, indeed, he comes uncomfortably close to 
obscurantism He is far from sharing the view of the Aufklarer that it is sufficient for 
the triumph of evil for good men to refuse to think. Werther is (albeit for different 
reasons) just as distrustful of thinking as are Nicolai’s orthodox-Lutheran clerics.
While we would be wrong in assuming that Werther’s views here are necessarily also 
Goethe’s, we may nevertheless say safely that Werther’s ideas are ideas which Goethe '
believes to be at least deserving of the reader’s consideration. Gellert, La Roche and 
Nicolai had each shown that the intellect might serve as a support in times of trouble; i
their model characters found consolation, a reason for living in the acquisition of 
knowledge. For Werther, this can never be the case. He sees in knowledge only a 
source of unhappiness: this not merely because too much education might make the 
poor discontented with their lot, but because Werther prefers a state of complete 
intellectual numbness to any too painful self-awareness. If knowledge is destmctive of 
happiness, it follows that as many as possible should be allowed to remain in a state 
of unquestioning ignorance. "Wir sollen es mit den Kindem machen wie Gott mit uns, 
der uns am glücklichsten macht, wenn er uns in freundlichem Wahne hintaumeln laBt"
[p.298].
Werther even feels some degree of envy -  an envy, it is true, not altogether free
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from condescension — for the simple, uneducated common people:
Ich sage dir, mein Schaz, wenn meine Sinnen gar nicht mehr halten 
wollen, so lindert’s aU den Tumult, der Anblick eines solchen 
Geschbpfes, das in der glückhchen Gelassenheit so den engen Kreis 
seines Daseins ausgeht, von einem Tag zum anderen sich durchhilft, die 
Blatter abfallen sieht und nichts dabey denkt als daB der Winter kommt 
[p.2793.
Were such opinions to find universal support, the community as a whole would 
scarcely benefit thereby (as those of Goethe’s readers influenced by the ideas of the 
Enhghtenment could not have failed to observe). If the uneducated poor were to be 
left in their natural state, this might indeed satisfy the æsthetic sensibilities of the 
Empfindsamen; but the way would be left open for an educated minority to exploit #
the ignorant to whatever extent and for whatever purpose might please them.
In declaring his allegiance to these conservative values, Werther is in effect 
challenging the principles not only of the Enlightenment, but also of the entire 
bourgeois culture which had given birth to Sensibility. Gellert and La Roche had 
defended ideals which were essentially middle-class: the ideas of virtue, benevolence 
and rational pragmatism were tightly bound up with both authors’ concept of 
Sensibility. For La Roche as for Gellert, self-awareness too had an entirely positive 
function: far from destroying feeling, it was thought rather to increase it. This was 
because reflection and analysis could alert the âme sensible to hitherto unsuspected 
aspects of his own personality — familiarise him with new outlets for his talents (and 
his feelings) in philanthropic projects of benefit to the community as a whole.
Goethe’s novel presents to the reader a world in which, for the first time, Sensibility 
is made independent of the bourgeois ideals of virtue, benevolence and intellectual 
freedom. Sophie Stemheim’s sensibility had been attributed explicitly to her middle- 
class heritage; it was moreover inseparable from (peihaps even a product o^ her 
exemplary zeal for the ideal of virtue. Goethe’s hero cares little for traditional
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bourgeois concepts of virtue, still less for bourgeois consciousness. The representative 
of middle-class ideas in Goethe’s novel is no longer an exemplary figure, whom the 
reader is urged to emulate. The upholder of bourgeois values is not Werther but 
Albert: the man of restrained, indeed limited emotional capacities — in Werther’s view 
at least, the near-philistine. Of course, Albert is by no means totally devoid of feeling. 
He is genuinely devoted to Lotte, devoted also to the memory of Lotte’s mother. He 
is not even averse to sentimental conversation m the moonlit garden in Lotte’s and 
Werther’s company. Lotte, for her part, reads Klopstock, weeps over Ossian and 
speculates on reunion beyond the grave; apparently finding in Werther a friend 
uniquely capable of satisfying a profound emotional need. Yet Lotte’s and Albert’s 
sensibility, in contrast to Werther’s, is never such as to pose a real threat to their 
psychological well-being. They are able to call upon sensibility as and when they 
wish, regarding the cultivation of feeling as a pleasant pastime for their leisure hours. 
For Lotte especially, in her active love for her family, virtue and sensibility are still 
very much two facets of one whole. In these two characters, Goethe depicts the kind 
of sensibility of which bourgeois society could approve -  a kind of sensibility of 
course very different from Werther’s.
Theirs is an attitude which Werther finds essentially limited. It will, he believes, 
involve those who adhere to it in no great conflict, sorrow or guilt, but it will at the 
same time correspondingly fail to expand their emotional capacity to the point where 
moral and artistic greatness becomes possible (see esp. letters of 26th May and 18th 
August). Werther is at once attracted and repelled by middle-class life, soothed and 
delighted by Lotte’s serene domestic world, yet at the same time suspicious of, even 
hostile towards, those who structure their lives in accordance with convention. It 
cannot be stated too emphatically that Werther is not Goethe; Werther’s views 
certainly do not correspond in every detail with those of his creator. Werther presents 
a critical appraisal of bourgeois Tugendempfindsamkeit -  and an alternative to it. This
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alternative is not one of which Goethe could approve in its totality — for in adopting 
it Werther sets the seal on his own destruction -, but one which he did consider to be 
worthy of discussion, deserving of interest and sympathy, if not of admiration and 
emulation.
It is profoundly ironic, symptomatic of the moral ambiguity and of the existential 
unease at the heart of the work, that Werther’s unusual gifts are directly responsible 
for his downfall; his strength and his weakness have a common source. A less 
vulnerable and sensitive man, without Werther’s exceptional emotional energies, a 
cynic or a sensualist, would, were he inadvertently to find himself in Werther’s 
predicament, certainly be capable of disentangling himself without thereby seriously 
endangering his emotional equilibrium. Similarly, everything which at first contributes
to bring Werther real, if temporary, happiness subsequently involves him in intense i■1misery, as he sees very clearly; "MuBte denn das so seyn? DaB das, was des 
Menschen Glückseligkeit macht, wieder die Quelle semes Blends wurde?" [p.314]
And: J
‘IO, daB ich launisch seyn konnte, konnte die Schuld auf’s Wetter, auf j
einen Dritten, auf eine fehlgeschlagene Untemehmung schieben, so wurde |
die unertr^gliche Last des Unwillens doch nur halb auf mir ruhen. Weh j
mir, ich fiihle zu sehr, daB an mir allein alle Schuld Hegt -  nicht Schuld. |
Genug, daB in mir die Quelle allés Blends verborgen ist, wie es ehemals j
die Quelle aller Seligkeiten war [p.346]. j
i|This is true above all of Werther’s love for Lotte, as also of his experience of |
God/Nature. Goethe presents his readers with two opposing possibilities, two modes of 4■1existence with their advantages and disadvantages -  on the one hand the moderate 
happiness of Albert’s bourgeois world, which for Werther means an intolerable state 
of indifference, or Werther’s own vacillation between the extremes of rapture and 
despondency. Those who are endangered, who incur guilt, and provoke hostility and 
rejection, are, Werther believes, those who have the noblest and purest intentions 
[p.307].
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Werther’s moral relativism is not necessarily Goethe’s, yet the subsequent fate of his 
hero does suggest that Goethe saw some validity in Werther’s conclusions, particularly 
as he himself drew attention to the ambiguity of the character in a letter to 
Schônbom:
Allerhand neues hab ich gemacht: Eine Geschichte des Titels die Leiden 
des jungen Werthers, darinn ich einen jungen Menschen darstelle, der mit 
einer tiefen reinen Empfindung und wahrer Penetration begabt, sich in 
schwarmende Traume verliert, sich durch Spekulation untergrabt, bis er 
zuletzt durch dazutretende unglückliche Leidenschaften, besonders eine 
endlose Liebe zerrUtet, sich eine Kugel vor den Kopf schieBt. °^
In the less complex and bewildering world of Gellert and La Roche, unhappiness 
principally arose when certain individuals, out of selfishness or from pure wickedness 
for wickedness’ sake, interfered with the natural course of events. Happiness for 
GeUert’s model characters, as for La Roche’s Stemhehn — and even for Nicolai’s 
Sebaldus Nothanker -  could be assured once they had found some means of 
protecting themselves from the machinations of their various enemies. Provided no 
untoward circumstances intervened, all would necessarily be well. The world of 
Goethe’s Werther is a good deal less comfortable. Now happiness is no longer the 
natural inevitable consequence of a virtuous life; happiness, like virtue, has become 
problematic:
Erst wo... das MaB des Glückes nicht mehr von moraUschen, sondern 
von physischen und psychischen Griinden abhangig gemacht wird, 
schwindet jene Sicherheit im Umgang mit dem Glück, die geradezu 
rezeptartige Versicherungen und Garantien fur die Glückseligkeit der 
Menschen anzubieten wuBte.^ ^
Here we have no villain, no guilt without mitigating circumstances. "Werther geht
zugrunde an den besten Krüften seines Wesens", Schôffler writes, "weii die Ehe
Anderer ihm heilig ist."^  ^ Whatever may be his reasons for so long remaining silent
about his love for Lotte, he is certainly not constrained by conventional — or
Christian -  morality. The ambiguity Schôffler detects here is rather more complex
than might at first appear; the impulse which inspires Werther’s love for Nature, for
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literature, for the peasants and their simple way of life, while good in itself, becomes 
fatal because its very strength prevents concentration on the experience of only 
pleasant, positive emotion.
In Goethe’s novel we find much that is reminiscent of conventional Empfindsamkeit.
It is surely significant that Werther was frequently named by contemporaries in 
conjunction with Martin Miller’s Siegwart, eine Klostergeschichte (1776), the work 
which came closest to rivalling the popular success of Goethe’s novel, as examples of 
the novel of Empfindsamkeit. The term Siegwartfteberi^ was coined on the model of 
the Wertherfieber which had preceded it. It may be assumed that eighteenth century 
readers tended to emphasise those aspects of Werther, above all the sentimental and 
rather banal love story, which it shared with inferior works such as Siegwart. Few of 
the traditional motifs of Empfindsamkeit are in fact lacking in Werther. Goethe’s hero 
is in many ways typical of die Empfindsamen — in his dislike of town life, in his 
preference for the English style of gardens, in his fondness for solitary walks by 
moonlight. He weeps "manche Thrâne" [p.279] for the dead Graf von M., though we 
are not told that they enjoyed a particularly close relationship. Indeed, we do not even 
know whether they met in person; it is possible.that Werther’s tears are prompted 
solely by the supposition that the Count must have once had feelings similar to those 
Werther now experiences while walking in his garden. Werther has a thoroughly 
sentimental attachment to the scenes of past emotions, to his favourite spot under the 
linden tree at Wahlheim, to Lotte’s garden and to the garden of the Pfarrhaus, above 
all to his childhood home. Like Sophie Stemheim, he undertakes a pilgrimage to the 
scene of his happiness as a child; "Ein Pilger im heiligen Lande trifft nicht so viele 
Stâtten religioser Erinnerung, und seine Seele ist schwerlich so voll heihger 
Bewegung..." [p.337]. Werther has in common with Sophie Stemheim and with the 
Sophie of Miller’s Siegwart a distinct fascination with his own death; in a manner 
characteristic of die Empfindsamen in literature as in life, he takes pleasure in
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imagining how his friends will conscientiously keep alive his memory, weep over his 
grave and visit the places he loved best [p.361ff].
In Goethe’s novel music has an important part to play in creating an atmosphere 
conducive to the experience and the expression of feeling. Werther’s response to 
music is characteristically emotional — characteristic, that is, both of Werther himself 
and of die Empfindsamen as a group (see esp. chapter on Miller’s Siegwart). Werther 
cares little for technical skill or virtuosity — whether Lotte is an accomplished pianist 
is a matter of indifference to him; her playing moves him so deeply simply because it 
is hers. Equally characteristic of Empfindsamkeit is the fact that a bond is created 
between Werther and Lotte by their mutual spontaneous association of the end of the 
storm with the name of Klopstock. The novel of the time contains numerous examples 
of romantic love nourished and sustained by the shared enjoyment of literature — 
especially, of course, the literature of Empfindsamkeit (compare Miller and Jacobi). 
Werther’s attitude to literature is as subjective and emotional as is his attitude to 
music. He and Lotte identify with the characters in the works they read, even if this 
necessitates a mis-reading of certain authors. Their response to Ossian is 
characteristically intense: "Die Bewegung beider war furchterlich. Sie fuhlten ihr 
eigenes Elend im Schicksal der Edlen, fiihlten es zusammen und ihre Thrânen 
vereinigten sie" [p.371]. Werther’s and Lotte’s reading of literature, which is mainly a 
personal, rather than an æsthetic response, foreshadows the contemporary public’s 
reception of Goethe’s novel, a fact that makes it all the more puzzling that Goethe 
was apparently so totally unprepared for the phenomena of Wertherfieber.
This subjective attitude is of course very different from that demonstrated by the 
characters of Gellert and La Roche, For these authors literature had always to have a 
didactic purpose if it was to be justified at aU; its function, they believed, was to give 
instruction, most often moral instruction. The reader was therefore placed in the
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position of a pupil of inferior understanding who, while free to exercise independence
of judgement, was nevertheless obliged to recognise that he had much to learn and
that good books had much to teach him. Werther manifests no such willingness to be
taught. He is entirely sceptical about the value of academic learning [p.274] and
convinced that, whatever may be the limitations of his knowledge, no man is superior
in feeling, and feeling is the sole faculty he cares to cultivate: "Ach, was ich weiB,
kann jeder wissen -  mein Herz hab ich allein" [p.338]. Nor, for that matter, does
Werther display the pedagogic tendency manifested by the characters of Gellert and
La Roche, just as Goethe sees it as no part of his function as a novelist to further the
specifically moral education of his reader. Werther attempts to reconstruct the
Patriarchal society he finds in the Bible and in "his" Homer in the very different i
social conditions of Rococo Empfindsamkeit for which Sophie Stemheim too had so
marked a predilection. He does not merely, like Haller or Gessner for example, praise
simpler, still existing lifestyles of rural communities; instead he idealises his
surroundings to the point where he can see in contemporary rural society the near
equivalent of a way of life long since gone for ever. He even tries to convince
himself that he too may achieve such unselfconsious simplicity. As he sits preparing
his own dinner and reading in his Homer, his feelings are represented thus:
Da fiihle ich so lebhaft, wie die herrlichen, übermüthigen Freyer der 
Penelope Ochse und Schweine schlachten, zerlegen und braten. Da ist 
nichts, das mich so mit einer stillen, wahren Empfindung ausfiillte, als 
die Züge patriarchalischen Lebens, die ich, Gott sey Dank, ohne 
Affektation in meine Lebensart einweben kann [p.291].
It is to be doubted whether Werther’s lifestyle is quite so free from affectation as he
apparently believes. There is something very contrived in this cultivation of simplicity.
His fondness for literary allusions and parallels — in itself typical of Empfindsamkeit
— is indicative of his inability to refrain from reflection and self-analysis. He tries to
live as the Homeric heroes did; yet in attempting to order his existence in accordance
with a pre-conceived pattern, he inevitably recedes further and further from his ideal
of spontaneity. The reader can scarcely fail to observe that Werther’s conception of
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his own manner of living is largely founded on an illusion. Werther’s position is very 
close to that of Rococo Empfindsamkeit;^ he cultivates an ideal of simplicity and rural 
innocence which he himself can never realise, since every attempt to bring it into 
being will inevitably be self-defeating, producing at best an artificial approximation of 
Homeric society.
One of Werther’s most pronounced characteristics is a peculiarly powerful and active 
imagination, something we have already observed in La Roche’s Empfindsamen. Both 
Sophie Stemheim and Lord Seymour indulge in unrestrained and usually painful 
imaginings, most often relating to their own or to one another’s deaths. Events which 
are as yet mere possibilities they tum over and over in their minds until these appear 
m vividly disturbing detail as unalterable certainties. Werther’s imaginative powers are 
such that he is able -  one ought perhaps to say: he is compelled — to empathise with 
the real or imagined sufferings of real or imagined people, to such an extent that he 
experiences vicarious but nonetheless very genuine mental anguish. Such is the case in 
his debate with Herr Schmidt on the evils of ill-humour (see letter of 1st July 1771).
Such too is his reaction on hearing Lotte and her friend discuss more thoughtlessly 
than callously the deteriorating health of a mutual acquaintance (see letter of 26th 4
October 1772). Clearly this vicarious suffering is occasioned by the enjoyment of 
feeling for feeling’s sake; it is the "joy of grief so characteristic of die 
Empfindsamen.
We should be wary of suggesting that die Empfindsamen, a group of people only 
loosely bound together by shared opinions and tastes, possessed the faculty of 
imagination — in Werther’s case, of course, very much a mixed blessing -  to a 
degree denied to those of their contemporaries who espoused different ideas on art 
and feeling. Yet perhaps it might be said that Empfindsamkeit predisposed its 
adherents to cultivate this faculty, concerned as the movement so intensely was with
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self-analysis. By dissecting their varying states of mind, manufacturing emotions if 
none sufficiently interesting presented themselves in the normal course of events, die 
Empfindsamen gave themselves a thorough training in the uses of the imagination. If 
this imaginative activity only rarely bore fruit in the form of artistic creativity — and 
curiously enough Werther eliminates the imaginative element as far as possible from 
his painting, striving instead to produce a faithful representation of nature as he sees 
it — if it did not necessarily make its adherents more considerate or humane in their 
treatment of others, it could (and in Werther’s case arguably did) give them unusual 
flashes of insight into the workings of the human psyche. The empathetic 
understanding of others’ experiences colours Werther’s attitude to many aspects of 
life, in particular to all aspects of morality.
Werther personifies a type of Empfindsamkeit very similar to that which we observed 
in La Roche’s Seymour. Like Seymour he is no stoic. Neither character makes the 
least attempt to combat despair. Feeling no moral obligation to restrain their emotions 
or to endure patiently whatever Providence has ordained, regarding personal happiness 
as the measure of all things, they abandon themselves entirely to the enjoyment of 
their grief: "Auch halte ich mein Herzgen wie ein krankes Kind, aU sein Whle wird 
ihm gestattet" [p.272] — this where those who were, like Gellert’s Countess, more 
influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment called upon reason, virtue and their very t
vague "religion" to sustain them in their troubles. For Werther and for Seymour — and 
this is an attitude which neither Goethe nor La Roche would condemn -  personal 
happiness is a right, and those to whom it is denied have a right to feel bitter.
Goethe’s portrayal of Werther’s love for Lotte similarly owes much to the tradition of 
Empfindsamkeit. Like Seymour, but unlike Gellert’s model characters, Werther is 
unable to regard love as just one of many aspects of life,- as something to which 
rather less significance should be attached than to the performance of one’s duty to
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society, as something which may be dispensed with (albeit reluctantly) should
circumstances so require. Seymour and Werther feel that love is all-important, that if
fulfilment is not found here it is to be found nowhere. Werther finds the entire
purpose of his hfe in Lotte:
Ich werde sie sehen, ruf ich morgens aus, wenn ich mich ermuntere, und 
mit aller Heiterkeit der schonen Sonne entgegen blicke. Ich werde sie 
sehen, und da hab ich fiir den ganzen Tag keinen Wunsch weiter. Allés, 
ailes verschlingt sich in dieser Aussicht [p.302].
Here there can be no question of finding an adequate measure of contentment in study
or philanthropic activity.
Werther is however, quite unlike Sophie Stemheim and Gellert’s various model 
characters, in that his love for Lotte is not dependent on any exemplary moral 
qualities she may have: it is not a reward for good conduct, which could and would 
be withdrawn should the slightest doubt be cast on the seeming irreproachable virtue 
of the beloved. Werther clearly does not love Lotte on account of the virtue which 
was of such importance in the novels of Richardson, Gellert, Hermes and La Roche,
Of course he recognises from the outset that Lotte is dutiful, considerate and loving 
towards family and friends; he is charmed by her role as devoted, supremely practical 
"mother" to her young brothers and sisters. Yet Werther is altogether less decided as 
to his reasons for loving Lotte than were the protagonists of earlier novels. In 
attempting to communicate his feelings to Wilhelm he must resort to the so-called ■%
Unsagbarkeitstopos: "Kurz und gut, ich hab eine Bekanntschaft gemacht, die mein I
Herz nâher angeht. Ich habe -  ich weiB nicht" [p.280].
Nor does Werther love with any definite aim in mind, certainly not with the intention 
of establishing a long-term partnership with Lotte. In the novels of Gellert, La Roche 'i
and Nicolai, love relationships always tended toward marriage, marriage being thought 
to possess a social as well as a personal function, or at least a social effect beyond
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itself. It formed a solid base, not merely for the education of children, but also for 
the performance of various duties towards the poor and needy. Once married, Gellert’s 
Countess and alternately the Count and Herr R., Lord and Lady Seymour, Sâugling 
and Marianne are in a good position to work actively for the welfare of their fellow 
human beings. It is difficult to conceive of Werther ever becoming involved in such a 
relationship, even if circumstances were to favour his suit. He clearly relishes the very 
painful intensity of his — by any conventional standards highly unsatisfactory -  
relationship with Lotte. It is the degree of any given feeling which is important to 
Werther; whether that feeling is pleasurable or otherwise concerns him but little. 
Intense unhappiness he evidently prefers to the modest contentment which presumably 
would soon have resulted from marriage to Lotte. Werther fears and despises nothing 
more that such states of near-indifference. In this he has adopted an attitude very far 
from the Tugendempfindsamkeit espoused by the model characters I have hitherto 
analysed. These characters were prepared, to a greater or lesser extent, to take 
whatever course of action might ensure not only their own personal happiness, but 
also contribute to the general well-being. Werther departs very markedly from this 
position. He refuses to sacrifice any of his own wishes, however much his doing so 
might benefit others, while his wishes no longer coincide with what would be right 
and proper in a wider social context. And where the characters of Gellert, La Roche 
and Nicolai found their purest enjoyment of feeling in doing good, Werther’s 
sensibility has become entirely divorced from morality; he does not experience 
emotion as having anything to do with virtue. Virtue concerns him but little. In so far 
as it impinges on his life it is as a concept dear to others or admirable in others, but 
likely to interfere with his own emotional gratification. In La Roche’s novel as in 
Gellert’s we noticed that those characters portrayed as representatives of die 
Empflndsamen tended to enter into relationships with people as like themselves as 
possible. A prospective marriage partner, even a friend, must share entirely all their 
principles, tastes and enthusiasms. For those unlike themselves they had, on the
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whole, very little interest or sympathy. Werther’s position is quite different. Lotte is 
everything he is not - tranquil, sociable and self-assured, at home in her own small 
world and desiring no other. She possesses precisely that quality which attracts 
Werther to children and simple folk: "die naturhafte SelbstverstândUchkeit des 
Lebens",^  ^ as Ernst Feise has termed it, the easy, apparently unthinking acceptance of 
life as it is, the unproblematic acceptance of oneself which is not undermined by self- 
analysis and attendant self-disgust. Werther would -  at times — wish to be like Lotte. 
Gellert’s Countess and her friends, still more so Sophie Stemheim, were well satisfied 
with their own merits. Had they been dissatisfied they would have undertaken -  no 
doubt successfully — to correct their faults, believing as they did that "virtue" was 
largely dependent on rational insight, on the acceptance and consequent 
implementation of some few moral principles. We would look in vain for any such 
optimism in Goethe’s novel. Werther was revolutionary not least because it implied 
that the intellectual perception that a particular course of action is prescribed by self- 
interest is entirely compatible with the pursuit of quite the opposite course. Werther is 
well aware of his own capacity for self-destruction, but he at no time seriously 
considers trying to change. "Er sieht, da6 sein Weg ihn ins unvermeidUche Verderben 
fiihrt, aber er setzt ihn doch ruhig fort."^ ® In other words, Man was not as rational or 
as exemplary as many previous writers had supposed. It is enough for Werther that he 
may admire in others, primarily in Lotte, all those excellent qualities he does not 
himself care to cultivate. Thus his love for Lotte is in more than the obvious sense 
love for the unattainable. It is part of his nostalgia for the innocence to which he can 
never return.
As we observed in relation to La Roche’s novel, the kind of love most characteristic 
of Empfindsamkeit is almost entirely lacking in eroticism. Sophie Stemheim shrinks 
from anything approaching sexuality with obvious hostility and dread. Similarly, 
Miller’s Siegwart has only the purest feelings for his Marianne. It costs him no inner
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struggle to transfer his emotional commitment from the Catholic Church -  he had 
long wished to enter a monastery — to this new beloved. The very intense relationship 
between Jacobi’s Woldemar and Henriette resembles that between an unusually close 
brother and sister; he calls her Brader Heinrich and laughs derisively at the 
suggestion that they might marry. In the novel of Empfindsamkeit friendship is valued 
a good deal more than love, and consequently the love which receives most approval 
is that which most closely resembles friendship, which is altmistic, spiritual, "pure".
To some extent Werther’s love for Lotte does correspond to this pattern. He feels for 
her, it would appear, something very like religious devotion. Like Lord Seymour, he 
evolves a curious, quasi-idolatrous cult of the distant or otherwise unattainable 
beloved. Every detail of the appearance of Werther’s servant becomes charged with 
significance, becomes sanctified, "heilig" [p.302] because he has been admitted to 
Lotte’s presence. The blue frock-coat and yellow waistcoat in which Werther first 
danced with Lotte also become holy [p.380]. He has an identical suit of clothes made 
when these wear out, and it is thus attired that he wishes to be buried, with one of 
Lotte’s bows in his pocket. When Lotte sends Werther some flowers he spends "die 
halbe Nacht" on his knees before them [p.374]. He takes Albert’s pistols "mit 
Entziicken" [p.377], when he learns that they have passed through Lotte’s hands. "Alle 
Begier schweigt in ihrer Gegenwart" Werther writes to Wilhelm [p.301]. "Ich habe 
kein Gebet mehr als an sie, meiner Einbildungskraft erscheint keine andere Gestalt als 
die ihrige, und allés in der Welt um mich her sehe ich nur im VerhSltnisse mit ihr" 
[p.318]. Such assurances bring to mind the conventional pattern of love relationships 
among die Empflndsamen, and for this reason their significance should not be 
overrated. As Claus Lappe has pointed out, "Allés was den Empfindsamen wert und 
teuer ist, ist heilig, heiligst, geheiligt." '^'
In any case, Werther’s love for Lotte differs considerably from the extreme spirituality 
of the emotion common among die Empflndsamen, It is true that Werther’s conduct is
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entirely honourable. He never abuses the intimacy which Lotte naïvely — or not so 
naively -  permits. He is not, he declares "So verderbt" [p.327] as to take advantage 
of her apparently thoughtless playfulness. Yet the possibility that he might do so is 
clearly present in his mind. He is thrilled by the mere touch of Lotte’s fingers, by the 
contact of their feet under the table — "Ich ziehe zuriick, wie vom Feuer, und eine 
geheime Kraft zieht mich wieder vorwarts. Mir wirds so schwindlig von alien Sinnen" 
[p.301]. This passage seems all the more significant when we consider that die 
Empflndsamen in life as in literature were accustomed to exchange warm and frequent 
demonstrations of affection, often in the context of large social gatherings, without too 
much meaning being attached to these. Werther’s dreams of Lotte are turbulent, 
feverish. He allows himself to indulge in the most violent imaginings. He even 
wonders whether he could not solve the dilemma by murdering Albert, or perhaps 
Lotte herself. Werther’s evident violent tendency is surely attributable at least in part 
to frustrated sensuality, sensuality which for want of any other outlet has turned to 
anger, just as the cult of pure friendship inaugurated by die Empfindsamen was not 
least a disguised expression and a sublimation of desires which would have been 
morally unacceptable in any other form. Friendship, no less than love, has become a 
problematic concept in Goethe’s novel. Werther has very little real communication 
with the rest of the world. His relationship with Wilhelm is symptomatic in this 
respect. Wilhelm is frequently addressed in terms reminiscent of the cult of friendship 
fundamental to Empfindsamkeit. He is "Bruder" [p.315], "Lieber" [p.324], "mein 
Schaz" [p.279], "lieber Schaz" [p.79]. In reality Wilhelm is little more than the 
passive recipient of Werther’s confidences. Werther writes to him, so it seems, not to 
obtain replies, but for the release of self-expression. "O daB ich nicht an deinen Hals 
fliegen, dir mit tausend Thranen und Entziickungen ausdrücken kann, mein Bester, all 
die Empfindungen, die mein Herz bestiirmen", he writes [p.311]. Ernst Feise has 
rightly drawn attention to Werther’s "Eigenschaft... immer mit sich selbst zu sprechen, 
sich an den Menschen vorbei sich selbst bekâmpfend oder bestarkend in seinen
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Ideenkreis hineinzuspinnen".^® This is certainly the course taken by many of Werther’s 
conversations. He does not discuss the question of suicide with Albert; he simply 
pours out his own feelings on the subject and by so doing succeeds in intensifying 
these feelings. In persuading Herr Schmidt of the evils of ül-humour, he is m fact 
attempting to satisfy himself of his own ability to control his emotions. Such too is, 
very largely, his aim in writing to Wilhelm. He is thereby able to justify himself to 
himself and to obtain some relief from his desperate loneliness.
Werther needs an intimate friend, a brother in feeling, and he has consigned Wilhelm 
to this role. We leam, however, of no return of confidences, that most essential 
ingredient of friendship among die Empfindsamen, Werther’s responses to Wilhelm’s 
letters are scarce and when these come it is in the form of vaguely surprised 
remonstrances that Wilhelm does not understand the peculiar nature of Werther’s 
predicament. It is true that Wilhelm does offer more or less sound practical advice, 
but it is advice which Werther must reject as being entirely irrelevant to his situation. 
Wilhelm is obviously well-meaning, but essentially uncomprehending and, viewed 
from Werther’s perspective at least, emotionally limited.
Whereas in Gellert’s novel die Empfindsamen had formed a separate community 
within society, Werther is very much alone. There is no one person who truly 
understands and sympathises with him, still less an entire group of people. In Gellert’s 
novel all experiences could be shared. The single explanation "O Bruder" was often 
sufficient to establish the most immediate and complete affinity. Those who did not 
share the ideals of "die wenigen Edlen" did not matter — they were thought to be a 
different breed, scarcely worthy of the name of men. Werther, however, finds he 
cannot avoid the conclusion "MiBverstanden zu werden ist das Schicksal von unser 
einem" [p.273]. It is a situation he cannot easily accept.
Ich môchte mir oft die Brust zerreiBen und das Gehim einstoBen, daB
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man einander so wenig seyn kann. Ach, die Liebe und Freude und 
Wârme und Wonne, die ich nicht hinzu bringe, wird mir der andere nicht 
geben, und mit einem ganzen Herzen voll Seligkeit werd ich den andem 
nicht begliicken, der kalt und kraftlos vor mir steht [p.345].
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, given their position as unacknowledged rivals and ^
their radically differing temperament, Werther also maintains some semblance of
friendship with Albert. In the literature of Empfindsamkeit, of course, such triangles i
■iare not uncommon, but often function most harmoniously, love for die Empfindsamen §
necessarily precluding the unworthy passion of jealousy. Goethe’s own Stella provides 
one such instance, Jacobi’s Woldemar another, Jacobi’s own domestic circumstances a 
third. It is to be doubted whether such relationships, when they did occur, were in 
fact quite as free from tension as these authors suggested. Goethe’s depiction of the 
eternal triangle in Werther is a good deal less simplistic. Albert becomes increasingly 
irritated as Werther’s daily visits continue after Lotte is married. He becomes curt and 
cold towards Werther and even towards his wife.
No real communication is possible between Werther and Albert. They do no more 
than observe the outward forms of friendship: "Wir gingen auseinander ohne einander 
verstanden zu haben. Wie denn auf dieser Welt keiner leicht den anderen versteht" 
[p.315]. With whatever degree of conscious intention, Goethe has supplied a corrective 
to the idealised cult of friendship central to Empfindsamkeit. It is, of course, deeply 
ironic -  and symptomatic -  that for all the intensity of feeling evident in the 
conversation of 10th September 1771, Werther and Lotte are talking at cross purposes, 
that they so conspicuously fail to understand one another; she, knowing nothing of his 
plan to leave the next day, little suspects the real significance of all their talk of 
parting and reunion. The community of spirit between them is not so great after all — 
not altogether surprisingly, since in one sense Lotte is almost an arbitrary object of 
Werther’s love. Goethe’s characters achieve no more than the appearance, the illusion 
of the easy, instantaneous sympathy enjoyed by Gellert’s Countess and her friends, or
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by Miller’s Siegwart, Kronhelm and Therese.
For a time it seems as though Werther may be able to attain the intimacy and mutual 
understanding he so desires with the Count von C. As is characteristic of first 
meetings among persons of sensibility, they immediately recognise one another as 
kindred spirits — or so Werther believes: "Er nahm Theil an mir, als ich einen 
Geschaftsauftrag an ihn ausrichtete und er an den ersten Worten merkte, daB wir uns 
verstanden, daB er mit mir reden konnte, wie nicht mit jedem" [p.325]. Yet once 
again Werther’s hopes are frustrated: circumstances, prejudices, differences in rank,
"die fatalen biirgerlichen Verhâltnisse" [p.327] intervene to cut short the hoped-for 
intimacy.
Finally, Werther finds in Fraulein von B„ if not a substitute for Lotte, then certainly 
some consolation for her loss. Wolf Christian Zimmermann somewhat misconstrues 
the nature of this relationship: his regret that Werther fails to induce Frâulein von B., 
who according to Zimmermann would require but little persuasion, to become his 
wife, is surely out of place.^  ^ There is no evidence that Werther is impeded here only 
by an excess of inhibition, by a feeling that as a bourgeois he cannot aspire to the 
hand of an aristocrat. A good part of Fraulein von B.’s attraction for Werther lies in 
her willingness to talk to him about Lotte, her eagerness to "love" Lotte, whom of 
course she has never met: "Sie sehnt sich aus dem Getiimmel [of high society] imd 
wir verphantasieren manche Stunde in lândlichen Szenen von ungemischter 
Gliickseligkeit, ach, und von Ihnen. Wie oft muB sie Ihnen huldigen. MuB nicht, thut’s 
freywilhg, hôrt so gem von Ihnen, liebt Sie" [p.329]. Typical of Empfindsamkeit is 
not only this willingness to love at a distance, without benefit of personal 
acquaintance, but also Werther’s evident need for a friend who will listen to his 
complaints and sympathise with his unhappiness. Yet once again events take a course 
which must sadly disappoint Werther’s hopes, again it becomes apparent that the ideal
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of friendship cherished by the Empfindsamen cannot be realised. Werther and Fraulein 
von B. allow themselves to be driven apart by force of circumstances; their common 
belief in the power of feeling is insufficient to enable them to overcome convention 
and prejudice.
A comparison between Goethe’s novel and earlier works of fiction in the tradition of 
Empfindsamkeit would be incomplete without some consideration of Goethe’s 
treatment of religious questions, an area in which he differs from his predecessors no 
less markedly than in his attitudes to society, to virtue and to sensibility.
Werther’s world view is scarcely Christian in any sense. He makes no distinction 
between accepted religious practice (i.e. the sacraments) and what would generally be 
regarded as superstition (compare the episode of Lotte and Malchen at the well 
[p.297fl]). He uses Christianity as suits his own intellectual and emotional needs, 
taking over those ideas he finds congenial, ignoring, rejecting, modifying, or distorting 
the rest. Moreover, his pessimism is very different from the Christian conception of 
earthly existence as a vale of tears: Werther’s sense of hopelessness does not spring 
from any belief in the natural depravity of man. Sin is something which appears to 
puzzle him, while original sin is for him an irrelevance.
His vision of the after-life, too, is far from orthodox. Heaven will be Heaven for
Werther primarily because Lotte will be there with him; he anticipates in Paradise
neither more nor less than the eternal continuation of the pleasures of life, and
particularly of love, on earth:
Keine Ewigkeit soil das gluhende Leben auslôschen, das ich gestem auf 
deinen Lippen genoB, das ich in mir ftihle. Sie liebt mich... sie ist mein, 
du bist mein, ja Lotte, auf ewig. Und was ist das? DaB Albert dein 
Mann ist. Mann? Das ware denn fiir diese Welt — und fiir diese Welt 
Siinde, daB ich dich liebe, daB ich dich aus seinen Armen in die 
meinigen reiBen môchte? Siinde? gut, gut, und ich strafe mich davor: ich 
habe sie in der ganzen Himmelswonne geschmeckt, diese Siinde, habe
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Lebensbalsam und Kraft in mein Herz gesaugt, du bist von dem 
Augenblicke mein. Mein, O Lotte. Ich gehe voran, gehe zu meinem 
Vater, zu deinem Vater, dem will ich Magen und der wird mich trôsten, 
bis du kommst, und ich fliehe dir entgegen und fasse dich und bleibe 
bey dir vor dem Angesicht des UnendHchen in ewigen Umarmungen 
[p.374].
In Goethe’s novel personal immortality is not anticipated as a certainty as it was by 
Gellert and La Roche and even by the rationalist Nicolai. It has now become a matter 
for discussion and speculation: "Wir werden seyn... aber, Werther, sollen wir uns 
wieder finden? und wieder erkennen? Was ahnden Sie? Was sagen Sie?" Lotte asks 
[p.321]. This uncertainty as to the destiny of the soul is all the more striking when 
we consider that a belief in the reward or punishment beyond the grave constitutes an 
essential feature of natural religion as of Christianity. Gellert, as we have seen, 
doubted whether life could be endured at all, if there were no certain prospect of 
future recompense for present trials. Nicolai, for his part, insisted that only the 
knowledge that their future fate was dependent on their present conduct was sufficient 
to induce men to forsake vice for virtue. In Goethe’s novel, personal immortality is 
no longer "necessary" in quite this way, since virtue is no longer regarded as the 
measure of all things. Werther promises himself eternal life, at the same time 
admitting — unrepentantly — that he has been and will be guilty of sin. By 
"sacrificing" himself for Lotte, he is in fact seeking to atone for one sin with another. 
In other words, Christianity for Werther means precisely what he wants it to mean. 
The reader acquainted with the content of Christian dogma as with Werther’s re- 
interpretation of it cannot fail, in comparing the two, to observe this discrepancy and 
to draw his own conclusions regarding Werther’s sense of reality. There is irony here, 
as always when Werther’s professed understanding of an idea is at variance with the 
actual content of that idea.
Nor does Werther assess Christianity according to the objective truth of its doctrine — 
he is insufficiently interested in objectivity as such for that to be the case -  but
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rather according to its results, its efficacy or lack of efficacy in comforting and
sustaining him in his distress.
Ich ehre die Religion, das weiBt du, ich fiihle, daB sie manchem 
Ermattetem Stab, manchem Verschmachtendem Erquickung ist. Nur, kann 
sie denn, muB sie denn das einem jeden seyn? Wenn du die groBe Welt 
ansiehst, so siehst du Tausende, denen sie’s nicht war, denen sie’s nicht 
seyn wird, gepredigt oder ungepredigt, und muB sie mir’s denn seyn?
[p.339]
According to strict logic, this position is untenable: if religion is accepted at all, it 
can, logically speaking, only be as an absolute. Werther could be assured of the 
beneficence of divine Providence only if he might be permitted to enjoy happiness 
with Lotte. His obedience is conditional upon God’s giving Lotte to him. "Ich, ihr 
Mann! O Gott, wenn du mir diese Seligkeit bereitet hottest, mein ganzes Leben soUte 
ein anhaltendes Gebet seyn" [p.339].
The God Werther envisages — one can scarcely say worships -  is fundamentally
sympathetic to the human predicament. He is a God of love and forgiveness, not of
anger, scarcely even of justice. He is not even a God who wUl rebuke those of His
creatures who do their own will in preference to His. Werther is confident that when
he meets his "Father" he will be comforted for all his sufferings, and pardoned for his
precipation in destroying the life God had given him. Werther believes in neither
Christianity nor natural religion, but a confused creed of his own making, a creed
which he barely finds satisfying:
II peut bien évoquer ou invoquer pour se justifier des souvenirs chrétiens.
Il est trop prisonnier de sa subjectivité pour en tirer des leçons de vie et 
ü n’est pas assez assuré pour s’en passer; il n’est plus chrétien et il n’est 
rien d’autre. Vraiment et pleinement, il persiste dans la confusion d’une 
alternative irresolue.“°
For Werther in his more serene moods, God is "der Alliebende, der Ewigschaffende", 
a power very like the creating and all-sustaining force envisaged by the Deists. 
Personal communication between the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the 
temporal he does, however, believe to be possible, at least in theory.
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Yet as his mental suffering increases, Werther comes to feel that Nature, no less than
human society, is governed by the forces of destruction. La Roche had seen in Nature
harmony, utility, almost an awareness of purpose lacking in Man, and had concluded
that Man could leam much from the observation of the natural world. Werther, in his
increasingly morbid subjectivity, comes to experience Nature as disharmonious,
purposeless, even malevolent.
Da ist kein Augenblick, der dich nicht verzehrte und die deinigen um 
dich her, kein Augenblick, der du nicht ein Zerstorer bist, seyn muBt.
Der harmloseste Spaziergang kostet tausend armen Wurmgen das Leben, 
es zerriittet ein FuBtritt die muhseligen GebUude der Ameisen und stampft 
eine kleine Welt in ein schmahliches Grab. Ha, nicht die groBe, seltene 
Noth der Welt, diese Fluthen, die eure Dorfer wegspiilen, die eure StHdte 
verschlingen, riihren mich. Mir untergrâbt das Herz die verzehrende 
Kraft, die im All der Natur verborgen liegt, die nichts gebildet hat, was 
nicht seinen Nachbar, nicht sich selbst zerstorte [p.316].
This is a world which has been forsaken by a loving God. Werther’s religious feeling
is completely divorced from the ethical content of Christianity. His religion is a
"Religion ohne Moral, woraus bereits erheUt, daB sie nicht biblisch-christlicher Art
sein kann."'^  ^ He feels no obligation to become better than he is: the laws of
Christianity mean no more to him than do the conventions of bourgeois society -  "Es
fehlt hier das Geftihl der Verantwortung dem Gotteswillen gegeniiber, dem Gehorsam
zu leisten ist. Es ist bezeichnend, daB das Wort Siinde zweimal mit einem
Fragezeichen vorkommt."'^  ^Nor does he derive any comfort from faith. His religious
impulses are too entirely dependent on his changing moods for that. His religion does
not influence his state of mind: it is his vacillating emotions which determine the %
course to be taken by his religious sensibilities.
These sensibilities are tightly bound up with Werther’s general frustration, his lack of 
purpose and fulfilment. He experiences a vague longing, above aU a longing to 
achieve communion with God, the creative force in Nature. "Man môchte zum 




seine Nahmng darinne finden zu kdnnen" [p.269]. Yet in his state of Einschrankung \
[p.275] Werther is very well aware that his yearning must remain unsatisfied. Werther 
is lacking in humility, surely one of the most basic ingredients of any Christian 
experience. He cannot accept human fallibility or human limitations, nor be content 
merely to wonder at the power of God/Nature. Instead he strives to become as it were 
a participant in the life-giving activity of the natural world:
Wie oft hab ich mit Fittigen eines Kranichs, der iiber mich hinflog, zu 
dem Ufer des ungemessenen Meeres gesehnt, aus dem schaumenden 
Becher des UnendHchen jene schweUende Lebenswonne zu trincken, und 
nur einen Augenblick in der eingeschrânkten Kraft meines Busens einen 
Tropfen der Seligkeit des Wesens zu fuhlen, das allés in sich und durch 
sich hervor bringt [p.337].
This impulse to abandon aU individuality in the experience of God corresponds to the 
mystic’s — in the German context particularly of course the Pietist’s — wish for self­
surrender, even self-abnegation. Werther’s subjective, thoroughly undogmatic reHgiosity 
does have something in common with Pietism: he shares with the Pietists the very 
sensual experience of religious emotions and in accordance with the mystical tradition 
he uses the language of erotic love to communicate his conception of God in Nature 
[p.270]. Like many Pietists, Werther is overwhelmed by his own enthusiasm — 
"gepackt", "ergriffen", feeling himself to be the passive recipient of divine grace: "Ich 
gehe dariiber zugrunde". He writes: "Ich erliege unter der Gewalt der Herrlichkeit 
dieser Erscheinungen" [p.271]. And again like the Pietists'^  ^ Werther vacillates between 
the extremes of exultation and despair, between abundance of feeling and the dreaded 
consciousness of having been deserted by feeling: as, inevitably, the mood of euphoria 
cannot long be sustained — when, worn out by the intensity of his own emotions, the 
enthusiast falls from bliss to apathy. Of course there is also a Hnk with the 
psychology of the Empfindsamen here. As Eva D. Becker has pointed out, "Da die 
Selbstbewertung der Empfindsamen von ihrer FShigkeit zu empfinden abhangt, 
fürchten sie nichts mehr, als daB ihr Geftihl nicht mehr funktioniere."'” Werther is 
famüiar with this much-feared state of mind: "Ich habe mich so oft auf dem Boden
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geworfen und Gott um Thranen gebeten wie ein Ackermann um Regen, wenn der 
Himmel ehem iiber ihn ist und um ihn die Erde verdürstet". He has become "ein #
versiegter Brunnen... ein verleckter Eimer" [p.346].
Similarly reminiscent of Pietism is Werther’s feeling that he is somehow uniquely fIclose to God -  and this on account of his unusual emotional capacities. He may ^
therefore number himself among the saints. "Ich lebe so gltlckliche Tage wie Gott sie |
seinigen Heiligen ausspart" [p.290]. Werther does not regard nearness to God as being 
dependent upon exceptional moral purity. It is granted, he believes, with all the 
attendant ecstasy and misery, not to unusually good men — we have seen that Werther %
prefers as far as possible to abstain from passing moral judgments — but to the 
Gefiihlsaristokratie of those who feel most and most intensely. Correspondingly — and 
this is entirely typical of Empfindsamkeit -  Werther believes than an extraordinary 
capacity for feeling is the distinguishing mark of an exceptionally noble soul, of a "I
soul worthy of enjoying especial closeness to God.
Since the publication of Herbert Schôffler’s study of Werther it has been generally
accepted that Werther’s letters contain unmistakable echoes of the last days of Christ,
as described by St John'*^ . Schôffler perhaps over-emphasises the part played by
secularisation in Goethe’s novel. It is an over-simplification to suggest that the decline
in religious belief which the Enlightenment had brought about may be held directly
responsible for Werther’s emotional lability, still less for the entire phenomenon of
Sensibility -  as Schôffler claims:
Und mit allem Nachdmck sei auf eines hingewiesen, die Griinde fur die 
seelische Erregbarkeit jenes ganzen Zeitalters, fur die Reizsamkeit,
Empfindsamkeit, den Weltschmerz zweier Generationen sind nicht in der 
Ebene des Âsthetischen zu suchen -  diese liegt nicht tief genug. Der 
Zerfall der alten Gottesidee lâBt plôtzlich den Menschen allein im 
Kosmos zuriick... Durch Jahrtausende war der Mensch von Gôttem, von 
einem Gott gefiihrt worden, der immer gütigere Ziige angenommen hatte 
— jetzt plôtzlich findet er sich allein im Geftihl kindhcher Ohnmacht und 




This argument is clearly in need of some modification. It is scarcely true that the 
other characters share Werther’s sense of alienation, despite the fact that they too 
apparently have no religious commitment. We cannot say that Empfindsamkeit was
"caused" by the decline in Christianity -  not, at least, in the sense Schôffler suggests. |
-1;
Rather we might concede that Empfindsamkeit constituted some kind of substitute for 1
religion, providing as it did an outlet for emotional energies no longer directed toward 
the traditional faith. Schôffler fails to bring out the full implications of Werther’s 
identification with Christ. More interesting perhaps than the mere fact that Werther 
draws such parallels is the way in which he alters -  or distorts — Christianity to suit 
his own case. Werther takes a "last supper" of bread and wine [p.377], commends his 
mother to the protection of his friend [p.378], as Christ had done, even exclaiming 
"Mein Gott, mein Gott, warum hast du mich verlassen?" [p.348], all in conscious and 
deliberate imitation of Christ, all serving, so Werther believes, to proclaim his death a 
noble act of self-sacrifice for Lotte’s happiness. The real effect is rather more 
ambiguous. As we have seen, Werther’s suicide is portrayed with some irony. We 
observed that this irony is present in the discrepancy between heroic intention and 
pitiful execution in Werther’s suicide; there is irony too, in Werther’s attempt to lend 
to his sufferings in love the tragic and the transcendental dimensions of Christ’s 
Passion. There are very great differences between Werther’s death and the death of 
Christ; his notion that he is dying for Lotte’s sake is a mere illusion, a feeble attempt 
at self-justification. His suicide cannot possibly restore Lotte’s peace of mind -  a 
point clearly borne out by the editor’s observation "Man fiirchtete fiir Lottens Leben"
-  nor is it at all likely to re-establish marital harmony between Lotte and Albert.
Both must inevitably be left with a sense of guilt; they may even be inclined to 
reproach one another.
Werther’s death would rather appear to be calculated to destroy their domestic
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happiness entirely; he almost seems to be punishing Lotte for her neglect of him.
Moreover, Christ, with humility Werther never demonstrates, did His Father’s will on 
earth and returned to Him at the appointed time. Werther renounces life when he 
finds it no longer endurable, entirely in accordance with his own, not with God’s will, 
yet stül, as we have seen, in the confident expectation of attaining to divine 
forgiveness and eternal bliss with Lotte. The effect of this very stark contrast, far 
from increasing the significance of Werther’s very unnecessary suicide, is rather to 
detract from it. Werther, contrary to his manifest intention, appears to the reader to be 
the victim of self-delusion. His view of himself is counter-balanced by a more 
objective standpoint, by implicit criticism. Goethe indulges in no facile condemnation 
of Werther’s "sin". He merely provides the reader with Werther’s assessment of his 
own actions and at the same time, through the medium of irony, suggests that another |
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6. JOHANN MARTIN MILLER: SIEGWART, EINE 
KLOSTERGESCHICHTE
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Nicht wenigen Zeitgenossen gilt Miller gleichsam als Initiator der empfindsamen 
Période überhaupt, jedenfalls was den Publikumsgeschmack an empfindsamer 
Romanlektûre betrifft. Empfindungen à la Siegwait und weinerliche Empfindsamkeit, 
siegwartisieren und empfinden verschmelzen zu synonymen Begriffen}
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The novel Siegwart, eine Klostergeschichte by Johann Martin MÎUer, first published in
1776, enjoyed a success among eighteenth-centmy Gennan readers surpassed only by
Goethe’s still more popular Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (1774). It was reprinted in
many subsequent editions, the first as early as 1777, and the work was translated into
ahnost aU European languages^. The phenomenon of Wertherfieber was succeeded by
Siegwarfleber; tlie latter was distinguished from the former chiefly by its still more
pronounced tendency towards lachrymosity or weinerliche Empfindsamkeit. To a
considerable extent, of course. Miller could capitalise on the success of Werther, since
Goethe’s novel had created a particular receptivity to sentimental fiction of precisely this
kind .^ At the same time the popularity of Siegwart undoubtedly owed much to the fact
that it was a good deal less controversial, indeed less shocking than Werther had been.
Most obviously (as Günter Eming has pointed out) the ending selected by Miller,
however banal, did at least have the advantage that it carefully avoided the question of
suicide -  thus sparing the sensibilities of those readers who would have been roused to
strong disapproval by the manner of Werther’s death. Thus as Eming rightly argues,
"dem Leser des Siegwart wurde durch den natürlichen Tod des Helden kern ethisches
Urteil abgefordert; um so leichter wurde sein Mitleid und Mitempfmden erregt*"^ . A
similar point is made in Kunze’s analysis of the novel:
Im Gegenteil zu Werther liebt Siegwart tugendhaft... wie er überhaupt vrel 
braver und aUtâglicher ist als Werther. Aber dies ist fiir seine Verbreitung 
ausschlaggebend gewesen, so daB er viel defer in die literarischen 
Unterschichten eindiingen konnte als der geistige Werther.®
In short, Miller’s novel was so popular largely because it combined what had been the
most successful aspect of Werther — namely, the sentimental love-story -  with a moral
innocuousness which to many readers must have been a welcome relief after the piquant
gallantry of the courtly novel, the ambiguity of Hermes® and the challenge to traditional
bour geois concepts of virtue posed by Werther.
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Dr Johnson said of Richardson, "... if you were to read Richardson for the stoiy, your 
patience would be so much fretted that you would hang yourself. You must read Mm for 
the sentiment, and consider the story only as giving rise to the sentiment" .^ Much the 
same judgement might be made on Miller’s Siegwart. It needs scarcely be pointed out 
that the work possesses no great aesthetic merit. The characterisation is weak — the 
characters being little more than implausibly motivated types, crude representatives of 
virtue and vice. Miller’s use of language and imagery is uninteresting, Ms attempts to 
create dramatic tension largely ineffectual. Neither the plot, wMch is at once tedious and 
improbable, nor the depiction of the characters’ inner life, are such as to be capable of 
sustaining for very long the interest of the modem reader.
Alain Faure suggests with some justification that Miller, rather than being unable to 
portray psychologically credible characters, is in fact prevented from doing so by Ms 
particularly rigid moralistic tMnkmg: "Son vertuisme se fonde sur une croyance profonde 
à l ’existence d’êtres sans défauts".® Faure argues that Miller’s preoccupation with the 
moral education of Ms readers imposed certain unavoidable limitations on his artistic 
development, Ms primary intention being not to produce a work of art, but a veritable 
Rath- und Hûlfsbüchlein wMch would offer guidance on all subjects, moral and 
practical.
Le romancier préoccupé de la vertu de ses lecteurs et du salut de son âme doit 
exercer sur ses contemporains une action directe et immédiate. H est 
nécessairement lié à son temps. Ainsi Miller ne prétend-il point à l ’immortalité, 
professant au contraire à l ’égard de la postérité un mépris qu’elle lui rendit 
bien.^
Miller’s artistic failings should nevertlreless not be overlooked on account of Ms didactic 
purpose. Indeed, it is precisely these æsthetic deficiencies which often make tlie novel 
appear so excessively sentimental. Miller is obliged to resort to a number of very
195
obvious devices in order to create the dramatic tension which would otherwise be 
lacking. Thus he introduces various unnecessary and entirely gratuitous accidents and 
illnesses. Pater Philipp falls seriously Ü1, merely in order that the reader may participate 
with Siegwart and Kronhelm in the edifying spectacle of his protracted demise. Equal 
edification and emotional tension are to be derived from the prospect of the imimnent 
death of Siegwart’s much-loved father. Like Pater Philipp, old Siegwart makes an 
unexpected recovery purely so as to ensure that the emotional high point of his first 
illness may be surpassed by his subsequent final decline. The intention is clearly that old 
Siegwart’s death should gain added poignancy by virtue of its being unexpectedly 
postponed. In fact, however, the effect is to trivialise both the death itself and the 
emotions to which it gives rise in the other characters. Very much the same is true of 
the multiplicity of accidents wliich occur in the course of the novel. The overturning of 
the carriage conveying Siegwart, Kronhelm and Therese; Kronhelm’s fall and injury to 
his hand; to say nothing of the thunderstorms which accompany almost every dramatic 
scene between the young lovers;- these serve no purpose other than to detract from the 
power and immediacy of the characters’ emotional responses. Miller mistakenly assumes 
that emotion will be all the more eloquent, convincing and genuinely moving if its 
expression is often repeated.
Yet, as Miller makes entirely explicit in his preface to Siegwart, he by no means regards 
the specifically sentimental content of the novel as an end in itself. He borrows the 
standar d ingredients of the sentimental tr adition very much as a means to an end. He 
aims to instruct his readers; his view of hmnan nature and his understanding of 
contemporary literary fashions alike require him to disguise his didactic intentions within 
the popular novel form. A moral message wUl, he asserts, be all the more readily
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grasped if it is presented not as abstract theorising, but in the form of a story in which
moral precepts are embodied by model characters:
Fast jeder Schriftsteller, und der Dichter besonders — dessen Beruf ich 
fur emen der erhabensten halte -  sollte hauptsachlich auf das Herz seiner 
Leser Riicksicht nehmen. Dadurch bahnt er sich am leichtesten den Weg 
zum Unteiricht und zur Belehrung. Wer Empfindungen erhôht und 
bessert, der erreicht gewiB einen ebenso erhabenen Zweck, als der, 
welcher bloB fiir den Verstand sorgt. Der letztere Schrifsteller kann auch 
nicht so ausgebreitet whken. Er hat hnmer nur eine kleinere Anzahl von 
Lesem, weil er Menschen voraussetzt, die schon in den Wissenschaften 
geiibt sind.^ ® [p.l]
For Miller it is of paramount importance that his books should achieve such a wide- 
ranging effect or influence. His idea of the novelist’s role is very close to that envisaged 
by Hermes, whose Sophiens Reise contained instructions relating to every conceivable 
aspect of hfe, from the most exalted morality to advice on cooking. The novehst. 
Miller, beheves "sollte so viel als moghch Allem allés werden. Daher muB sein 
Unterricht mannigfaltig, und an keine gewisse Form gebunden seyn" [p.2].
Some exphcit narratorial comment provides us with information regarding the reading 
pubhc Miller had hi mind. His readers are in need of instruction, of moral guidance; 
themselves lacking experience of the world (and in particular of its darker aspects) they 
are scarcely in a position to form their own moral principles and assessments, unaided 
by Miller and similar instructors. Miller’s readers are, he assumes, fundamentally 
innocent, unfamiliar with the evh of which human nature is capable, more likely to be 
distressed than corrupted by any insight he may give them into the extent of human 
depravity. "Wohl euch, edlen, unschuldsvollen Seelen" he writes, "denen das Laster 
unbegreiflich und der Gang einer boshaften Seele unerforschhch ist. Mdchtet ihr immer 
bey eurer unwissenden Einfalt bleiben" [p.2]. It is interesthig to note that this is 
precisely the reverse of Gellert’s view of liis readers, Gellert had taken for granted that
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his public would be basically hostile to the Tugendempfindsamkeit for which he wished 
to win their approbation and sympathy. With expectations fonned by familiaiity with the 
gallant novel, they would be likely to regard with scepticism any attempt to inspire them 
with enthusiasm for the bourgeois ideal of virtue. Miller, on the contrary, assumes that 
his readers aie already well acquainted with middle-class Sensibility, that they have, 
indeed, made it very much their own. They aie not, therefore, in need of conversion to 
Miller's way of thinking; rather they merely require instruction in the details of virtuous 
living, on the choice of a university, a profession, a wife. In short, in the three decades 
between the publication of Gellert’s novel and Miller’s, Sensibility had become an 
accepted, one might even say an essential component of bourgeois culture.
Miller adheres to the more traditional method of instructing his readers -  he presents 
them with the example of a character who embodies all conceivable virtues. Such a 
model figure is Siegwart. He is at once introduced to the reader as an "edelgesmnter 
Jtingling" [p.3]. He possesses all manly, scholarly and artistic accomplishments. From an 
early age he has shown a marked interest in the skills of the warrior and hunter, wliile at 
the same time being a talented violinist and singer.^’ For all his sensibility he never 
appears weak or effeminate, in his early boyhood at least. His enthusiasm for outdoor 
pursuits is no less great than is his predilection for graveyard poetry. The result is a very 
favourable combination of characteristics: "Obwohl Siegwart fur das Mânnliche und 
Charakteristische der Deutschen geschaffen war, so liebte er doch auch das Sanfte und 
die schone stiUe Natur. Beydes ist selu' oft beisammen, und bildet einen 
liebenswurdigen, fur die Welt sehr brauchbaren Charakter" [p.9]. In most essentials 
Siegwait corresponds to tlie early ideal of Tugendempfindsamkeit as contained in the 
novels of Richardson, GeUert and La Roche. For him, as for the Swedish Countess and
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the Frâulein von Stemheiin, virtue and sentiment are inseparable.
At the same time, Siegwart has much in common with Werther. Like Werther he is the 
victim of extreme emotional instability, vacillating continually between exaltation and 
despair, rarely experiencing either moderation or tranquillity. From Siegwart's earliest 
childhood it has been apparent that, perceived from any objective standpoint, he 
possesses a dangerous tendency to indulge in fervent unrestrained imaginings. Lacking 
stability, he is prone to switch allegiance from one overwhehning enthusiasm to another 
without benefit of much reasoned reflection. Thus he is easily influenced to abandon all 
thought of leading the active, outdoor life for which he is apparently so well suited, in 
favour of the monastery. Nor is his assessment of the relative advantages of the 
monastic life made on rational -  or for that matter specifically religious — grounds. He 
does not debate the issue with himself with the intention of arriving at an informed 
conclusion. His first brief visit to the Kapuziner inspires him with a fervent appreciation 
of the æsthetic and atmosphere of their way of life, an appreciation which is almost 
entirely sentimental or nostalgic, and necessarily superficial. From this episode the 
reader may draw the conclusion that Siegwart’s fiery temperament, which is kept in 
check by little of Kronhehn's quiet good sense, poses a threat to his ultimate happiness, 
perhaps even to his psychological health. There is some truth in Schonsee's assertion 
"Die Jugendgeschichte steht so ausfiihrlich... um das Scheitem emsichtig zu machen."^^
In one important respect Siegwait corresponds to the classic type of the melancholic. He 
is subject to fits of unaccountable sadness, to unspecified longings, to the vague sense 
tliat the world in which he finds himself is far from perfect, but such that he is 
powerless to alter it. He experiences mingled joy and despair, exultation and unease, the
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intense satisfaction which die Empfindsamen derive from any intense emotion and a 
curious lack of fulfilment at one and the same time. Such is his reaction to the growing 
attachment between Kronhelm and Therese: "Siegwart fuhlte in seinem Herzen eine nie 
empfundene Sehnsucht, die er nicht erklaien komite. Bin paarmal hob ein unwillkürlicher 
Seufzer seine Brust, es war ihm wohl und weh" [p.317].
We are told "Siegwart bekam immer mehr einen mânnlichen und festen Charakter", yet 
in the course of the narrative, whatever his natural physical courage, we see little 
evidence of such emotional stability [p. 180]. Indeed, Miller makes it clear to the reader 
that Siegwart’s superiority, his exceptional capacity for feeling, is responsible for his 
eventual unhappy fate. As is also the case with Werther, Siegwart’s absolute desires 
prove to be irreconcilable with imperfect reality. This, Müler suggests, is the inevitable 
lot of such characters. "Kein Herz ist mehr zur Schwëimerey geneigt, als ein solches, 
das bei einer lebhaften Einbüdungskraft ein zaites moralisches Gefühl hat, und es mit 
den Menschen, seinen Briidem, gut meynt" [p.45].
As in Gellert’s novel, in La Roche’s and so some extent also in Goethe’s, the characters 
in Miller’s Siegwart are divided schematically into two groups: die Empfindsamen and 
the others, their opposites and natural adversaries. To this latter group belong aU the 
cynical and materialistic men and women of the world, the rationalists, pragmatists and 
crude pleasure-seekers who have no inclination to cultivate their emotions, who know 
precisely how they should live to secure their own maximum advantage (whatever the 
cost to others). It is characteristic of these "others" drat drey are accomplished 
diplomatic masters hr the art of disshnulation. It need scarcely be stressed that die 
Empfindsamen wish to have as little as possible to do with such people. Shrce they
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generally succeed in gathering around them at least a small group of like-ininded souls, 
the avoidance of these opponents usually presents no great difficulty. When such cynics 
do intrude mto the select circle, they are generally ignored. Siegwart’s brothers may 
therefore be dismissed each with two words of condemnation. Carl is "stolz und geizig"
[p.99], Wilhehn "phlegmatrsch und trâge" [p.99]. Therese’s attitude to them corresponds 
exactly to the attitude of die Empfindsamen -- "die wenigen Edlen" — to the "otliers".
We are told "mit beyden machte sie sich also nicht zu viel zu schaffen, und gab üiren 
Schwachheiten soviel als môgüch nach" [p.99]. She can feel no sympathy for those so 
completely unHke herself, at best an indulgent condescension.
Furthennore, the portrayal of family relationships hr Miller’s novel was evidently 
profoundly influenced by the ideas of Empfmdsamkeit. The relationship between Therese 
and Siegwait, her "Herzensbruder" [p.29] is particularly close, as is the understanding 
between both children and their father. Old Siegwart represents a model fatlier in the 
new sentimental mould, one who will not sacrifice the happiness of his children to 
wealth or prestige: "Ich will meine Kinder zu kemer Sache zwingen, am wenigsten zur 
Wahl einer Lebensart, von der ihr künftiges Gluck oder Ungliick abhangt" [p. 109]. Such 
sentiments, it should be remembered, were by no means commonplace in the eighteenth 
century. This new kind of family relationship is based on feeling, rather than on 
obedience to parental authority as had hitherto tended to be the case. Siegwart, Therese 
and their father enjoy a very real intimacy and mutual trust. Therese especially is as |
much an equal and companion as she is a daughter. Old Siegwart discusses all family |
problems with her and values her advice as he would that of a contemporary. It is now 
assumed that there exist between parents and children reciprocal duties and J
jresponsibilities. It is no longer the prerogative of the parent to command, however |
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umeasonably or ujifeelingly, or of the child to obey without question or demur. Veit 
Kronhehn and Hofrat Fischer are presented to the reader as entirely deserving of 
condemnation in their lack of affection for their offspring.
Indeed, we find in Müler’s novel most of the familiar features of the Empfindsamkeit 
tradition. Critics have frequently drawn attention to the vital role played by tears in 
Miller’s narrative. As we have seen, the characters in earlier novels of the sentimental 
school wept frequently and at the slightest provocation. Tears were for them not merely 
a sign of an entirely positive and desirable receptivity to emotion, but less obviously 
they were also proof of exemplary virtue. Only the model characters can weep at all; 
their harsh, egotistical opponents are incapable of it. The return of the ability to weep is 
widely regarded as certain proof of conversion to the path of vir tue (compare MeUefont 
in Lessing’s Miss Sara Sampson and Miller’s Gutfried). It is significant that tears are 
still more frequent in Miller’s novel than in GeUert’s Swedische Grafin, where they were 
on the whole reserved for moments of particular emotional tension, or even in La 
Roche’s Sternheim. (Sophie Stemheim, we should remember, does have more reason for 
distress and even for self-pity than do most characters in the novel of Empfindsamkeit), 
Martin Greiner has made some exact calculations as to the incidence of tears in the three 
volumes of Müler’s Siegwart}'^ The conclusion would appear to be that Müler became 
intoxicated by his own lachrymosity to such an extent that having expended his 
characters’ tears for the most trivial causes, he is obliged to increase the intensity of the 
pathos at ever shorter intervals, if the emotional tension of the narrative is not to be lost 
completely.
It is difficult to conceive of a reaction adequate to a genuine calamity, such as the death
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of a beloved parent, when so many tears have already been shed over the sentimental 
enjoyment of Klopstock and Kleist. Miller’s response to this problem is interesting. As 
Greiner points out,^  ^ sentences such as "er hatte keine Thranen" are employed to 
convey "ein Maximum an Hoffnungslosigkeit... und gleichsam den Zustand einer 
bestiirzenden seelischen Impotenz." At the same time it should not be forgotten -  
though Greiner does appear to have overlooked this fact -  that if tears are more frequent 
m the final volume of the novel, so also are reasons for tears. In the first volume, 
especially, the characters are often very merry, even humorous. In lamenting, and 
mocking, the lachrymose tendency of Miller’s novel, critics have conspicuously failed to |
do justice to its lighter aspects. It cannot really be said that his characters find such 
pleasure in weeping that they deliberately seek out situations which will give rise to 
grief, simply in order to create opportunities for intense emotional experience. When 
there is cause for laughter rather than tears. Miller’s characters, for all their sensibility, 
can and do laugh very gaily. They are repeatedly said to be "vergniigt" [p.305]. The 
married life of Therese and Kronhelm indicates that when life offers them the possibility 
of happiness, they enjoy it to the full. Old Siegwart, for aU that he is the prototype of 
the "empfiadsamer Vater", has wept only twice in his whole Hfe, once on the death of 
his wife and now when Xaver sets out to study in Ingolstadt [p. 142].
Greiner argues that Miller’s characters, not least because of their tears, are entirely banal
and undeserving of our interest:
Das stereotyp wiederkehrende "und wemte" ist die charakteristische 
Wendung, gleichsam der Schlüssel zu dem ganzen Werke. Er schlieBt die 
Einsicht auf, das hier gar nicht von besonderen Ausnahmenaturen, von 
genialischen Menschen die Rede ist, sondera von recht 
durchschnittlichen und aUtâghchen sogar, dir auBerdem wemen.
This analysis is less than helpful. MUler nowhere claims to be dealing with "genialischen 1
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Menschen"; his characters are, surely, conceived very much as representative types, as 
young men and women in very average circumstances and of very limited ambitions, 
whose interests are confined ahnost entirely to the private sphere of famÜy and personal 
relations. The depiction of the larger-than-life figures Greiner envisages would in fact be 
incompatible with Miller’s avowed aim of providing his readers with detailed advice on
how best to conduct their lives. His readers would on the whole be young people of
/middle-class birth and very average education. If they were to accept exemplars, then 
these must be at once sufficiently average for a parallel with the reader to be apparent 
and sufficiently exceptional to serve as models. Miller’s characters display the desire to 
escape from the world which we observed m the novels of GeUert and La Roche. The 
most obvious example of this tendency — a tendency entirely typical of 
Empfindsamkeit — is Siegwart’s wish to enter a monastery. This resolve is by no means 
prompted solely by piety or by a détermination to devote his life to the service of God. 
Attractive as is the tranquillity of the monastery, its ceremony, even the opportunities it 
provides for useful practical work, Siegwart’s resolve is motivated primarily by his 
general sense of dissatisfaction, his world-weariness before he has acquired the 
experience necessary for a balanced appraisal of the world. One is reminded of 
Werther’s vague longing for security in limitation ("Einschrankung"), of Sophie 
Stemheim’8 fear of the fashionable world of the Residenz, of GeUert’s Countess and her 
friends in their desire to retreat into quiet bourgeois domesticity. Even Kronhelm and 
Therese, in other respects thoroughly cheerful and positive in their attitudes, delight in 
constmcting a shared dream-world as a means of escaping from the difficulties of life. 
Their ideal is to live as hermits, far from refined society in peace and quiet, visited only 
from time to time by a few like-minded friends. It almost seems that MiUer’s characters 
are largely negative in tlieir response to life, that their deske to flee the world has its
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roots in fear of that world. Kronliehn writes to Therese, "Ach Therese, laB nns eilen an 
den Ort, wo keine Menschen sind. Denn der Mensch ist kalt und grausam" [p.335].
The ultimate extension of this attitude is an indifference to Hfe itself. Kronhelm makes
diis life-denying stance expHcit [p.337] "Man muB aufhoren, ein Mensch zu seyn, wemi
man gliicldich werden wHl". When it becomes apparent üiat Siegwart does not return her
love and wHl never do so, Sophie too longs for death:
Ach, ich hatte emst eine Schwester, sie ist nun bey Gott. Sie war mein 
AUes, meine ionigst vertraute Freundin. Sie starb in meinem Arm. Ach, 
wenn ich nun schon bey ihr ware. Sie ist gliickUch, iiber allés glücldich.
Und auf Erden kann man’s nicht seyn [p.356].
The unfamihai' experience of love has a similar effect on Siegwart: "Er fuhlte eine 
dunkle Sehnsucht, sich hmzulegen und zu sterben" [p.422]. It is not difficult to detect 
here evidence of the preoccupation with death and dying so central in the cult of 
Sensibility. Moreover, Miller shares the predilection we observed in the novels of 
GeUert, La Roche and Goethe for the protrayal of moving and edifying death-bed 
scenes. One such instance is provided by the death of Pater Joseph, which Pater Anton 
later describes in some detaU to Siegwart: "Ach, du hottest ihn sehen soUen, wie er 
starb, mit welcher Ruhe, mit welcher Heiterkeit. Aber so ein Leben war auch eines 
solchen Todes wert" [p.21]. Siegwart and Kronhelm derive similar moral advantages 
from the death of Pater Philipp: "Die beyden JungUnge waren unaufhorUch um Um und 4
lernten aus seinem Munde tausend weise Lehren, denn nichts ist lehrreicher als das 
Kiankenbette eines weisen Christen. Nirgends diingen die Lehren tiefer ein" [p.264]. hi 
MiUer’s novel, death-bed scenes serve a double pmpose: "Die Bewegung der Seele wkd 
zum Selbstzweck, und fast jedes Mittel ist recht, das geeignet ist, die Seele zu riihren.
Darum — und nicht nm* aus didaktischen Griinden — sind Sterbeszenen so ungemein 
beliebt, denn der Tod ist weniger schreckUch als die Austrocknung der Seele".These  




separate but related phenomena. The specifically sentimental element has kept pace with 
contemporary literary fashions, wlnle the didactic aspect looks back to the 
Tugendempfindsamkeit of GeUert. It is significant that MiUer’s characters show no 
interest in the writings of the Stiirmer and Dranger, preferring to weep over Klopstock, 
Kleist, GeUert mid Gessner. Their preoccupation with virtue, as with tranquU famUy life, 
point back to a more secure and complacent world-view than that portrayed in Goethe’s 
Werther. As Carl Heine and Hans Heinrich Borcherdt have pointed out, MiUer has 
depicted an ideal of innocence and moral purity specific to the early eighteenth 
century.^® MUler’s ideal is very far from the unrestrained emotionalism which many 
critics beUeved to be synonymous with Empfindsamkeit.^^ His characters do not strive 
after inteUectual or emotional freedom; for them Umitation {Einschrankung) is always 
deskable.
This point is best Ulustrated by reference to the depiction of Therese. Therese is the 
personification of quiet, domestic bourgeois values, susceptible to feeling, yet at the 
same tune free from aU excessive senthnentaUty, aU over-cultivation of emotion or 
inteUect.
[Sie war] ein rasches, naïves Landmhdchen, mit emem runden, voUen 
Gesicht, das von der Faibe der Gesundheit gliihte.- In ihren Reden war 
sie schneU und heftig, ihr Witz war immer neu und lebhaft. Munterkeit 
erwachte, wo sie hinkam und sie lachte gem aus voUem Herzen... Nichts 
Uebte sie mehr als Geschaftigkeit, und besonders hausUche 
Beschaftigungen [p.98].
Therese prefers the perfonnance of domestic chores to attendance at social functions.
Significantly, her favouiite attire is that of the Arcadian shepherdess [p. 105]. She is
frequently contrasted with her sister, Salome, who is sufficiently condemned by the fact
that she chooses to live, not in her native Swabian vUlage, but in fashionable Munich




Lenten" [p.lOl]. It is to the credit of Therese, MUler implies, that she was unhappy in 
the town and longed to return to "die einfaltige, ungekiinstelte Natur" [p. 102]. As in La 
Roche’s novel, the rivalry between town and country is depicted largely as a conflict 
between differing moral standards. Werther, it should be remembered, is captivated 
above all perhaps by Lotte’s exemplary performance as housekeeper and substitute 
mother. Kronhelm, similarly, is delighted by the spectacle of Therese perfonrnng with 
supreme skill and diligence all those tasks necessary to the well-being of her family. His 
love for her increases when he observes her m earnest and respectful conversation with 
the vicar of Wmdenheim, or playing with his little niece. It seems hkely that this picture 
of domestic, contented womanhood was one which had considerable attraction for die 
contemporary public — as is indeed evident from the popularity of the scene depicting 
Lotte cutting bread for her little brothers and sisters. Therese, like Lotte, conforms to an 
ideal of the time.^” While fitting into this pattern, Therese is also intended as a model 
to the reader, just as Siegwart is conceived both as a response to the mood of the time 
and as a guide in all matters of good conduct. There is in Therese none of the ahnost 
hysterical, often merely affected sensibility deplored by the critics of Empfindsamkeit.
She is, rather, a healthy country girl, healthy in mind as in body, lacking hi finesse 
perhaps, but more than compensating for this deficiency -  scarcely a deficiency in 
Miller’s perception or in that of his shnilarly-minded reader -  by her simplicity, 
spontaneity and naturalness, her devotion to father and brother, her zeal for domestic 
chores. It is not least on account of these qualities that Kronhelm loves her, and rightly 
so. Miller implies. Therese responds in the most commendable manner possible to every 
situation, in such a manner moreover as to ensure die affection and good opinion of all 4
those around her, including the discerning uncle who is able to reward her with 
Kionhelm’s hand. It is the strongest possible recommendation to the reader both of
Therese’8 conduct and of Kronhehn’s choice of a wife that their happiness is at last 
secured despite all difficulties.
Therese, m short, is no fine lady. Indeed, Miller’s exemplary characters view with 
suspicion anything which might be regarded as betraying an excess of cultivation or 
finesse. Like La Roche’s Sophie and Goethe’s Werther, they value rustic simplicity. The 
most socially accomplished figures in the novel -  Kreutzner, the Lieutenant, Hofrat 
Fischer — are also the most suspect, even degenerate, all the more dangerous because 
they conceal their vicious tendencies under a veneer of sophisticated gallantry. Pater 
Philipp explicitly warns Siegwart and Kronhehn against those who are all too obviously 
courteous: "die gar zu hofUchen Leuten kann ich fur den Tod nicht ausstehen. Sie haben 
hnmer so ihre Ursachen und Nebenabsichten dabey, warum sie es sind. Da wer’s gut 
meynt, geht grad heraus und sagt ohne Umschweife, was er denkt" [p. 165]. Tins 
emphasis on simple unaffected manners corresponds to Miller’s general insistence on the 
superiority of the quiet rural way of life over the shallow sophistication of the town.
Like GeUert, La Roche and indeed Goethe, MiUer is openly contemptuous of the gaUant, 
courtly ideal. The values he would substitute for this ideal are simplicity and innocence. 
Particularly in the case of Siegwart, this innocence often amounts to an extreme — so 
extreme as to be almost incredible -  naïveté. Like La Roche’s Stemheim he is an easy 
victim for aU those with some skiU m deception. He is himself so innocent and pure in 
heart Üiat he can scarcely conceive that others may be capable of lying. However 
unlikely Kreutzner’s inventions become, he wUl beUeve the worst tales of Kronhelm and 
Pater Philipp rather than suspect his friend of deceit. As in La Roche’s novel, this 
extreme gullibility is intended as a further proof of the exemplary virtue of the hero, 
since it is axiomatic among die Empfittdsamen that those who can suspect others of evil
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must themselves be capable of it.
It is significant -  and appropriate — that in MiUer’s novel as elsewhere die 
Empfittdsamen are invariably young. Schrager, the husband Hofrat Fischer intends for 
his daughter, is an outsider not least on account of his age (he is around thirty), 
something which is itself regarded as proof of his lack of sensibiUty. By contrast, 
Siegwart and Marianne, Kronhelm and Therese are as yet only on the brink of Ufe, 
manifestly stiU "Jiinglinge" and "Madchen". SensibiUty, particularly as it becomes 
evident in the experience of love, is hi the latter pait of the eighteenth century very 
substantiaUy the prerogative of the young. It is true that hi the Uterature of SensibiUty 
we also encounter the type of the "empfindsamer Vater", whUe the "ehrwiirdiger Alter" 
combines popular wisdom with an element of senthnentaUty. Yet it is on the whole the 
very young who constitute the heroes and heroines of sentimental fiction and drama, 
those who do not yet require to sacrifice the cultivation of emotion to the attainment of 
prosperity or success. Contempt for the professional world — the world of an Albert or a 
Schrager -  is an essential part of the ethos of SensibiUty.
The characters’ experience of music and Uterature is very much hi the tradition of 
Empfindsamkeit. Indeed, MUler accords to music specifically a degree of significance 
which would appear to look forward to the Romantics. He writes of "Trauermusik, die 
die Seele durch dunkle, menschenleere Wtisten bis ans Grab hinfuhrte, und sie von der 
Veiivesung des Koipers zurückschauem machte" [p.76]. Siegwart and Kronhelm 
frequently play their vioUns together in a deUberate attempt to create an atmosphere of 
quiet pathos: "Und nun spielten sie so schmelzend, so bebend und so whnmernd, daB 
ihre Seelen weich wie Wachs wurden" [p.239]. It is of course entirely typical of die
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Empfindsamen that Siegwart and Marianne first come to an understanding about their 
feelings for one another while making music together -  music, like literature, it was 
believed, lending to produce an emotional or sentimental ambience. It is the model 
characters, die Empfindsamen, who appreciate music. Veit Kronhehn is adequately 
characterised by the fact that he detests it. It goes without saying in this context that 
music must serve an emotional rather than an æsthetic purpose. Music is important not 
in so far as it pleases the ear — this is a secondary consideration only -  but when it 
touches the heart and inspires the listener to new heights of sensibility. Siegwart, 
Kronhelm and Therese, the circle of die Empfindsamen, structure their lives — and above 
all, of course, their personal relationships — around the shar ed experience of literature. 
They have no aims which could properly be called scholarly; like Werther and Lotte 
they have a personal and subjective attitude towards literature, hr literary texts they look 
for and indeed find parallels to then own experience, reflections of their own emotional 
states. The works which they prefer are those which offer most scope for such 
identification, such stimulation of their feelings. At moments of particular tension, as for 
mstance before a parting. Miller’s characters will inevitably turn to the literature of 
Sensibility. Most frequently consulted at such times is Klopstock’s Messias. Therese 
explains: "Klopstock ist auch ein Freund der Leidenden. Er entzückt mich oft. Nun 
[when she has reached the point of despair and — she believes — inurdnent death] kann 
ich ihn erst ganz schatzen. Denn hn Leiden sieht man, was ein Freund ist; und das ist er 
iiber alle MaCen, Gott und er" [p.351]. It is scarcely surprising that the characters’ 
reading-pattems aie intensive rather than extensive.^- They revel in their familiarity 
with the canon of sentimental literature. Kronhelm and Therese plan to begin their new 
life as hermits with only a very few books. Klopstock, Kleist, a minimum of others they 
must have; all the rest may be safely consigned to the flames. Klopstock and Kleist have
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m effect rendered all other works superfluous [p.305]. This canon is to be consulted 
religiously at every time of trial or crisis, less because it can provide readily applicable 
advice than because emotion is intensified (for die Empfindsamen always a desirable 
end); at the same time rendered more endurable by the knowledge that it constitutes a 
pait of the general burden of suffering which must be borne by "die wenigen Edlen",
Die Empfindsamen find in theh reading the assurance that they are exceptional, an 
emotional and spiritual elite. At the same time they may draw comfort from the certainty 
tliat they are not alone in their s o i t o w s . This latter assurance does not inspire them with 
confidence in a happier future, it merely renders the inevitable resignation and 
renunciation more intensely satisfying, at once more painful and more pleasurable; for, 
as we have seen, for die Empfindsamen the nature of any feeling, whether it be painful 
or pleasurable, is of considerably less importance than its intensity. Since so much 
emotional and moral sustenance is to be derived from a few works of literature, die 
Empfindsamen are able to recognise one another by the conformity of their literary 
tastes. This is certainly the case with Kronhelm and Therese. "Therese hatte groBe 
Stellen aus dem Messias und aus Kleist, die ihr vorztiglich gefielen, und die auch in der 
Tat die besten waren, abgeschiieben. Kronhehn las sie vor; ihre Empfindungen waren 
fast immer dieselben, und oft riefen sie zur gleichen Zeit vor Bcwunderung aus, wenn 
sie eine Stelle vorzüghch rührte" [p,294].
The cult of friendship has a vital role to play in Miller’s novel. As is typical of die 
Empfindsamen — compare Werther and Wilhelm — Siegwait and Kronhelm consistently 
address one another as "Bmder". In their years at school and university they are virtually 
inseparable, confidants in everything. When Siegwait falls in. love, the friends spend 
hours sitting together in the dark, either completely silent or playing together mournful
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%music — "wehldagende Stiicke" [p,418]. When Siegwart discovers Kreutzner's treachery
and is reconciled to Kronhehn, their reconciliation resembles that after a lovers’ quarrel.
Moreover, many friendships in the novel correspond to the sentimental pattern in that
they are instantly contracted between virtual strangers. Thus Pater Philipp is favourably
disposed towards Siegwart from their first moment of meeting. Similarly, Marianne at
once loves Therese as a sister simply from Siegwart’s description o f her, a senthnent
which comes to her aU the more readily because the two girls, both examples of
Empfindsame, are very similar in character. It should be remembered that in loving
others die Empfindsamen often love the reflection of their own merits — and especially
of course the reflection of tlieh own capacity for emotion. As Balet and Gerhard have
pointed out, "Es ging bei den Freundschaften... nicht um das Objekt, nicht um den
Freund, sondem einzig und aUein um das subjektive Gefühl. Was damais Freundschaft
hieB, war in den meisten Fallen nur Selbstberauschung am Freund".^  ^However, the
theme of sentimental friendship is given a slightly different treatment by Miller from
that which we observed in the novels of his predecessors: Goethe’s Werther had already %
implied scepticism over the efficacy of such close friendships, and MUler is explicitly
critical of those sentimental idealists who mistakenly suppose that a single meeting, even
a single moment, is sufficient to establish conformity of tastes, ideas and feelings. True
friendship, empfindsam in the best sense, is demonstrated by Kronhelm:
Er blieb sich hi alien Lagen hnmer gleich, und wen er einmal liebte, von 
dem war sein Herz nicht mehr abzuziehen, sein Freund müBte denn 
lasterhaft gewesen seyn [there is in virtuous friendship as in virtuous 
love always this reservation]. Dies war ihm aber niemals noch begegnet, 
denn er war in der Wahl semer Freunde vorsichtig imd langsam. Er 
machte keine Freundschaftsversicherungen, und bot seine Dienste 
niemals an, aber, sobald sehi Freund sie nothig hatte, half er ihm, ohne 
was davon zu sagen [p. 181].
Miller’s portrayal of love also owes much to traditional Empfindsamkeit. Kronhehn’s
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love for Therese, despite the fact that it is requited and eventually results in maiTiage,
closely conforms to the pattern of Werther’s sentimental passion for Lotte. His feelings,
like Werther’s, are sacred to him. His beloved is enveloped m an aura of holiness, as is
every tiling pertaining to her. As Werther had also done, Kronhelm religiously guards a
bunch of flowers given to hhn by Therese, quite simply "weü er sie von Theresen
empfangen hatte" [p.309]. Like both Seymour and Werther, Kronhelm assiduously
creates a veritable cult of the beloved. Among his most treasured possessions he
numbers a bow from Therese’s dress, a motif aheady familiar to the reader of Werther.
"Sie war ilun so heilig wie eine Rehquie, und er sah sie nachher oft halbe Stunden lang
an, und driickte sie an seinen Mund" [p.351]. Kronliehn insists that "Wer einmal liebt,
liebt ewig" [p.404]. Unhappy in love, he reacts in the manner typical of the romantic
hero, exhibiting a propensity to almost violent melancholy, more characteristic of
Werther than of the gentle youth he would otherwise consistently appear to be.
Kronhehns Seele versank itzt nach und nach in die tiefste düsterste 
Melancholic. Sem ganzer Charakter bekam ehie andere Wendung. Er 
ward heftig und auffahrend und iiber allés argerhch. Allés, was er sah 
und horte und die ganz Welt ward ihn zuwider. Er verachtete das ganze 
Menschengeschlecht... Er las in seinen Büchem nichts als diistere, 
wehmütige Stellen. Die Musik ergotzte ihn auch nicht mehr. Nur 
zuweilen phantasierte er in lauten Dissonanzen und wimmemden Tdnen.
Die Emsamkeit war ihm das liebste, und sie lobte er aUem. Oft pries er 
unsem Siegwart wegen des Entschlusses selig, die Welt zu verlassen 
[p.236].
Here Miller has adopted the conventions of later Empfindsamkeit not so much because in 
so domg he hopes to shed new light on the workings of the human psyche, or because 
he thereby hopes to influence his readers for good — Kronhehn’s extreme reaction did 
after all have its dangers, as Goethe’s novel had recently demonstrated — but rather 
because he has, with whatever degree of conscious intention, been influenced by new 
romantic ideas of love, derived very substantially from Goethe’s Werther. Siegwait’s 
relationship with Maiianne has a similar aura of sphitual religiosity. It is symptomatic
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that he fkst sees her in church, where he is overwhelmed by the spectacle of her
kneeling in devout prayer. "War das ein Engel, oder war’s Maria?" [p-411] he asks. For
a long time Siegwart’s meetings with his beloved take place in no other setting. It is
entirely appropriate, therefore, that the lovers meet their fate behind convent walls. The
narrator adheres to the convention of Empfindsamkeit and describes Marianne as "schon
und heiter wie ein Engel Gottes". Typically also Marianne’s various youthful admirers
fail totally to regard her as a physical being. The sensual element is entirely lacking in
their appreciation of her; Gutfried makes this cleai':
Aber sie war doch für mich zu heilig; ich sah zu üir hinauf wie zu der 
Mutter Gottes, und wünschte nichts als einen einzigen Gnadenbhck von 
ihr. Eimnal sah ich sie am AUerheHigen in der Kirche. Ihr Aug und Herz 
bebeten vor Andacht. Nun wagt ich’s doch zum ersten Mai wieder, 
meine Augen aufzuheben und Gott um Erbarmung anzuflehen [p.462].
The sight of Maiianne at prayer is sufficient to convince the hitherto irreligious Gutfried
of the eiTor of his ways. From this crucial moment onwards, he is a devoted and resolute
convert to viitue. Thus Marianne indeed takes on the traditional role of the angel.
Siegwart, like Gutfried, is for a long time paralysed by his feelings of veneration for
Marianne. When he does act, it is only to ensure that he obtain an opportunity for
continuous undisturbed observation of the object of his affections. As Gutfried had
aheady done, he rents a room with a view over Fischer’s house. His extreme respect for
Mariamie and the timidity this engenders wül not permit him to approach nearer.
Perhaps one might also see in this hesitancy evidence of a general tendency to
procrastination, Siegwart -  as reflective as Werther, if less original in his reflections -
shares with Weifher a propensity to cultivate thought and feeling at the expense of
action.
The Sophie episode provides a further mstance of sentimental, love. When Sophie is
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dying she bequeaths to Siegwart a diaiy chronicling the course of her unrequited love 
for him. It is disappointment in love which induces Sophie to take refuge in religion. 
Religion is for her a substitute for love. She pours out her feelings for Siegwart, her 
"bridegroom" and looks forward to reunion with him in Heaven, a reunion which, having 
forsworn earthly love, she has no theological right to anticipate. The imagery she 
employs in her descriptions of Siegwait is reminiscent of the mystical tradition of the 
Song of Songs:
Schon bist du, mein Geliebter, bliihest wie die Rose, die am Morgen 
aufwacht in Thau. Schon bist du, mein Brautigam. Deine Wangen sind 
rosemot. Blau ist dein Auge wie der Mittagshimmel; mild dein Lacheln 
wie die Abendsonne, golden sind deine Haare, wie die goldbeschaumten 
Wolken, wenn die Sonne sinkt. Der du itzt schon so lieblich bist, wie 
wirst du einst beschmiickt sein in den Tagen der Belohnung. Wie 
einhergehen unter Engeln und Gerechten [p,377].
Such protestations do not add up to a coherent view of hfe or of love. Sophie at one and
the same time addresses Siegwart as her "Bridegroom" and assures him "Ich will eine
Braut des Himmels seyn" [p.337]. This confusion is in itself perhaps less surprising than
is the fact that Miller has his character -  an innocent young girl -  express her feelings
for her beloved m such exphciüy erotic terms. It is Siegwart’s physical beauty on which
Sophie concentrates, not, as the reader of sentimental fiction might have expected, on his
moral perfections. This fact is perhaps best explained if we bear in mind that Miller was
affected by the new Werlherian concept of romantic love more perhaps than he might
have cared to acknowledge — more even than he knew or would have considered
desirable. While it remains indisputably true that Müler could approve and recommend
to his readers only that love which was sanctioned by reason and virtue, he nevertheless
sustains a distinct predilection for the sentimental, for the expression in intoxicating
language of intense, self-indulgent emotion. H iis predilection involves hhn m certain
dangers.
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The issue of suicide is relevant in tliis context. Reminiscent of Goethe’s Werther is the 
close association of love and death in Miller’s novel, the idea that death may provide the 
only possible escape from unhappy love. There can be no question for MiUer of a 
deliberate resolution of this conflict through suicide, that most sinful of actions, however 
great may be the suffering of the characters. Both Siegwart and Therese are designed as 
models, as exemplars; at no point therefore may they be permitted to overstep the 
bounds of virtuous conduct. The hero’s death may offer proof of the intensity of his 
pain, tliereby providing both edification and emotional satisfaction for the reader; but 
death cannot be administered by his own hand. For religious and moral reasons MUler 
must substitute death from a vaguely defined broken heart for the controversial, stUl 
largely unacceptable suicide.
One is tempted to ask whether by so doing MUler is not beggmg the foUowhig question. 
Suicide, one would have thought, must have been unacceptable to the eighteenth-century 
moralist largely because it constituted the most blatant denial of divine Providence, a 
denial of the value of human hfe. In this context, it is logically speakmg, irrelevant 
whether the act of suicide is actually accomphshed; the mere wish for death, one must 
have thought, must have precisely the same hnphcations. By wishhig to die -  as 
Siegwart, Marianne, Kronhelm and Therese aU do wish at some time -  they are by 
hnphcation rejecting the generally accepted law according to which tlie mdividual, every 
individual, wiU eventually secure his own greatest happiness if he is only prepared to 
wait patiently for the working-out of the ordained scheme of things. MUler is appaiently 
aware of no conflict here. He intends his pxincipal characters to serve both as paragons, 
instructing the reader in virtuous conduct, and as focal points of feeling — themselves 
âmes sensibles living out their fate in such a way as to work to the highest possible
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degree on the emotions of the reader. These two aims are in some measure 
kreconcUabie. If Miller’s characters can be seen to endure almost unendurable suffering, 
this can best be made apparent if  (hek suffering is so great as to make them weary of 
life; and yet, according to Christian doctrme as to the doctrine of traditional 
Tugendempfindsamkeit, despak is morally inexcusable, constituting as it does a dkect 
denial of the belief in a beneficent Providence.
It is no longer assumed, as was the case in the novels of GeUert and La Roche, that love
is merely a particulaiiy valued form of friendship, respect to be granted almost
automaticaUy as a reward for exceptional merit. Indeed, Kronhelm explicitly distances
himself from this view of love. When Siegwait urges him to declare his affection for
Regkie, Kronhehn excuses hknself on the grounds that whatever regard he may feel for
the young lady on account of her moral worth, this cannot be enough to induce love. He
takes advantage of the situation to deliver to Siegwart, and to the reader, some advice on
the coirect conduct of relations between the sexes:
Man kann im Umgang mit Madchen nicht vorsichtig genug seyn, jedes 
Wort muB man abwagen, sie legen gar zu geme aus, und wk miissen 
keine Veranlassung dazu geben... Ich halte jeden für einen Feind des 
weiblichen Geschlechts, der den Madchen nichts als SüBigkeiten vorsagt, 
aUes an kmen bewundert and ehrt, und ihnen unaufhdrUch die Hande 
leckt. Die armen Geschopfe wissen gar nicht, worauf es ausgesehen ist?
Und ob man’s aufrichtig mit ihnen meynt? Sie werden entweder 
Koquetten oder miBtrauisch und sprode [p.249].
Kronliehn has the discernment and practical sense to distinguish between genuine feeling
and mere affectation. He sees in Regine something of the false sensibility (falsche
Empfindsamkeit) to which so many critics took exception in contemporary Uterature and
society.
We must remember that in the novels of GeUert and La Roche there was no veiy great
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difference in kind or degree between love and friendship, or between the various forms
of love. As Natalie Halperin has pointed out:
Es gibt wenige Abstufungen der Empfindungsstarke, je nach dem realen 
Wert des Objektes, auf das es sich bezieht, wenige Differenzen in den 
verschiedenen Beziehungsarten, zum Beispiel zum Freund, zur Braut, 
zum Meister usw. Es gibt nur ein empfindsames Gefühl, das gewaltig 
ausbrach und mit gleicher Stürke die verschiedensten Menschen 
umffng.^ ^
Nor did Gellert’s characters experience any great difficulty in transforming love into 
friendship, should duty so require. Love for Gellert’s characters, as for La Roche’s 
heroine, was morally inferior to friendship. It was a less important aspect of life, one 
without which life was entirely possible, useful and even pleasurable.
Therese makes some attempt at such self-sacrifice for her beloved Kronhelm. Since their 
maniage would appear to be impossible, she tries to convince herself that he at least 
may stiU hope to find happiness with another. There can be no question here of a 
continuing peaceful friendship between Therese and the newly married couple, no such 
relationship as is established between Gellert’s Count and Countess, Caroline and 
Herr R. Therese does not expect to survive Kronhehn’s marriage. Her sentiments are 
both similai' to and different from those of the early Empfindsame. Like the model 
characters of GeUert and La Roche, she lacks aU propensity to sexual jealousy. Her 
readiness to love Kronhehn’s future wife is entirely typical — and entirely sincere. 
Within the context of the novel of Sensibility it provides certain proof of her exemplary 
vhtue. Jealousy conquers only weak, foolish characters such as GeUert’s Maiianne, or 
monsters such as Lessing’s Marwood. For the virtuous Empfindsame, love is equivalent 
to altinism. For diem any other reaction than unmitigated deUght at the happiness in 
love achieved by a fomier suitor is both iUogical and inconceivable. Therese loves 
Kronhehn because she has recognised his exceptional merits, not least of course his
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exceptional sensibiUty. It is moreover typical o f Empfindsamkeit that Therese already 
regards herself as loving someone — Kronhehn’s future wife — whom she has never 
even met. She can be assured only that the young lady in question belongs to the 
extended family of die Empfindsamen which is in itself sufficient guarantee that she is 
worthy of Therese’s affections.
To aU appearances Therese accepts her fate with the exemplary Gelassenheit of GeUert’s 
and La Roche’s heroines. She wUl not complain, she writes, but submit to the decrees of 
Providence. Anything other than total submission, it is hnpUed, would amount to unholy 
rebeUion. But is Therese as resigned as she would have us beUeve? She wishes that it 
might be in her power to submit with something like patience, but she has no great 
hopes of being able to endure her lot. As we have seen, she anticipates speedy death as 
a certainly and a release. Thus we find in conjunction two attitudes which ought in strict 
logic to be mutuaUy exclusive.
The theme of persecuted innocence, so central to the novels of GeUert and La Roche, 
appears again in MUler’s narrative, albeit in modified fonn. Significantly, the 
specifically sexual element is absent in MiUer’s treatment of this question. We find none I
of the ambiguity inherent in Hermes’ portrayal of hnperiUed virtue. MiUer’s readers are 
to remain as innocent as Siegwart and Marianne. Marianne, and to a certain extent also 
Therese, are persecuted; not, it is true, by seducers, but by proud, materiaUstic and (on 
occasion) violent fathers, who aie anxious to prevent a mésalliance at aU costs. It is 
surely significant that the violent actions of Veit Kronhehn and Hofrat Fischer are 
described in some detaU, Here considerations of psychological plausibUity are cleaily 
secondary: if  Veit’s venomous and ultimately fatal rage at the prospect of a marriage
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between his son and the humble Amtmann’s daughter Therese is at least pai dy 
explicable with reference to the exaggerated pride of some aristocrats in hneage and 
station, the frantic insistence of Hofrat Fischer that Marianne should marry the entirely 
respectable but unprepossessing Schrager appears somewhat arbitrary, since the family is 
sufficiently weU thought of in Ingolstadt society to be visited by aristocrats such as 
Kronhelm. One also wonders why the Hofrat had initially taken such pains to make the 
unworthy Siegwart so completely at home in his family circle, when he must surely 
(astute observer of human weakness that he appears to be) have suspected that his 
daughter was likely to form an attachment to a young and agreeable man, whose tastes, 
feelings and ideas harmonise so completely with her own. MUler makes no attempt to 
preempt such questions in the mind of the reader. It is sufficient for his purposes that %
botli Veit and Hofrat Fischer should appear as vUlains, eager to thwart the entirely 
legithnate and suitable love of their unfortunate offspring. Whether they do so in the 
pursuit of some recognisable and logical end is of relatively little significance. By 
portraying such thoroughly evil characters MUler is able to increase the reader’s natural 
sympathy for the young lovers. By this means he can arouse a variety of emotions -  
pity, suspense, righteous anger. The more violent the response of the vUlahious fathers, 
the greater wUl the reader’s sympathy for their victims be, the more admirable also will 
be the sustained dutiful endurance of Siegwart, Marianne, Kronhehn and Therese in the 
face of such apparently insurmountable opposition and relentless persecution. Miller’s 
depiction of love has been aptly characterised by Alan Faure:^ '^  "Siegwart paraît se 
situer... entre le roman sentimental d’épreuves à la Richardson où tout s’achève pai le 
mariage, et la conception Wertheiienne et romantique de la passion fatale, où le héros 
est détmit par son amour même." As we have seen, Wertlier experiences love as an 
absolute. For him love constitutes the focal point of existence, without which no other
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aspect of life can have meaning, without which life is worthless and can be thrown 
away. Miller has clearly taken account of this new romantic assessment of love.
However great may be the influence on bis writing of early Tugendempfindsamkeit, it 
cannot be maintained that he is entirely critical of the new Wertherian attitudes. It is true 
that Siegwait and Marianne perish because they refuse to compromise their ideal of 
love, but the effect of their deaths should not only be to increase the reader’s sympathy 
for then suffering. As in Goethe’s novel, the untimely death of the hero must be seen at 
least to some extent as constituting an unfavourable verdict by the autlior, since 
Siegwart’s fate -  death from a broken heart — is in fact a direct consequence of his 
extreme subjectivity. Yet at the same time Siegwart, more than Werther, is presented to 
the reader as a victim not only of his own feelings, but also of the callous manœuvrhigs 
of others. He is a martyr to a feeling which is in itself entirely legitimate, often edifying 
and moreover inspired by the most suitable and worthy object. Like Werther, Siegwart 
"geht zugrunde an den besten Kraften seines Wesens".^ ® His most noble emotions and 
impulses are directly responsible for his self-destruction.
We should not assume that MUler is here making any very profound phUosophical point 
regarding the fundamental ambiguity of human existence. There is no indication that he 
sees Siegwart’s relationship to Marianne in any such symbolic terms. Rather we must 
conclude that he is unsure in his own mind. One the one hand, he clearly recognises the 
dangers inherent in the emotional absolutism which defeats Werther and constantly 
threatens Siegwart. The moral imperative which precludes defiance of even the most 
unjust parental decrees also makes MUler suspicious of overpowering feelings as such. 
Pater Philipp warns Kronhehn against according too much and too exclusive attention to 
emotion in general and to love in particular, thereby neglecting his sacred duties towards
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God and society:
Mach er die Liebe nicht znm Hanpttriebfeder seiner Handlungen, und 
vergeB er seine übrige Bestiimnung nicht dariiber. Dies ist der 
gewbhnliche Fehler bey jungen Leuten. Sie glauben nur fur ihr Madchen 
allein geschaffen zu seyn und gegen die übrige Welt weiter keine Pflicht 
zu haben... Die Liebe soUte uns am meisten zur VervoUkommnung 
unserer selbst antreiben. Denn je mehr Vorzüge und innere 
VoUkommenheiten wir haben, desto glückücher konnen wir einst den 
geliebten Gegenstand machen. Durch Kenntisse und Wissenschaften 
bahnen wir uns den Weg zu Ehrenstellen, ansehnHchen Àmtem und 
Besoldungen, Und dann konnen wir mit gutem Gewissen einem 
Frauenzimmer unsere Hand anbieten. [p.314]
Here one is reminded of Werther’s satirical depiction of that type of love which is
compatible with good sense, good prospects, moderation in all things.
We would be wrong to assume that Miller’s largely sympathetic portrayal of love 
constitutes nothing more than a concession to the tastes of his youthful, and no doubt 
substantially female, readership. It would rather appear to be the case that Miller, with 
some important reservations, accepts the Wertherian emphasis on the love relationship. 
He is certainly far from believing with GeUert and La Roche that love is by its very 
nature inferior to friendship; or that it must be possible for every virtuous and reasonable 
person to suppress his love, retaining only an altmistic affection for its object, should 
unsurmountable obstacles be placed in the way of its realisation. Both Therese and 
Kronhehn are in every sense of the word model characters. There is no situation to 
which they do not respond with exemplary moral rectitude, sensitivity and altruism. Yet 
both fail utterly in their attempts to turn then forbidden love for one another into pure 
friendship. If they do not openly resist or defy the misplaced pride of Veit Kronhehn, 
nor do tliey accept his judgement as final. They grow sad, weak and fil, looking forward 
to the apparently certain prospect of a speedy death with something like anticipation, hi 
short, in MiUer’s novel it is no longer an essential feature of moral perfection that a
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person be capable of accepting cheerfully the necessity of replacing love by friendship.
Indeed, Theresa's father scarcely expects that his daughter should accomplish such a feat 
of resignation, despite his advice that she endeavour to do so. One might also see here 
evidence of the influence of Werther, a novel in which the greater emphasis placed on 
romantic love was a substantially important factor in obscuring moral issues which had 
hitherto been both unambiguous and paramount Beyond this merely Hterary influence, 
one can even look to the general movement towards increasing secularisation of society; 
to a shift in emphasis from the specifically religious, through the merely didactic, to a 
new state of subjectivity.
Siegwait is constantly urged by Marianne to place his trust in God, to wait patiently and 
passively for Him to resolve all their difficulties in His own good time. There can be 
little doubt that Miller would recommend this course of action to the young and 
inexperienced reader as that necessary if  he is to perform his duties to God and society.
The possibility that Kronhelm and Therese, or Siegwait and Marianne might actually 
defy the entirely unjust decrees of cruel and avaricious fathers is never raised. Their 
natural virtue is evidently such that they can have no plans which would conflict with 
the accepted moral code of the time -  a solution is sought not in defiance but in death.
As Remhard Schonsee makes clear: "Marianne beruhigt Siegwart immer wieder, daB 
Gott ihre Liebe segnen werde. Doch das Schicksal versagt das irdische Gluck. Miller 
sucht den Widerspruch in der Theodizee, die schembare Ungerechtigkeit zu überspielen, 
indem er auf Ergebung hmweist"^ *^  -  this, of course, with conspicuously little success.
Indeed, at die end of the novel this resigned stance can no longer be sustained, even as 
an. illusion. The love of the model characters had throughout appeared legitimate, 
justified, deserving of sympathy and even of admiration; yet, in the end Miller tries to i
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convince the reader that personal feelings should be sacrificed to duty. Schonsee rightly 
suggests that the reader is left with a choice, since MiUer is not in a position to resolve 
this apparent contradiction. "Je nach Ferspektive, Gefühl und Anlage kann sich der Leser 
fur Theodizee oder Tragik entscheiden, objektiv durchgefiihrt werden beide nur halb, 
weil Miller das eine mochte, ohne das andere m  gefahrden,"^’ A conventional happy 
end would detract firom the pathos of the love story, would run counter to the 
expectations raised by Goethe’s Werther. In order to win the greatest possible sympathy 
for his characters. Miller is obliged to deprive those characters of the happiness in love 
which their patient submission to the decrees of Providence ought in all justice to have 
earned for them.
Miller’s characters inhabit a world which is in many ways simpler and more easily 
negotiable than is the world of Goethe’s Werther. Great as are the obstacles they 
encounter hi the shape of selfish, calculating parents and siblings, they are threatened by 
no inner conflicts. They always know what is right and hence they are never plagued by 
self-doubt. This being so, there is no danger of their feeling envy of those more secure 
and complacent than themselves, such envy as Werther occasionally feels for Albert.
Nor do they experience the love which, like Werther’s love for Lotte, has its roots in the 
realisation that another possesses qualities one would wish to possess oneself but to 
which one can never attain. Miller’s characters experience no such complex 
relationships. They feel love and friendship for others like themselves, precisely because 
those others are so very like themselves. All those who do not feel as they do, they 
choose to ignore. The reaction to the gallant frenchified Lieutenant ("Man gab auf seine 
Reden aber wenig acht" [p.311]) is entnely characteristic.
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The enthe problem of evil Miller deals with in the most simplistic manner possible. If a
beneficent Providence is to be seen to be at work in the universe, then all human
suffering must be explained, resolved, in a sense removed. Miller attempts to do
precisely this. In this scheme of things, everyone has his appointed place in which he
must remain. Pater Philipp even believes that he has found a satisfactory explanation of
the suffering of the sick and infirm:
Man leidet so viel, wenn man andere leiden sieht. Aber lieber Gott, wer 
woUte dich droben zur Rede steUen? Und dort, dort (indem er zum 
Himmel wies) gibt’s keine Krüppel und Lahme mehr. Dies ist allés, was 
man sagen kann, und allenfaUs daB dergleichen Leute nach dem Gluck 
nicht so sehr schmachten, was sie nicht kennen, und mit kleineren Labsal 
vorhebnehmen, als wir. VieUeicht sind auch hue Erapfindungen 
schwacher. Das Beste ist, das Gute, was man hat mit Danck annehmen 
und genieBen und dem Ungliicldicheii sein Blend so viel erleichtem als 
man kann [p,265].
As Marion Beaujean argues^ ® MÜler seems resolved to avoid conflict at aU costs. No 
amount of suffering, whether experienced by Ihmself or by others can induce Siegwart to 
question the existing order of thmgs. It is evident from Siegwart’s own case that the 
virtuous do not inevitably prosper, yet he nowhere expresses doubt in the beneficence of 
Providence.
Nie gerat er emsthaft mit semer Umwelt und semem Gewissen m 
Konflikt. Er sieht zwar die Unzulanglichkeiten in der Ordnung der Welt, 
denn m exemplarischer Rehienfolge wird er mit Blend und Ungliick 
konfrontiert. Er lemt die unchristliche Verachtung Andersglaubiger 
kennen, die unmenschlichen Methoden der Werber, das ungerechte 
Betragen adelsstolzer Herren ihren Untertanen gegenüber, er leidet mit 
seinem Freund, dem ein brutaler Vater aus Standesdiinkel die Gehebte 
vorenlhalt... Aber so sehr seme Empfindsamkeit ihn auch zum MMeiden 
pradestmiert — es bleibt doch eben Mitleid, dem er sich zwar bereitwhlig 
und ganz überlaBt, das ihn auch zum liilfreichen Tun ermuntert, das ihn 
aber nie an sich selbst und an der Welt kre werden laBt... Bis zu einer 
Frage nach dem mneren Sum alien Leidens verdichtet sich das Mitgefiihl 
nie. AUe schmerzUche Erfahmng schemt nur da zu sein, um die eigene 
EmpfindungsfMhigkeit recht auszubilden; denn nm* Empfinden ist hochste 
LebensfiUle.^^
Miller’s novel, like aU those we have discussed, also contains an element of social
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criticism. He attacks the manifestly unjust hunting laws which favoured the pleasures of 
the aiistocracy at the expense of the peasants’ very livelihood. The conversation 
Siegwart overhears between a group of peasants wliile on his way to Ingolstadt is radical 
in tone: "Denk dir einmal, wenn es dem Fürsten einfalien sollte, daB das Wasser auch 
fur ihn aUein gçschaffen sey" [p. 146], speculates one of their number, while another |
exclaims "WeiB Gott, wir sind doch auch Menschen und keine Hund’. WoUt’ sehn, wo 
der Fxirst blieb, wenn wir nicht wâren, und uns schier zu Schanden arbeiteten" [p. 146].
The portrayal of Kronhelm’s father Junker Veit is a caricature of the boorish, scarcely 
literate Landadel, The reader is left in no doubt regarding the brutality of such men, who 
abuse their inherited prestige in a manner harmful to aU those beneath tliem. Yet the 
recognition that social injustice exists, that it is even widespread, is insufficient to 
prompt Siegwart — or Miller — to question the social order as such. He is in principle 
entirely in favour of the existing order of things. He would wish merely that social 
relations might be governed by greater humanity, that there might in short be "une 
condescendance bienveillante de la part des grands, et de la part des humbles un 
attachement affectueux et fidèle à leurs maîtres".^ ®
It is evident from the frequency of confessions and diary entries contained hi Miller’s 
novel that the work owes something to Pietism. This influence is discernible also in the 
various religious attitudes expressed by the model characters. Siegwart himself adheres 
to a shnple and unintellectual faith. He is quite mdifferent to theological argument, to 
dogma and doctrine, to everything other than pure feeling and the practical benevolence 
to which this feeling can give rise. As does Werther, he conceives of a God who 
represents the principle of loving and forgiving fatherhood. In the conception of the 
Deity, as in his quietistic resignation and passive tmst, he is close to the Pietists. As
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H.H. Borcherdt has pointed out, for Siegwart "Gott ist das groBe Herz, dem man sich 
naht, indem man sich in die Tiefen der Seele versenkt... Bdelmut und Geduld sind die 
Leitsteme des Lebens. Es sind die pietistischen Tugenden."^  ^The simple piety of the 
village people constitutes a model for Miller’s other exemplary characters. Thus Therese, 
despite a convent education and a lively interest in music and contemporary literature, is 
no scholar. She has no very definite aspirations to intellectual progress. She already 
knows everything she needs to know in order to perform her various duties as daughter, 
sister and housekeeper and has no thoughts of developing beyond the limits of this very 
restricted sphere. Her attitude towards Siegwart’s newly acquired learning is one of 
mockhig, if  indulgent scepticism. To her brother’s shocked insistence that she acquaint 
herself at once with the life and works of St. Francis she makes the playful retort, "Nur 
zu, ich werde doch ohn ihn seltg werden konnen" [p .ll2 ].
Therese favours a more practical Christianity, such as is preached — and practised -  by 
the vicar of Windenheim. This WeltgeistUcher corresponds to the Enlightenment’s ideal 
of the humane and practical pastor, who is concerned for the material as well as for the 
spiritual welfare of his flock and fully aware of the specific needs of a rural community. 
Like liis counterparts in the novels of La Roche and Nicolai, he conveys his sphitual 
message through the medium of familiar, usually concrete imagery drawn from the 
reahns of everyday life and agricultural labour, just as -  Pater Anton draws Siegwart’s 
attention to this fact — Christ Himself had done. Here Miller may perhaps have been 
influenced by Johann Joachim Spalding’s Von der Nützlichkeit des Fredigtamtes (1773) 
or by the so called Naturprediger^^ at the basis of whose thinking was the notion that 
the role of the pastor was similar- to that of a good schoolmaster or, in a modem context, 
even tiiat of a social worker. An exemplary clergyman, it was thought, would be able
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and willing to keep abreast of developments in contemporary life, be these intellectual, 
literary or even agricultural. While attacking die ignorance and suspicion of the intellect 
displayed by the Capuchins, Miller nonetheless praises their practical activities. Pater 
Anton is a worthy representative of his order because he is a humble and practical man 
who regards no task which will benefit others as beneath his dignity: as F.J. Schneider 
points out:^ ^
Es ist vieUeicht die hochste Ehre, die der protestandsche Theologe den 
katholischen Ordensbriidem erweisen konnte, daB er die auch bei den 
Gottmgem noch beliebte Gestalt des ehrwürdigen Alten durch den 
Kapuzinerpater Anton, den railden Menschenfreund und Menschenfiihrer 
verkoipem heB,
Miller is ready to approve those orders which are actively engaged in the life of the 
community, making a positive contribution to the welfare of their fellow-men. It is 
undoubtedly true that he looks more favourably on monasteries than on convents of nuns 
not least because women, by being obliged to enter closed orders, were deprived of the 
opportunity of doing good to others.
On the whole Miller’s portrayal of monks and nuns is less than entirely favourable. With 
some few noble exceptions such as Pater Anton and Siegwart’s teacher Pater Philipp, 
they are shown to be for the most part selfish, avaricious and calculating. Whenever they 
face the prospect of enlisting to their number some newcomer, their conduct is beyond 
reproach, their welcome as warm as any novice might desire. Such friendliness, 
however, is displayed with one very definite purpose very much in mind. It is essential 
for the financial survival of each monastery tliat it obtain the largest possible number of 
novices, and the monks are prepared to employ any amount of hypocrisy in the hope of 
securing prosperity. Significantly, when Sophie’s parents overcome their natural 
reluctance to consign their daughter to a convent, they do so on the advice of a priest
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who, for reasons which have little to do with Sophie’s welfare, persuades them that as 
dutiful Catholics they have no alternative [p.358]. Quite without justification, the monks 
are able to persuade old Siegwart that it is a matter of conscience (Gewissenssache) that 
he gives his son to God [p.l08].
In the debate as to the relative advantages and disadvantages of the monastic life. Miller 
would appear to have a good deal of sympathy for the arguments put forward by the ' J
eminently sensible Therese. Therese, having attended a convent school, has first-hand 
experience of this way of hfe, something the enthusiastic Siegwart as yet lacks. She 
rejects monasticism on the grounds that it is fundamentally life-denying and is 
unjustifiably so, since God has created tlie world and aU the good things it contains for 
the greater pleasure of his creatures. Like GeUert’s model characters, and to some extent 
also La Roche’s Sophie, Therese makes a plea for the virtuous and modest enjoyment of 
earthly pleasures, for the Diesseitsfreudigkeit which gladly accepts human love and even 
money as gifts from Heaven. Therese distances herself from Catholic — and Protestant — 
asceticism in favour of the Enlightenment’s belief in "Irdisches Vergnügen an Gott". As 
Schneider has pointed out, to the new generation of Sturm und Drang vmters, the denial 
of female sexuality involved in the maintenance of the convent system was particularly 
abhonent '^^  (compare Leisewitz, Julius von Tarent [1776]). One of the reasons for 
Miler’s critical response to monasticism is his belief that celibacy is both contrary to 
nature and positively harmful. Siegwart’s love for Maiianne is itself proof that a young 
man should not abandon the world before he has gained experience of the range of 
human emotions. Kronhehn, joining Therese in her attempts to dissuade Siegwait from 
taking the decisive step, puts this case veiy succinctly: "Glaub mir, Siegwart, mil einem 
fühlenden Herzen in der Welt zu leben, und nicht fuhlen zu dürfen, muB der groBte
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Schinerz seyn, der imsichtbar am Herzen nagt" [p. 187]. Despite approval for the 
practical work of the Capuchins and admiration for the piety of some few individual 
monks, Miller subjects the content of CatlioHcism to some quite rigorous rational 
criticism. From his perspective there could scarcely be a more damning verdict on the 
monks than his, observation that their library contains only works of legend and 
hagiography. From the same standpoint -  that of the Aufklarer -  Miller criticises the 
Catholic Church for the influence it accords to its priests. There is a danger, it is 
suggested, that those priests who aie unworthy of their calhng will make many people 
suspicious of religion as such. Miller believes with the Enlightenment that religious faith 
must be the product not of bhnd obedience to authority, but of independent and matuie 
reflection. From the same perspective he exposes the absurdity of certain practices 
designed to mould the novice to unquestioning obedience. Siegwart and his companions 
aie obliged to move piles of wood from one spot to another, only to return them 
immediately to their original position. Or again, they are presented with a dish of hot 
food, only to see this at once removed and replaced by a morsel of dry bread. Miller is 
contemptuous of the self-denial which has no purpose beyond itself. The Church as an 
institution has no part to play in Miller’s novel -  suiprisingly so, since its hero is for so 
long resolved on becoming a monk. There are plenty of references to God, but few to 
the Church as an entity. This may perhaps be explained with reference to Miller’s lack 
of any very profound acquaintance with Catholicism, or perhaps seen as evidence of 
some considerable degree of suspicion of the Catholic theory and practice of religion. 
Curiously for a clergyman, Miller is largely mdifferent to all questions of dogma. He 
presents the reader with only a very vague and partial analysis of his own theological 
position, a position which might perhaps be adequately characterised as moderately 
enlightened Protestantism, with a strong emphasis on practical ethics and some sympathy
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for the specifically aesthetic appeal of Catholicism.
Religious tolerance is a distinct, if  subsidiary, theme in Miller’s novel. The author’s own 
attitude towards Catholicism is by no means entnely dismissive. His message would 
appear to be that there is good and bad in all branches of the Christian family. His 
model characters are active hi the cause of tolerance and brotherly love. Indeed, one is 
reminded hi places of Lessing’s Nathan der Weise, as when Iherese naïvely remarks |
that her friend the Captain is worthy to be a Catholic: "Er ist doch so artig und hat ein 
recht gutes Gemüth, so gut als ein Katholik" [p. 186]. Old Siegwart is shnMaiiy tolerant 
of the Lutheran Klopstock: "Er muB doch ein braver Mann seyn, den ich einmal hn 
Himmel anzutreffen hoffe" [p.298]. The reader is presented with the ideal of the peasant 
woman who gives food to a starving Lutheran beggar, is beaten for it by her husband 
and vindicated by Pater Anton, who makes a touchingly shnple plea for religious 
tolerance:
Schemt die Hebe Sonne etwa nur hi kathoHschen Dorfem, oder nicht 
auch in den lutherischen? Haben wh allein Wasser und Brot? oder 
haben’s eure lutherischen Nachbam nicht auch? Regnet’s nur bey uns, 
wenn’8 nôthig ist, oder auch bey den Lutheranem?.,. Meynt ihi* denn,
Gott wurde Menschen erhalten, wenn er sie nicht Heb hâtte? [p. 102].
It seems curious that Siegwart experiences no apparent inner conflict when he abandons
all thought of entering a monastery and prays instead that God may grant hhn happhiess
with Marianne. He reverses his ideas on the relative merits of love and monasticism
quickly and effortlessly. Miller nowhere suggests that tliis instantaneous reversal might
be unworthy of a model hero. Siegwart’s change of heart is psychologically thorouglily
convincing, since his commitment to the monastic life would never appear to have been
very profound, based as it was on fear of the unknown world outside and on an ahnost
exclusively aesthetic appreciation of CatiioHcism. One can only assume that Miller, in
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any case awaie of the less acceptable aspects of Catholicism, must countenance 
Siegwart’s preference for life in the outside world. Siegwart is inspired with youthful 
enthusiasm for monasticism. The mere thought that he may be permitted to participate in 
this idyUic Hfe raises his spirits to fever pitch. "Seine Seele war von einem Taumel 
ergiiffen, der dm nichts horen und nichts sehen HeB, als nur das Kloster. Die ganze 
andere Welt war dun nun verhaBt und ode. Er betrachtete sie nun als den Wohnplatz 
abgeschiedener bedauemswiirdiger Seelen" [p.34]. Siegwart’s first impressions of the 
monastery are personal, emotional, subjective. He does not observe according to rational 
criteria. "Seine Seele war* jetzt weich wie Wachs; unwillktirHche Thrdnen, die das Mittel 
zwischen Wehmuth und Freude hielten [this "Wonne der Wehmut" is of course the 
sentimental emotion par excellence] glanzten ihm hn Auge" [p. 12].
Martin Greiner characterises the monastic life as portrayed in Miller’s novel as "eine Art 
Zuflucht und Endstation fur die am Leben Gescheiterten, insbesondere fur die 
unglückHch Liebenden".^ ’ This assessment is correct only to a limited extent, for 
Greiner takes no account o f the fact that Miller is far from condoning this attitude. By 
entering the monastery Siegwart could be assured of escaping danger and emotional 
tuimoil. Miller, however, makes it clear that this escapism is not to be condoned. 
Siegwait had been mistaken, if not exactly at fault, in failing to take account of the 
hnportance to be accorded to natural human feelings such as love. Miller does not 
condemn monasticism or monks per se\ merely those monks whose motivation is in 
some sense unworthy or inappropriate, who are materialists concerned more with the 
attainment of a comfortable lifestyle and with personal prestige than with devoting 
themselves wholeheartedly to the service of God, those who wish merely to escape from 
the hardships of life in the world and those who, Hke the very young Siegwart, are
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seduced by the æsthetic appeal of Catholic ritual. From the narrator’s perspective, for all 
that he is sympathetic to the plight of those whose legitimate feelings are thwarted by an 
unfeeling society, it is by no means to Siegwart’s credit that he finally does retire to a 
monastery.
Miller’s view of Catholicism and of the monastic life is not, therefore, wholly 
unambiguous. He is aware of the disadvantages and dangers of both, just as he is aware 
of the disadvantages and dangers inherent in Empfindsamkeit, His sympathies are always 
with die Empfindsamen; never with the others, their unfeeling and hence morally hrferior 
adversaries. Yet at the same time he recognises the necessity of vigilance against 
superstition, obscurantism and excessive self-indulgent emotionalism. His readers (like 
the readers of Goethe’s Werther) were no doubt too much inclined to stress the 
sentimental aspect of his work, its allegiance to Empfindsamkeit, thereby tending to 
underestimate or even ignore the element of rational didacticism it also contains.^ *^
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Aufklarung bringt Kâlte, sagt der Eine - und Gefühlsflamme zeugt Schwàrmerey, sagt 
der André, und beyde sagen wahr und falsch - wahr, wenn sie Aufklarung und Gefühl 
isolieren, Jedes vom andern unabhàngig, allein behauen, und ihren wechselseitigen 
Einfluji vernichten oder auch nur hemmen; falsch, wenn sie Aufklàrung des Geistes und 
Erfahrung des Gefühls gegenseitig verbinden, beyde in Einklang stimmen und durch 
einander erweitern, festnen, reinigen}
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It is my intention that the final chapter of this thesis should attempt to answer 
conclnsr/ely a number of questions which have arisen in the course of the preceding 
chapters. Firstly, I would wish to consider the relationship between the Enlightenment 
and the phenomenon of Sensibility as revealed in the novels I have analysed, in the hope 
of establishing the nature and the boundaries of German Empfindsamkeit. This wül 
necessitate some consideration of the varying perceptions of different kinds of emotion - 
- one must deterrdne which feelings were m general to be cultivated and which rather 
avoided, to what extent this was the case, and on what grounds. Secondly, I would Hke 
to deal with the concept and practice of Tugendempfindsamkeit as depicted in the novel: 
precisely what was understood thereby, and how did perceptions of it change and 
develop m the course of the eighteenth century? How has scholarly research interpreted 
the relationship between Empfindsamkeit and virtue, and are the views expressed by 
scholars hi need of modification? Thirdly, in accordance with the title of my thesis, the 
relationship between SensibiHty and reHgion is also worthy of consideration. Hence we 
must analyse both Pietism and the more rationaHstic school of eighteenth-century 
Christianity to detemune how this relationship has traditionally been perceived, both by 
contemporaries and by historians of ideas. The two latter areas of discussion naturally 
lead on to a further question: how have scholars explained the rise of Empfindsamkeit'} 
What factor or factors have generally been thought to produce it? Is this explanation 
adequate or can some further conclusions be drawn or, at least, suggestions made? 
Finally, it would perhaps not be out of place to put the following question: what were 
the results of Empfindsamkeit! did it produce lasting effects in Hterature and society, and 
if so, what were these?
Fhsdy, however, I would like to devote some attention to several other novels of the
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time which have been mentioned in the course of this thesis, but to which no individual 
chapter has been devoted, largely on account of necessary limitations of time and space.
These novels are deserving of more than a cursory mention since they were either 
extremely popular among the contemporary reading public or respected by subsequent ;-j
generations; in either case they shed some light on the development of the genre and 
indeed on the phenomenon of Empfindsamkeit as such.
Much read at the time were the novels of Johann Timotheus Hermes (1738-1817). For 
much of the latter part of the eighteenth century, his Sophiens Reise von Memel nach 
Sachsen (1770-72), an epistolary novel in five volumes, was a favourite of the middle 
classes. That it sank into obscurity with the advent of the Romantic novel is scarcely 
surprising. An irrepressible tendency to instruct his readers at length on every subject 
which might arise, from sexual morality to the preservation of virtue and religion, from 
the necessity of an avoidance of too much scholarship in women to tlie detriment of 
housewifely skills, going so far as to include recipes for food and medicines — all 
necessarily impede the progress of the narrative and render sententious and tedious a 
work which has the benefit of an engaging heroine and an exciting plot. Hermes’ first 
novel Geschichte der Miss Fanny Wilkes (1766) was also much read, though perhaps 
less valued on account of its avoiding a German setting, in favour of the England made 
fashionable by Richardson. The influence of Richardson is particularly marked in this 
tale of persecuted virtue, which alternates between a tone of righteous moral outrage and 
scenes (for example one set in a brothel) which seem rather designed to titillate the 
senses of the reader.
Christoph Martin Wieland (1773-1813) has maintained his popularity since the
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eighteenth centuiy. He continues to be read for entertainment, to feature in literature 
courses in universities and to be the subject of scholarly research. At first sight, 
therefore, it may appear incongruous that I have not devoted a substantial portion of this 
thesis to a consideration of his novels. There are several reasons for this deliberate 
omission. Firstly, Wieland’s novels do not deal directly with contemporary reality and 
witli die depiction of life in society. The are not Gegenwartsromane and hence are of 
less obvious relevance m an analysis which has as its declared purpose to show how 
social realities and currents of thought are revealed in the novel of Sensibility. Wieland’s 
settings are antique, or otherwise exotic. Secondly, Wieland cannot in any sense be 
called a novelist of Empfindsamkeit or even, as Nicolai is to some extent, a novelist who 
sets out to criticise or satirise the movement. Sensibility is not at the centre of his 
preoccupations. What concerns him far more is the problem of human irrationality, 
whether as stupidity and blind prejudice (as in Ms Geschichte der Abderiten) or as 
thoughtless guUibitity and the unquestioning acceptance of tradition — as in Don Sylvio 
von Rosalva (1764), where the hero accepts fairy tales as reality. These are much more 
obviously questions wMch tie at the heart of the thinking of the Enlightenment.
Wieland’s novels did not enjoy the popularity of Goethe’s Werther or Miller’s Siegwart 
quite simply because they did not accord with the expectations of the contemporary 
public. Tills public had no real taste in titeratuie for wit or irony (qualities which in any 
case might be decried as copying the tone of "decadent" aristocratic Francophile cultme), 
while tlie charm of Rococo elegance and grace might be suspected of reviving the 
tendencies of the galant novel to frivolity and even licentiousness. Members of the 
public had in short come to expect and prefer novels which would make them weep 
rather than think. Of Wieland’s novels the one wMch perhaps sheds most tight on the
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author’s attitude to Empfindsamkeit and its adherents is his Agathon. Wieland was 
disappointed by the reception of the work, as once again it appeared to be ahead of its 
time; more precisely, perhaps, Wieland had been proved too optimistic in Ms hope that a 
novel so heavily laden with historical and literary references would acMeve any real 
degree of popularity among a middle-class public insufficiently acquainted with die 
mainstream of European literature. The hero of the novel is a young man whose natural 
youthful idealism and purity of intention are exaggerated to a degree which prevents him 
from enjoying a normal sensual hfe. As Ms education or Bildung proceeds, Agathon 
comes to understand that he has been a prey to Schwarmerei or enthusiasm in a negative 
sense and that a hfe wMch answers best the claims of both happiness and virtue 
necessarily avoids all such extremes; in short, all excess of moral feelings must be 
tempered by reason.
Thus sununarised, Wieland’s view would appear to fall fairly clearly into the general 
pattern of the more sensible or restrained criticism of Empfindsamkeit. Yet, especially at 
the end of the work, it becomes apparent that Wieland is uncertain whether Agathon has 
not lost something precious in renouncing enthusiasm for the sake of a more coolly 
rational approach to life, whether after all some measure of Schwarmerei is not 
desir able, TMs Schwarmerei is a fundamental ingredient of Agathon’s character and one 
wMch is perhaps the root of many of his best qualities: the mainspring of Ms virtue, and 
not merely (as in Don Sylvio) the product of erroneous thinking. As Hildegard Emmel 
has argued:
Der Ausweglosigkeit und der schwankenden LiMenfuhrung seines 
Argumentes gegen Ende des Romans ist Wieland voll bewuBt. Er weiB, 
daB er keine logisch geordneten Gedanken entwickelt, sondem vielmehr 
das tut, was er bei seinem Helden verteidigt, er trifft Entscheidungen des 
Herzens, gegen die vemünftigerweise viel eingewandt werden konnte.^
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In this novel Wieland wishes to convince his readers that reason is perhaps not the only 
or even die most important human faculty deserving of cultivation. The contribution 
which Agathon can make to society is very largely the result of his propensity to 
Schwarmerei, since herein lies the source of his insight and his motivation to virtue.
Where Hermes deliberately set out to create novels in the tradition of Richaidson’s very 
popular example, and Wieland strove to bring to bear the influence of the wider cuirents 
of European literature, himself inspired by the greatest novel to date, Ceivantes’ Don 
Quijote, Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel (1741-1796) wrote in the whimsical tradition of 
Sterne’s Sentimental Journey and Tristram Shandy. The title of Hippel’s Lebenslaufe 
nach aufsteigender Linie (three volumes 1778-81) is deceptive, since one is led to expect 
a Bildungsroman with a possible moralistic bent. Only the first volume sustains any 
consistent attempt at a narrative; later the story-line is lost entirely in a fragmented and 
increasingly chaotic combination of digressions, in which Hippel tries to reflect the 
confusion of actual existence. It may be that Hippel, for some years mayor of 
Konigsberg, was influenced by perhaps the second most important of its citizens: 
Hamann, with his philosophy of the irrational.
Another novelist whose work has definite philosophical implications, one who indeed 
was respected by contemporaries as a philosopher as well as a writer of fiction, was 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1809), brother of the sentimental poet Johann Georg 
Jacobi who inspired the SaugMng of Nicolai’s Sebaldus Nothanker. His two novels 
Eduard Allwills Papiere (1775-6, revised edition 1792) and Woldemar (1777-91, revised 
edition 1794) are primarily concerned with the problems of Empfindsamkeit, in particular 
with the problem of the Empfindsamer, the man. who is prompted in aH he says and does
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%by feeling alone. The question which causes serious heart-searchings to the characters as 
indeed to their author can be stated in the following terms -  how far is this reliance on 
emotion compatible with the claims of virtue? is it acceptable for a man to live thus or 
win he thereby cause too much haim to those around him?
Eduard Allwills Papiere delivers a largely negative response to these questions, as 
indeed its tone throughout is negative and even bitter. While the novel clearly reflects a 
general tendency in contemporary thought, it was also the product of a deeply-felt 
personal disappointment. Jacobi was by temperament and inclination suited to 
participation in the intense friendships so beloved of the Empfindsamen. He longed to 
unburden himself completely, to pour out his innermost thoughts to some like-minded 
soul, in return for equal confidence and in die happy expectation of complete mutual 
understanding. With much literary discrimination but (it proved) some lack of wisdom, 
Jacobi selected the young Goethe, then at work on his Werther, for his partner in such a 
friendship. In the event, Goethe proved less than receptive to Jacobi’s overtures, unable 
and unwilling as he was to involve himself without reserve in such a relationship; and 
Jacobi took refuge in committing to paper in Allwill and Woldemar his feelings of 
frustration, rejection and anger. With little real skill as an artist, Jacobi proved quite 
incapable of disguising the nature and source of these feelings. The hero of the novel is 
based on Goethe as Jacobi in his disillusionment perceived him — a man whose sense of 
himself is so strong and whose reliance on his own will is so absolute that he is 
incapable of love or disinterested friendship and hence a danger to those whose feelings 
are pure. Despite the personal invective which is responsible for the artistic inadequacies 
of title book, Jacobi’s eloquence is such that tlie reader is led on to draw some general 
conclusions about the problematic nature of Sensibility and of the new cult of the Genie.
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Both Allwill and the later Woldemar were very much respected by Jacobi’s 
contemporaries, among them such discerning critics as Wieland and Lessing/ The 
reason for this success may perhaps lie in the fact that the books both contrive to shed 
some light on some of the most intensely felt issues of the time, while also (and more 
precisely) encouraging the reader to feel, rather than simply to understand; to experience 
in himself the conflict between head and heart, unselfish affection for others and the 
desire to fulfil himself, cost what it may.
It should be remembered -  and in so doing we should become aware that 
Empfindsamkeit was a fashion as well as an ideology, deliberately cultivated in many 
cases to earn for its adherents the reputation of being in the forefront of artistic and 
intellectual developments -  how far the movement was not merely a literary one, but 
manifest over the whole spectrum of the arts. Thus in painting, for example, the more 
intimate forms of the genre became fashionable, those best suited to the portrayal of 
emotional and usually domestic scenes -  such as the newly developed art of the 
silhouette, painting on porcelain and small-scale sculpture. Portraiture was particularly 
favoured, especially family portraits and the miniature. Miniatures, especially of course 
when the subject was a relative or Seelenfreund, were especially prized by the 
Empfindsamen and often worn set in jewellery. Genre paintings were also popular, as 
were idyllic or melancholy landscapes and literary or social themes likely to inspire 
emotion or famüiar to the public as already forming part of the corps of "Sentimental" 
material; especially popular was the portrayal of any scene from Goethe’s Werther.
In music, particular attention was devoted to the theory of Sensibility, in attempting to 
devise a comprehensive system of "objective" music, in which different tones could be
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deliberately employed to convey specific feeling to the hearer. Two distinct tendencies 
developed which both showed the influence of Empfindsamkeit in music; on the one 
hand towards combination of music with the spoken word, more exactly poetry and 
drama on sentimental themes in song and in opera; on the other hand towards solo 
instruments or chamber music (especially favoured being the piano, harp and flute), 
since this kind of music was thought to reflect and promote an atmosphere of intimacy 
and domestic happiness.
I would now like to return to those novels which I have discussed in detail in this thesis, 
with the intention of summarising how an analysis of these texts has contributed to 
increasing our understanding of the phenomenon of Empfindsamkeit. In my introductory 
chapter I dealt briefly with the mass of material written by contemporary commentators 
on the subject of "Sensibility", very much of it critical or even hostile rather than merely 
analytical in tone. Sometimes amusing but less useful for our purposes are those texts in 
which the author is apparently swept along by the force of his own antipathy to indulge 
in blatant exaggeration and misrepresentation. Such critics castigate Empfindsamkeit"  ^ as 
a Seelenkrankheit or more elaborately as "eine jetzt umgehende Seelenseuche, welche 
unter alien Krâften unserer gesamten korperlichen und geistigen Natur zu recht 
sichtbarer Verminderung der Summe unserer Lebensfreuden seit einigen Jahren eine 
fürchterUche Verwüstung angerichtet hat".^  Leaving such polemics aside, the consensus 
which emerges would appear to be that Sensibility is in itself desirable, but should 
always be tempered and restrained by reason. An excess of either is to be avoided in the 
pursuit of the middle ground wherein lies the path to vhtue and happiness.
In an attempt to clarify the issue, most critics are concerned to establish two very
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different categories of Empfindsamkeit and to define the boundaries of these. Thus some
distinguish wahre from falsche Empfindsamkeit, while others are concerned to dissociate
true Empfindsamkeit from Empfindelei or After empfindsamkeit, which has no rational
foundation, no basis in virtue and hence no purpose. Joachim Heinrich Campe’s view
corresponds to that of many contemporary critics:
Der Empfindsame und der Empfindler unterscheiden sich erstlich durch 
die Arth, wie jeder von ihnen zu demjenigen, was er seine 
Empfindungen nennt, veranlaBt wird. Die wirklichen Gefüle des Ersten 
sind ihm natürlich, die wirklichen oder angebHchen Gefüle des Andern 
hingegen sind erkünstelt.®
Our understanding of the ideas of the time is greatly increased when we realise that the
true Empfindsamkeit approved by even the most severe critics is equivalent to
Tugendempfindsamkeit. Particularly among the earlier novelists I have studied this
concept is of central importance. Critics and novelists are in agreement in their
approbation of only that kind of feeling which has some useful purpose. It must be
tatige Empfindsamkeit: not emotion as an end in itself, but with results in some definite
action for die benefit of others. This might take the fonn of tlie Gelassenheit
recommended by Gellert, where individual inclination is sacrificed to the greater good,
or as in the novels of La Roche and Nicolai, of work for the benefit of the poor and
needy. Indeed, Campe defines Empfindsamkeit as precisely "die Fahigkeit, sitthche
Empfindungen zu haben, und in engerer und gewohnlicherer Bedeutung eine hohe
Empfangüchkeit oder Fertigkeit in lebhaften sittHchen Empfindungen."^ And further he
wishes to establish "Was das Wort Empfindsamkeit überhaupt sagen woHe, das nicht
eine gi'oBere Fahigkeit zu jeder Artihi von Empfindungen, sondem bloos eine groBere
Fahigkeit zu solchen Empfindungen, in denen etwas Sittliches ist",® Pedagogues aie




Erinnem Sie sich, meine schônen Leseminen, daB ihre feinen imd zarten 
Empfindungen ihnen nicht bloB zum Schinucke gegeben worden, sondem 
Sie zu edlen und wohlthâtigen Handlungen anzusporen. Das Mithleiden 
zmti Beispiel 1st dem menschlichen Herzen nicht eingepflanzet worden, 
nm bloB ein schônes Gesicht mit sanften Thrânen zu zieren, oder dem 
holden Auge eine schmachtende Anmuth mitzutheilen. Nein, es ist vom 
Schôpfer bestimmt worden, die eifdgsten Bemühungen zur Hilfe der 
Nothleidenden in unserm Busen zu erregen?
Thus Tugendempfindsamkeit and tâtige Empfindsamkeit are very closely related, if not
exactly synonymous. This indeed is the only form and the only degree of
Empfindsamkeit which the earlier exponents of the movement — including Gellert, La
Roche and the critical Nicolai -  could approve. It is important here to be entirely clear
as to the meaning of "virtue", since, following Richardson who is generally cited as the
first and most paradigmatic of the novelists of Sensibility, it has sometimes been thought
that virtue in the eighteenth century means little other than the preservation of virginity
until marriage. For Gellert, La Roche and Nicolai, sympathy or pity and benevolence are
perhaps the most fundamental ingredients of Tugendempfindsamkeit, For theii* model
characters, feeling should always be a matter of helping others.
It is here that we must mark the most cmcial phase in the development of
Empfindsamkeit, Contemporary readers and scholars of the period have always
recognised a striking difference between the Sensibility espoused by the chaiacters of
Gellert and La Roche on the one hand and of Werther and Siegwart on the other. This is
surely not, as has sometimes been assumed, merely a difference of degree. It is no doubt
hue that Siegwart weeps more frequently and more copiously than does Gellert’s
Countess, but tliis is not the crucial point. What is significant is the reason for their
emotion. As Gerhard Sander and Wolfgang Doktor argue:
Die Mangel bisheriger Untersuchungen der empfindsamen Tendenz 
lassen sich weitgehend auf das Nichterkemien der Dialektik von Selbst- 
und Mitgefuhl zurückführen. Die Annahme, sowohl Empfindsamkeit als
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auch Empfindelei seien einrig als egoistische und narzissistische 
Phanomene zu verstehen, ist falsch. Mitleid, WohlwoUen und allgemeine 
Sympathie als zentrale Elemente der Empfindsamkeit belegen hire 
moralische und soziale Funktion nicht weniger deutlich als die 
stereotypen Aufforderungen ihrer Theoretiker zu einer "tatemeichen 
Empfindsamkeit. "
Equally relevant here is the consideration that Tugendempfindsamkeit is based on sanfte 
Empfindungen^K These feelings -  precisely benevolence and sympathy ™ are by their 
veiy nature pleasant, gentle and productive. They do not involve any excess of suffering 
and hence do not lead to any suffering; they do not overwhelm and thereby render 
inactive. Later Empfindsamkeit, which Goethe influenced and by which he was 
influenced and of which Mhler’s Siegwart is most representative, differs here in that it 
does not stress this need for concentration on gentle emotions alone. On the contrary, 
both Werther and Siegwart are often violent in the strength of their feelings.^  ^ In a 
sense, feeling has now emancipated itself from virtue. It is considered to be desir able 
that emotion should be cultivated for its own sake, because it preserves an awareness of 
self which might otherwise be lost in the cares of everyday existence, or even because 
its mtensity is in itself pleasurable, giving rise to a certain "joy of grief".
Neither Goethe nor Miller are concerned to cultivate only "unselfish" feelings.
"Selbstgefühl", as Sander defines it, is not so easily confined within the bounds of the
more gentle emotions, and hence gives rise to spleen, to a general emotional distress and
dissatisfaction with the world. This negative feeling clearly struck a chord with many
readers — a factor which helps to account for the immense popularity of botlr works —
but was vociferously deplored by the pedagogues and moral philosophers. Again, Campe
states this position clearly:
leider wimmelt’s in unsem verfehrerten Standen von Ungliicldichen 
dieser Arth, von Unglticklichen, die bei jedem BHck, den sie hr die Welt 
werfen, die bei jedem Schritte, den sie thun, auf Dinge stoBen, vor denen
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ilir Herz, wie bei einem elektrischen Schlage zusammenfahrt, weü sie 
mit den idealen Empfindungen streiten, zu denen sie durch empfuidsame 
Lektüre, Beispiele und Anführungen verwohnt sind, Ungîücldiche, die 
iiberall Uhrsache zum MiBvergniigen, zur Traurigkeit, zum Schmerz, 
nirgends Uhrsache zu inniglicher Freude fînden, weü sie das Ideal von 
sitdicher Volkommenheit, welches mit ihnen aufgewachsen ist, imgends, 
das Gegenteü davon an alien Orten sehn/^
The presence or absence of this emphasis on virtue is also central to an understanding of
attitudes to religion. In none of the novels I have analysed is there any evidence of
conformity with orthodox Lutheranism: dogma is invariably either ignored or, in the case
of Nicolai, explicitly rejected. Instead we find an insistence on the importance for tme
religion on the one hand of practical ethics and on the other of the emotional responses
engendered by religious belief. As might be expected, in those authors whose ideal can
be broadly defined as the cultivation of Tugendempfindsamkeit the balance tends to be in
favour of the performance of good works, whereas in the novels of Goethe and Miller,
religion is seen and experienced principally as a matter of feeling. Werther adopts a kind
of Pantheistic Christianity of his own creation to suit his own emotional needs, while
Siegwart is enthralled by the aesthetic and theatrical aspects of Catholicism, with little
thought for the inteUectual aspect.
All this might seem to suggest a close connection between Empfindsamkeit and Pietism. 
Indeed, there are some striking paraUels here. The Pietists too were very much 
concerned with charitable works and practical goodness and of course their cultivation of 
the role of the heart, of direct emotional experience of God, constitutes their hnportant 
and unique contribution to the development of religion at that lime. Such simdlarities 
between the two movements have led scholar s to define Empfindsamkeit simply as 
"secularised Pietism".
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TYet the issue is not quite so straightforward. It is always dangerous to assume that any 
historical event or intellectual movement is directly attributable to one single cause, and 
to over-emphasise the links with Empfindsamlmt is to show a somewhat limited 
understanding of Pietism. We have seen that die Empfindsamen cultivated feeling either 
because it provided a spur to the performance of good deeds for the benefit of others 
(Tugendempfindsamkeit) or because they valued emotion in itself and for its own sake. 
Of course, neither such approach had been adopted by, or could be approved by, the 
Pietists. Feeling for the Pietists had as its aim union with God in a state of rebirth of the 
soul. Essential to all their thinking was the hope of attaining communion with Christ — 
and this is nowhere stated as a goal, either explicitly or implicitly, in the writings of 
Empfindsamkeit. Nor should it be forgotten that Pietism was by its very nature 
individualistic and disparate and hence at no stage constituted a unified phenomenon. As 
the ecclesiastical historian Kantzenbach points out "den Pietismus hat es eben nicht 
gegeben.
Thus three main points about the nature and the origins of Empfindsamkeit emerge from 
this study. In the first place, while there are similarities with Pietism, we should not 
attempt to see the sources of Empfindsamkeit in Pietism (see my introductory chapter for 
a detailed analysis of the philosophical ideas which might be thought to have contributed 
towards the rise of the movement). Secondly, virtue is central to the development of 
Empfindsamkeit. In the earlier stages we can speak explicitly about 
Tugendempfindsamkeit -  diat this influence later abated in favour of the cultivation of 
feeling for its own sake marks a crucial turning point in the movement. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly, it is a cliché of scholarship and an assumption in need of 
radical revision that Aufklarung and Empfindsamkeit represent polar opposites. We
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would be quite wrong to suppose that emotion played no part in the Enlightenment 
(again for further detail on tliis point see my intioductory chapter). Moreover, both 
novelists and theorists on the subject are constantly concerned to point out that the ideal 
towards which all human beings should strive was a harmony or balance between head 
and heart.
It remains only to add a few words relating to the reception of Empfindsamkeit. The 
progress of the movement coincided with marked changes in the constitution and in the 
habits of the reading public. I have already dealt with this question in some detail and 
my conclusions might perhaps be summarised as follows. Whereas until the middle of 
the eighteenth century the middle classes read little other than works of a religious or 
explicitly moral nature, and indeed tended to pride themselves on their avoidance of the 
frivolous and "lying" novel form, the advent of the Moralische Wochenschriften and the 
development of novels which aimed to communicate a moral message encouraged much 
more widespread approval of the genre. In short, the novels of Empfindsamkeit were 
increasingly widely read as the century progressed. As the fashion became more firmly 
established, the moral message tended to become obscured by feeling for its own sake as 
in Werther and Siegwart. Perhaps because the absence of moralistic propaganda made 
these latter works more immediately appealing to a wide public, these novels enjoyed a 
degree of popularity far beyond that, for example, which Gellert would have envisaged 
for himself. Another change in the reading habits of this period which has been widely 
recognised is the movement away from the repeated pemsal of a few tieasured texts 
towards the increasing consumption of a large number of works, these perhaps being 
read only once. That this development appear ed together with the novel of 
Empfindsamkeit is perhaps no coincidence. Thus we might not be mistaken in seeing in
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the Rezeptionsgeschichte of the novel of Empfindsamkeit a forerunner of nineteenth and 
twentieth century romantic, sentimental and sensational fiction, in a word —
Trivialliteratur.
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